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Abstract
In the first chapter, I propose a theoretical framework to elucidate how capital from
unsophisticated investors (naive money) is associated with fund performance dynam-
ics. In the framework, when naive money invested in a fund exceeds the ideal amount
for the manager's skill, it leads funds to underperform persistently. In contrast, the
model predicts that, when the amount of invested naive money is smaller than the
ideal size of a fund reflecting the manager's skill, the fund performs the same as the
market on a risk-adjusted basis. Empirical results using mutual fund data support
this prediction.
In the second chapter, I develop a model that characterizes how naive money
influences the decisions of active mutual fund managers: in particular, managerial
effort, fees, marketing expenses, private benefit-seeking, and risk-taking. My model
predicts that managers who receive a surplus of naive money are inclined to reduce
their managerial effort, charge higher fees, allocate more resources towards marketing,
and pursue their private benefit by sacrificing returns to investors. In addition, it also
predicts that a manager is most likely to increase idiosyncratic risk when the amount
of invested naive money gets closer to a certain size of the fund that reflects the
manager's skill.
In the third chapter, I build a model to study how naive money affects funds'
survivorship and entry decisions. Sufficient capital provision from unsophisticated
investors elongates the survival of unskilled managers. Competition among funds
determines the industry equilibrium, and the equilibrium is affected by several key
market conditions: the aggregate investment opportunities, the aggregate capital in-
flows from unsophisticated investors, and the supply of skilled managers. When AM
markets are heterogeneous in investor sophistication, the model shows, AM markets
with more sophisticated investors (say, hedge fund markets) differentiate from those
with less sophisticated investors (say, mutual fund markets). Skilled managers gen-
erate more value in hedge fund markets, and choose to enter those markets.
Thesis Supervisor: Leonid Kogan
Title: Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Professor of Management
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Introduction
Why do active asset management (henceforth, AM) markets exist and persist at all?
This question has puzzled many financial economists, since neoclassical finance and
neoclassical economics, despite their kindred standpoints on most issues in financial
economics, give starkly different answers to the question. The answer from the con-
ventional perspective of neoclassical finance is that market efficiency prevents fund
managers from beating the market even before fees but, nonetheless, actively managed
funds exist since all the investors in those funds are simply irrational. In contrast,
traditional neoclassical economists take the view that investors are rational, and that
the active AM industry persists because active fund managers have skill. These two
different intellectual traditions offer sharply contrasting views on the rationality of
investors and the existence of active managers' skill.
Empirical findings on the performance of active mutual funds are in line with
the view of neoclassical finance. Active mutual funds underperform the market net
of fees on average (e.g., Fama and French (2010)), and persistently outperforming
funds are hard to find (e.g., Carhart (1997)). The former evidence supports a view
that (at least a significant portion of) investors in active mutual funds are irrational.
The latter evidence appears to be consistent with a view that active mutual fund
managers rarely have skill. These two high-profile empirical results seem unfavorable
to neoclassical economists' view, where investors are rational and active managers
have skill.
In order to overcome inconsistency with the empirical evidence, the seminal work
of Berk and Green (2004) refines the view of neoclassical economics. From the per-
spective of traditional neoclassical economists, active AM markets are markets for
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managers' skill, i.e., rational investors look for skilled managers and invest in those
managers' funds. On the other hand, the perspective of asset market efficiency tells
us that the average risk-adjusted excess return on active funds must be zero after
fees, as long as investors are rational and they consider active funds as one type of
asset class. Reconciling these two perspectives leads to a seemingly peculiar idea:
active managers are skilled, but in equilibrium they perform the same as the market
on a risk-adjusted basis. This idea is consistent with the non-persistence of good
performance, but fails to account for the average underperformance in active mutual
fund markets.
Since neoclassical economists' view on the active AM industry is not consistent
with (some) empirical findings on performance, can't we simply take the view of
neoclassical finance and move on? In fact, this view, where active managers do not
have skill and there are only irrational investors in active funds, has difficulties in
explaining the cross-sectional fund performance. There are many empirical studies
(e.g., Gruber (1996)) showing that some active funds perform better than others do,
and may outperform the market in the short run. The traditional view of neoclassical
finance cannot very well accommodate such empirical findings.
In this thesis, I attempt to fill this lacuna by developing a theoretical framework for
understanding the AM industry that reconciles the perspectives of neoclassical finance
and neoclassical economics. This thesis adopts the view of neoclassical finance that
there is a substantial number of irrational investors in AM markets. On the other
hand, this thesis adopts a view that skilled managers exist in AM markets, partially
taking the perspective of neoclassical economics, and this is crucially different from
that of neoclassical finance. This new framework provides a natural explanation for
the two major empirical findings in active mutual fund markets: the non-persistence
of good performance and the average underperformance.
Although Berk and Green (2004) do not take irrational investors into account, it
is worth highlighting their insight into the efficiency of AM markets. When skill is
subject to decreasing returns to scale, fierce competition among investors in capital
provision drives the performance of active funds down to that of the passive bench-
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marks. Since investors in active funds break even, the entire value from skill goes
to the managers in the form of fee profits. Therefore, from the investor rationality
perspective, the competitive nature of capital markets translates into the efficiency of
AM markets as markets for skill: rational investors correctly evaluate and compensate
managers' skill.
By introducing irrational investors, this thesis opens up the possibility of ineffi-
ciency in AM markets: overpricing of managers' skill. Decreasing returns to scale
at the fund level imply that there is a fund size that correctly prices the manager's
skill, given the fee schedule. If there is only a small amount of capital from irrational
investors (henceforth, "naive money" or "naive capital") invested in a fund, rational
investors flow into the fund until the fund reaches its correct size and, consequently,
the manager's skill is fairly priced. In contrast, if the amount of naive money invested
in a fund exceeds that size, the skill of the manager is overpriced, i.e., the manager
receives fee revenues greater than the surplus (or value, interchangeably) that she is
expected to generate. However, rational investors cannot correct for such overpricing,
since they are not able to short-sell funds.
This thesis studies how the overpricing of managers' skill shapes AM markets.
One of the most prominent implications of the new theoretical framework is the
performance dynamic of active funds. In equilibrium, overpriced funds underperform,
and the rest perform the same as the market on a risk-adjusted basis. Moreover, the
underperformance of overpriced funds persists. Such performance dynamics of active
funds, particularly that of active mutual funds, is studied in chapter 1.
Overpricing of skill distorts managers' incentives, and changes their behavior.
Smart investors induce managers to make their best efforts to create value for in-
vestors. However, the possibility of skill overpricing may lead to deviation of man-
agers' behavior from the optimal behavior from the perspective of smart investors.
Existing managers may choose to adjust their choices (intensive margin) such as fees,
effort, etc.. Managers may even want to change their entry and exit decisions (ex-
tensive margin). These industrial organization (10) aspects of the AM industry are
studied in chapter 2 and 3.
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In chapter 1, I build a model that associates naive money with fund performance
dynamics. If funds receive excessive capital from naive investors exceeding the fair
size, at which the managers' skill is fairly priced, those funds underperform persis-
tently. In contrast, when funds only receive small amounts of capital from naive
investors, those funds perform the same as the market on a risk-adjusted basis. Em-
pirical tests using mutual fund data are consistent with these predictions.
In chapter 2, I propose a model of active mutual fund managers' decisions, par-
ticularly effort, fees, idiosyncratic risk, marketing and private benefit-seeking. More
invested naive money is associated with less effort, higher fees, more marketing and
more private benefit. In addition, managers choose to take the maximum amount of
idiosyncratic risk when fee profits from naive investors are at the same magnitude of
those from smart investors.
In chapter 3, 1 develop a model to examine how naive money influences managers'
entry and exit decisions, and how those decisions shape the AM industry. In particu-
lar, when there is heterogeneity of investor sophistication across markets, AM markets
with smarter investors (say, hedge fund markets) differentiate from those with naive
investors (say, mutual fund markets). Hedge funds attract relatively skilled managers
compared to mutual funds do. In addition, hedge fund managers create more value
than they would generate by managing mutual funds.
Lastly, I would like to emphasize that the conclusions of this thesis do not rely on
a set of possibly questionable premises regarding the behavioral patterns of irrational
investors. Theoretical studies that involve irrational investors are often criticized
for being sensitive to how their behavior is modeled. Since we lack a satisfactory
understanding of investor choice in AM markets, such sensitivity is an undesirable
feature for theories. Here, the only crucial assumption in chapter 1 is that naive money
is persistent. In chapter 2, in addition to the assumption of chapter 1, I make an
assumption that unsophisticated investors are less sensitive to fees than sophisticated
investors are. In chapter 3, I make an additional assumption regarding naive money:
competition among funds deteriorates the average naive money flow that a fund can
attract. The modesty of these assumptions should assuage the concern about theories
12
involving irrational investors.
The remainder of this thesis is as follows. In the remainder of the introduction,
related studies on active AM markets, especially those on active mutual fund markets,
are briefly discussed. Chapter 1 discusses the implication of the theoretical framework
for the performance dynamics of active funds, and presents the analysis of empirical
tests on those implications. Chapter 2 theoretically investigates how naive money
affects the decisions of active mutual fund managers, particularly fees, effort, idiosyn-
cratic risk, marketing and seeking private benefit. Chapter 3 theoretically examines
how naive money influences entry and exit decisions of managers in the AM industry,
and how changes in those decisions shape the AM industry, particularly when AM
markets are heterogeneous in investor sophistication.
Related literature
Empirical studies on the average underperformance of active mutual funds go back to
Jensen (1968). More recent studies (Gruber (1996), French (2008), Fama and French
(2010)) confirm the underperformance. Carhart (1997) is a representative study that
empirically shows the non-persistence of good performance. I would like to emphasize
Fama and French (2010), especially their contribution showing that the aggregate
portfolio of actively managed US equity mutual funds is close to the market (with
99% R 2 ), but underperforms the market after fees roughly at the magnitude of the
average fee. This result makes it difficult to argue that the average underperformance
of active mutual funds is simply due to benchmark misspecification or missing risk
factors.
Many empirical studies on active mutual funds associate the characteristics of
funds with their future performance in the short run (usually the following quarter).
Gruber (1996) finds that the past risk-adjusted performance (alpha) predicts the fu-
ture performance. Similarly, the "return gap" (Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008))
and the "active share" (Cremers and Petajisto (2009)) predict performance. Cohen,
Coval and Pastor (2005) find that managers whose portfolios consist of stocks that
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other successful managers hold outperform. These studies suggest that, to a certain
extent, a group of managers have the ability to make portfolio choices that outperform
the market in the short run.
There are theoretical studies on the active AM industry based on the standard no-
tion of investor rationality. Berk and Green (2004) is the first study that theoretically
addresses the non-persistence of the performance of active mutual funds, by assuming
decreasing returns to scale at the fund level. Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) assumes
decreasing returns to scale at the industry level, and justifies the substantial size of
the active AM industry despite the average poor track record. Glode (2011) associates
the underperformance of active mutual funds with the counter-cyclical component of
their performance, which provides insurance against market downturns. One common
issue with these approaches is that it is hard to see how active funds can underperform
on a risk-adjusted basis without assuming the existence of irrational investors.
Among many empirical studies that document the irrationality of investor deci-
sions (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (2001)), a set of empirical studies that investigate the
role of brokers and/or financial advisors in the AM industry are particularly inter-
esting. Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) show that brokers do not benefit
investors in most tangible dimensions. Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) provide evi-
dence that funds sold through brokers underperform index funds. These studies show
not only that unsophisticated retail investors exist, but also that the AM industry
possesses effective means of directing those investors towards underperforming funds.
Some theoretical studies on the active AM industry are based on irrational or
"distorted" behavior of investors. A study by Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015)
proposes a trust-based model in which trust distorts the investors' perception of
riskiness, and allows the manager to charge high fees despite the underperformance.
Carlin (2009) presents a model of retail financial markets in which firms make their
price structure complex in order to attract less knowledgeable consumers. While
there are other pertinent theoretical studies (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson (2006)) that
are not explicitly written in the context of the AM industry, their implications for
the structure of that industry fall outside the scope of this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Theory and Evidence: Mutual Fund
Performance Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
Are investors in active AM markets rational or not? It is quite well documented
that active mutual funds on average underperform the market (e.g., Jensen (1968)).
Hence, aggregate investors in active mutual fund markets do not seem to make optimal
capital allocation decisions. This supports the view that a non-negligible portion of
investors, especially those in active mutual fund markets, are not fully rational. The
term 'naive money' well captures the nature of such investors, although there is an
ambiguity in the precise meaning of this term.
The rationality of investors is closely linked to the question whether active fund
managers have skills or not. If managers do not have any skill, provided that investors
pay fees, all the investors in active management markets must be 'naive'. On the other
hand, if all the investors are not able to evaluate managers' skill correctly, managers
do not have any incentive to realize their skill. Therefore, the existence of rational
investors in active AM markets implies the existence of skilled managers.
Surprisingly, when the average risk-adjusted return (alpha) is used to measure
active mutual fund managers' skill, the evidence is not favorable to the view that
managers have skills. Compared to the market, active mutual funds underperform on
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average (e.g., Jensen (1968)). Besides, the performance of active mutual funds does
not persist (e.g., Cahart (1997)), with an exception that poor performance persists.
In addition, in order to examine whether alphas of active funds come from luck or
skill, Fama and French (2010) conducted a thorough cross-sectional study of mutual
funds, and found little evidence for skill.
However, if alpha does not correctly measure active managers' skill, there may
well be skilled managers. A rational framework introduced by Berk and Green (2004)
theoretically justifies that view. According to their model, rational investors identify
active funds that exhibit skills and flow into those funds. But there is a limit to
how much a fund can scale up its skill, because of diseconomies of scale (decreasing
returns to scale). In equilibrium, a skilled active fund grows up to a size such that the
net alpha becomes zero, and, as a result, the fund performs exactly the same as the
market. In Berk and Green (2004)'s framework, active managers have skills, but the
managers do not show any superior alpha to the market. Their framework suggests
that alpha may not be a good measure for managers' skill.
Berk and Green (2004) is the model of 'smart money' as opposed to 'naive money':
all the investors are rational in active AM markets. Yet, even empirical studies that
do not involve alpha are not quite supportive of this view. Previous studies (e.g.,
Frazzini and Lamont (2008)) find that aggregate investors in mutual fund markets
lose wealth in the long run from their capital allocation decisions. Moreover, there
is more direct evidence on the irrationality of investors in studies of investors' choice
of funds within 401(k) plans (e.g., Agnew and Balduzzi (2012); Madrian and Shea
(2001)).
In this chapter, I propose a theoretical framework of AM markets, where active
managers have skill, and both smart and naive investors participate in the AM mar-
kets. This framework can be viewed as an extension of Berk and Green (2004) in a
sense that funds are subject to decreasing returns to scale. Due to diseconomies of
scale, there exists a fund size that correctly compensates the manager's skill, and I
call the size the 'fair size'. If the amount of invested naive money exceeds the fair
size, smart investors withdraw all of their capital from that fund, and the fund is
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dominated by naive money. In this case, the skill of the manager is overpriced. On
the other hand, if the amount of invested naive money is smaller than the fair size,
smart investors provide capital up to the fair size. In this case, the marginal investors
are smart investors, and the skill of the manager is fairly priced.
In the equilibrium of the model, overpriced funds underperform, and the rest
perform the same as the market on a risk-adjusted basis. Moreover, the underperfor-
mance of overpriced funds persists. When a manager's skill is overpriced, unsophisti-
cated investors subsidize the overpriced amount in the form of negative average excess
returns (alpha). Since sophisticated investors do not invest in funds with negative
alpha, only unsophisticated investors remain invested in those funds. As long as naive
capital invested in overpriced funds persists, those funds continue being overpriced
and, hence, keep underperforming. On the other hand, when a manager's skill is
fairly priced, both the sophisticated and unsophisticated investors are invested in the
fund, and those investors receive zero risk-adjusted excess returns on average. Since
funds, at best, perform the same as the market, good performance does not persist.
In addition, because some funds underperform while the others do not outperform,
on average active funds underperform.
Using mutual fund data, I test a prediction that funds dominated by naive money
underperform. The main challenge for this test is identifying those overpriced funds,
since both skill and the amount of naive money are not directly observable. In
particular, since size and skill are correlated, large funds are not necessarily dominated
by naive money. In order to overcome the challenge, I identify funds with the worst
track records but the largest capital flows as most likely to be overpriced. In contrast,
funds with the best track records but the smallest capital flows are identified as least
likely to be overpriced. Results are consistent with the prediction that overpriced
funds underperform, and fairly priced funds neither underperform nor outperform.
Additional empirical tests support the mechanism of the model as well.
In the remainder of the chapter, section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses
the implications of the model for the performance dynamics of active funds. Section
4 presents the analysis of empirical tests on those implications. Section 5 discusses
17
the limitation of the model and future directions for research, and summarizes the
conclusions.
1.2 The Model
In this model, funds charge a flat proportional fee fdt between t and t + dt. I assume
that f is constant and uniform across funds'. Figure 1 illustrates types of investors
and funds in the model:
[See figure 1]
1.2.1 Heterogeneity in skill across managers
There are two types of active managers: skilled (high or H-type) and unskilled (low
or L-type). Skilled managers generate surplus while unskilled managers cannot create
any value. A skilled manager faces decreasing returns to scale (DRS) as her assets
under management (AUM) increase. I assume an extreme form of DRS at fund level:
a skilled manager can generate a fixed amount of value (per time) regardless of her
AUM. Qualitative results of the chapter do not depend on the specific form of DRS.
A skilled manager generates
A dt + -dZ,)
over the passive benchmark between t and t + dt, where A is the average dollar value
per time that the manager creates, Zt is a standard Brownian motion, and s is signal-
to-noise ratio of the fund's excess return. Hence, a skilled manager creates surplus
on average, but there is uncertainty associated with the surplus. The uncertainty is
idiosyncratic across managers, i.e., for manager i and j
dZi, - dZj, = 0 ,Vt, s.
An unskilled manager generates no value on average, but the volatility of the
'Endogenous choice of fees is addressed in chapter 2.
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excess return over the passive benchmark is the same as that of a skilled manager.
This guarantees that the skill of managers is not immediately revealed 2 .
1.2.2 Information and learning
There is no informational asymmetry on managers' skill between investors and man-
agers, i.e., all the agents in the model share the same information about the managers'
skill. When a new manager enters an AM market, the manager and investors have
the same prior on the manager's skill. New information about the manager's skill
comes solely from the manager's performance over time. From the manager's track
record, both investors and the manager learn about her skill. Since the performance
of managers is public information, all the agents solve the same inference problem.
Therefore, all the agents share the same posterior on managers' skill at all times.
The signal-to-noise ratio s determines the speed of learning: small s implies that the
learning process is slow, and large s implies the opposite.
The probability distribution of a manager's skill follows the Bernoulli distribu-
tion, since the manager is either skilled (H-type) or unskilled (L-type). At time t,
the probability pi,t of being H-type is a sufficient statistic for the probability distribu-
tion of skill for manager (fund) i, given the prior and track record of the manager's
performance. Unless the type of manager i is known with certainty, agents cannot
directly observe the physical Brownian motion Zi,t, which governs the uncertainty of
the value created by manager i. Instead, define
dZi, ( = s(li,H -pi,t)dt + dZi, (1.1)
where 1 i,H is 1 if manager i is H-type and 0 otherwise. Zi,t is a standard Brownian
motion under the available information set at time t. Observing the track record of
2Since the model is in continuous time, the volatility of skill can be accurately measured in an
infinitesimally short period of time. If the volatility of the excess return is different between skilled
managers and unskilled managers, agents can instantaneously infer whether a manager is skilled or
not.
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the manager between t and t + dt, the Bayes' rule for pi,t is
dpi,t= spi,t(1 - pi,t)dZi, ,
using results on filtering from Liptser and Shiryayev (1977). Since d~i,t is orthogonal
to dZj,t for all j 4 i, the learning process for one manager's skill is independent of
that for another manager's skill.
1.2.3 Naive investors
Regarding fund performance dynamics, what matters is the amount of invested capital
from naive investors. Hence, I do not explicitly model capital allocation decisions of
naive investors. Rather, I model the amount of invested naive money in a reduced
form. In order to obtain the fund performance results of this chapter, I only need one
assumption: the amount 4t of invested naive money is persistent. In continuous-time
setup, this assumption is automatically guaranteed as long as there are no jumps in
it. Any process of 4t satisfying this assumption (e.g., geometric Brownian motion,
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process, etc.) results in fund performance results that follow in
the next section. Note that due to the short-sale constraint, it cannot be negative.
1.3 Theoretical Results
In this section, I first consider a case without naive investors as a benchmark, and
then consider general cases with naive investors.
1.3.1 Benchmark: no naive investors
Surplus that a manager generates is distributed to the investors, in proportion to
the amount of investment that each investor made in the fund. Therefore, all the
investors in a certain fund receive the same (gross and net) excess return to the
passive benchmark. The gross excess return on a fund between t and t + dt is given
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by
A (iHdt + !dZt)
dRX = Iqt
where 1 H is 1 if the manager of the fund is H-type and 0 otherwise, and qt is the
AUM of the fund. Investors pay a proportional fee fdt between t and t + dt. Hence,
the net excess return on a fund between t and t + dt is
A (lHdt + !dZt)dr" = dRt" - fdt = d ) fdt.
qt
Investors can diversify away idiosyncratic risks by themselves. Therefore, the stochas-
tic discount factor does not depend on idiosyncratic risks. If the net expected excess
return (net alpha) on a fund is strictly positive, sophisticated investors are strictly
better off increasing their investment in the fund slightly. As a result, the net alpha
must be non-positive in equilibrium.
On the other hand, if the net alpha is strictly negative, sophisticated investors
do not invest any dollars in the fund. Therefore, strictly negative net alpha cannot
constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, the net alpha must be zero in equilibrium.
Mathematically, this statement translates into
ptA
Et [drex] = 0 qt = q*(pt)
t qt
where q*(p) is the fair size of the fund. The skill of the fund manager is correctly
priced and compensated: between t and t + dt the manager receives fee revenues of
f qtdt = ptAdt = Et A 1Hdt + - dZ)]
which is the expected surplus generated by the manager. Therefore, when there are
no naive investors, funds perform the same as the market on a risk-adjusted basis.
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1.3.2 With naive investors
If the net alpha on a fund is strictly positive, sophisticated investors are strictly better
off increasing their investment in the fund slightly. As a result, the net alpha must be
non-positive in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the net alpha on a fund is strictly
negative, sophisticated investors are strictly better off decreasing their investment
in the fund. However, since investors cannot short-sell funds, there is no way that
sophisticated investors can benefit beyond withdrawing the entire investment from
the fund. Therefore, the net alpha on a fund must be either zero, if any sophisticated
investor is remaining in the fund, or negative, if only unsophisticated investors remain
invested in the fund.
Mathematically, these statements translate into
Et[&-ex] (ptA f) dt 0 , 41 < qt
( qt <0 , 4t-qt
where qt is the AUM of the fund at t, and 4t is the amount of naive capital invested
in the fund at t. When there are sophisticated investors invested in the fund,
qt = q* (pt) = p ,A
where q*(p) is the fair size of the fund. As long as 4t < q*(pt), i.e., naive capital
does not exceed the fair size of the fund, the net alpha of the fund is zero, and
sophisticated investors remain invested in the fund. The amount of invested capital
from sophisticated investors in the fund is q*(pt) - 4t. In this case, the skill of the
fund manager is correctly priced and compensated: between t and t + dt the manager
receives fee revenues of
fqtdt=ptAdt=E A lHdt+ 1dZt)
which is the expected surplus generated by the manager.
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If qi q*(pt), i.e., the amount of naive capital exceeds the fair size of the fund,
Et[dr] = pA-f d dt( A f) dt=
where the first inequality comes from the fact that investors cannot short-sell funds.
Hence, the net alpha on a fund is negative when the amount of naive capital goes
beyond the fair size of the fund. Since the net alpha is negative, sophisticated investors
do not invest in the fund, and only unsophisticated investors remain in the fund, i.e.,
qt = q. In this case, the skill of the fund manager is overpriced: between t and t + dt
the manager receives fee revenues of
f qtdt = f 4tdt > ptAdt = Et A (Hdt + -dZt)]
I ( s
The fund manager is compensated more than the surplus that she is expected to
generate, if there is excessive naive capital invested in the fund. Therefore, the
manager does not have an incentive to block capital from unsophisticated investors.
The following proposition summarizes the analysis.
Proposition 1.1 The A UM of a fund is
q = max ,(qI ,
i.e., the AUM is the fair size if the amount of invested naive capital is smallerf
than the fair size, and the A UM is qt if the amount of invested naive capital exceeds
the fair size.
The net expected excess return on the fund is
Et[dr V=(ptA -- f) dt0={4
\ 9 /< 0 ,4t > Pt
i. e., the fund underperforms if the amount of naive capital exceeds the fair size.
The investors are a mix of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors if the net
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alpha is zero, and only unsophisticated investors remain invested if the net alpha is
negative.
Proof. Proof provided in the above analysis. m
The mechanism of skill overpricing is graphically illustrated in figure 2:
[See figure 21
The following corollary gives some intuitions regarding flows to funds:
Corollary 1.1 Given the skill of a manager at t and t + T (p, and Pt+T), flows to
the fund between t and t + T are
(Pt+T A ~ptA4
Aqt,t+T =-qt+T -qt = maX f , qt+T} - maX { pA }f f
The flows are the largest for 4t+T = t+T and 4t < qt, and the smallest for 4t+T < qt+T
and 4t = qt, i.e., given pt and Pt+T, flows are the largest if fairly priced funds become
overpriced, and the smallest if overpriced funds become fairly priced.
Proof. If it+T =-qt+T and qt < qt, then
Aqt,t+T = Pt+T-J t A Pt+TA - pA
f f f
i.e., flows to overpriced funds that were previously fairly priced are always greater
than flows to continuously fairly priced funds, and
ptA -axptAI4
t,t+T 4t,+T -~- t i+T -maxf f
i.e., flows to overpriced funds that were previously fairly priced are always greater
than flows to continuously overpriced funds.
Similarly, if 4t+T < qt+T and qt = qt,
q1 +T = Pt+TA t Pt+TA ptAAq~t--i- f 
-t f f
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i.e., flows to fairly priced funds that were previously overpriced are always smaller
than flows to continuously fairly priced funds, and
Pt+rTA ~ Pt+TA ~+ ~ ~iAqt,t+T = - 4t < max f , qtJT -t Vqt+r
i.e., flows to fairly priced funds that were previously overpriced are always smaller
than flows to continuously overpriced funds.
Combining these two sets of results, given pt and Pt+T, flows are the largest to
overpriced funds that were previously fairly priced, and the smallest to fairly priced
funds that were previously overpriced. m
Lastly, the following corollary provides additional implications for the magnitude
of underperformance:
Corollary 1.2 When a fund is overpriced, i.e., the amount of invested naive money
exceeds the fair size of the fund, the magnitude of underperformance increases in the
amount i of naive capital, and decreases in the expected skill ptA.
Proof. When a fund is overpriced, the magnitude of underperformance is given by
ptA ptA|Et [dre"||= - f - .
qt qt
The magnitude is increasing in 4t and decreasing in ptA. m
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Empirical challenges
Empirical tests of this chapter involve active mutual funds. The model suggests that
a mutual fund underperforms when only naive capital is invested in the fund (when
the manager's skill is overpriced). However, identifying funds that are dominated by
naive money is quite a challenging task, since we cannot directly observe both the
skill of managers and the amount of naive money invested in funds. In particular,
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the size of a fund may not be a good indicator for whether the fund is overpriced or
not, because skill and size are positively correlated.
In order to overcome this challenge, I employ capital flows instead of size. This by
itself does not fully address the issue, since capital flows may be from sophisticated
investors and/or unsophisticated investors. Corollary 1.1 is helpful since, controlling
for the perceived skill, the largest capital flows can be associated with the funds
becoming overpriced. Similarly, the smallest capital flows can be associated with the
funds becoming fairly priced, controlling for changes in perceived skill. Thus, extreme
flows can be exploited in order to distinguish overpriced funds and fairly priced funds.
In addition to the main challenge of identifying funds dominated by naive money,
the performance evaluation of mutual funds is subject to several types of bias. Sur-
vivorship bias (Brown et al. (1992)) and incubation bias (Evans (2010)) are upward
biases, and are widely recognized in mutual fund studies. Reverse-survivorship bias
(Linnainmaa (2013)) is a more recent concern, and is a downward bias. Since the em-
pirical tests of this chapter examine underperformance, downward bias is a particular
concern. The concern is that, if reverse-survivorship bias contributes to the estimate
of underperformance, the true performance of (those identified as) overpriced funds
may not be significantly different from the market performance, on a risk-adjusted
basis.
In order to address the concern about reverse-survivorship bias, I take a portfolio
approach: I form portfolios and estimate the performance of those portfolios, instead
of measuring the performance of individual funds. Reverse-survivorship bias comes
from the positive correlation between idiosyncratic shocks to fund performance and
the survival time. Simplistically, suppose that the risk-adjusted excess return on fund
i is
it= ai + 6 i't ,
where cg is the mean-zero idiosyncratic component of fund returns that is orthogonal
to systematic risks that the fund bears. The conventional estimate of alpha of an
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individual fund can be written as
Tar,
t=1
where T is the survival time of fund i. The estimate of alpha is downward biased:
E[&- =E Tir =oi +E Ti <ai,
.i t=1 _Ti t=1 .
as long as the survival time T and idiosyncratic shocks t, 1 j,t are positively corre-
lated. On the other hand, by forming a portfolio of funds, the conventional estimate
of alpha of the portfolio can be written as
ITE Nt
aP - EE wi,tr e
t=1 i=1
where TE is the length of the estimation period that is exogenously set by the re-
searcher, Nt is the number of funds existing in period t, and wi,t is the portfolio
weight on fund i in period t. Suppose that all the funds in the portfolio have the
same ai =a. Then, the estimate of the portfolio alpha is
1E K- N ex[] TE Nt 'TE NtE [&p] =E E :w ,tri [ E wi'tai + E[ EEwi'tesi'
_ t=1 i=1 T t=1 i=1 [ t=1 i=1
Since wi,t is determined before ct is realized, the estimate of the portfolio alpha is
unbiased:
E1 TNt 1[ TE NtE T Z,tw,,t = 0 - E [&p] = E =wtai  a .
Therefore, by taking a portfolio approach, reverse-survivorship bias is no longer a
concern.
However, if funds in a portfolio have heterogeneous a, there is another concern.
Since low a funds are more likely to die out than high a funds, portfolio weights
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on high a funds are likely to increase in time within the estimation period for any
sensible weighting scheme. For instance, consider equal weighting. If the attrition
rate is independent of a,
E [p]= [ITE I Nt 1ei N
E[p EVE NY: a,
t=1 i=1 . i=1
where N is the number of funds that exist at the beginning of the estimation period.
In this case, the expected value of the estimated portfolio alpha is exactly the average
alpha of all the funds included in the portfolio. Yet, if the attrition rate is higher for
low a funds,
TE Nt 1 N
LE JtEt=1 i=1 ] i=1
In this case, the expected value of the estimated portfolio alpha is above the average
alpha of all the funds included in the portfolio: the estimate is upward-biased. I
refer to this upward bias as "general survivorship bias," as opposed to the narrow
interpretation of survivorship bias (Brown et al. (1992)) due to missing data of
dead funds. While the general survivorship bias is a valid concern, underperformance
cannot be overestimated due to such upward bias. Therefore, the bias is less of a
concern of this chapter.
1.4.2 Empirical tests
I employ an identification strategy that compares two groups of mutual funds: one
group of funds that are most likely to be dominated by naive money, and another
group of funds that are least likely to be dominated by naive money. If the former
group mostly consists of overpriced funds, and the latter group mostly consists of
fairly priced funds, then the model predicts that the former group underperforms,
and the latter group performs the same as the market on a risk-adjusted basis.
In the main test, I identify funds with the worst past performance, but the largest
capital flows, as most likely to be overpriced; likewise, funds with the best past
performance, but the smallest capital flows, are least likely to be overpriced. In the
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model, past performance is the most directly related to changes in the perceived
skill of funds. By controlling for past performance, from corollary 1.1, funds having
received the largest flows are likely to be overpriced, and those having received the
smallest flows are likely to be fairly priced. Among the former, funds with the worst
track records and largest flows are the most likely to be overpriced, because past
underperformance implies that a significant portion of those funds are overpriced.
Similarly, funds with the best track records and smallest flows are the least likely to
be overpriced.
In the second test, I identify funds with the smallest return gap, but the largest
capital flows, as most likely to be overpriced; likewise, funds with the largest return
gap but smallest capital flows are least likely to be overpriced. The return gap, pro-
posed by Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008), is defined by the difference between
the gross return of a fund and the hypothetical return on the most recently disclosed
portfolio of the fund. The return gap measures whether managers improve perfor-
mance by changing their holdings, and hence the return gap is an indirect measure
of manager skill. Funds are more likely to be overpriced when the skill of managers
is low, given the same amount of invested naive money. Therefore, from corollary
1.1, funds with the smallest return gap and largest flows are the most likely to be
overpriced, and funds with the largest return gap and smallest flows are the least
likely to be overpriced.
In the third test, I take a different approach that provides less direct support for
the model's mechanism than the other tests do. Instead of looking into the entire
set of active (domestic equity) funds, I consider a subset of funds that are involved
in mergers. Mutual fund mergers are quite common in the industry: 4-9% of mutual
funds exit each year, and roughly half of them are merged into other funds. However,
our understanding of why some funds choose to acquire other funds is quite limited.
In particular, the investor rationality view does not provide a good explanation.
This chapter takes the view that mergers benefit acquiring funds by transferring
naive money from target funds to acquiring funds. In order for acquiring funds to
benefit, they have to be overpriced after mergers. Under this view, from corollary 1.2,
29
the performance of acquiring funds worsens after mergers since the amount of naive
money invested in those funds increases as a consequence of mergers. In particular,
corollary 1.2 implies that the magnitude of underperformance after mergers increases
with the size of the target funds: funds that acquire larger target funds obtain more
naive capital and, hence, underperform more after mergers compared with their per-
formance before mergers. I test this prediction, which is a joint test of corollary 1.2
and the hypothesis that mergers are transfers of naive money.
1.4.3 Data and methodology
The main data source of this chapter is the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund
Database. The database provides the characteristics of mutual funds and their net
returns. As previously discussed, I take a portfolio approach by double-sorting funds
into 5 x 5 bins. In order to have sufficient numbers of funds in each bin, I focus on
data from January 1991 through December 2016'. Since the CRSP database assigns
separate identifiers for different share classes of a single fund, I construct returns of
funds by value-weighting returns of their share classes. I only include US domestic
equity funds based on the CRSP style code, and exclude index funds and ETF/ETN
in order to include active funds only.
I take further steps in order to address known biases - in particular, incubation
bias. The concern of (the narrow interpretation of) survivorship bias is mostly ad-
dressed by using the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. However,
incubation bias is still a valid concern. In order to assuage the concern, I only include
returns of a fund after the point that the fund reaches $15 million AUM (in end of
2016 dollars) for the first time. For computing the real AUM of funds, I use the GDP
implicit price deflator, which is obtained from the FRED website4 .
In the main test, I double-sort funds on their performance and flow. I use the
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor (FFC4F) model for evaluating the performance of
'In the CRSP database, after data cleaning, there are 656 domestic equity funds in January 1991,
and 2,776 domestic equity funds in December 2016. In 1990, there are less than 100 domestic equity
funds in the CRSP database.
4https://fred. stlouisfed.org
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portfolios of funds. The four factors are obtained from Kenneth French's website5 .
Funds are sorted on their past 12-month performance (FFC4F alpha), and then are
sorted on the flow in the past 12 months, which is defined by
Fl = AUMt - (1+ rt)AUMt_1
AUMt_ 1 '
where rt is the net rate of return on the fund between t - 1 and t, and the time
interval is one year (12 months). I double-sort funds at the beginning of each year,
starting from the 1st of January 1992 through the 1st of January 2016, and, hence,
annually rebalance portfolios in each bin. This procedure gives me returns of 5 x 5
mutual fund portfolios from January 1992 through December 2016. I measure the
performance of these 25 portfolios.
In the second test, I double-sort funds on their return gap and flow. In order to
compute the return gap, I obtain the holdings of mutual funds from the Thomson-
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database. In order to compute the hypothetical
return, I obtain return data of individual stocks from the CRSP US Stock Databases.
The gross return of a fund is computed by adding the expense ratio to the net return.
When linking data from the Thomson-Reuters Database to data from the CRSP
database, I employ the Mutual Fund Links (MFLINKS) database. I rebalance 5 x 5
portfolios annually based on the past year's return gap and flow, similar to the main
test. These procedures moderately reduce the number of samples compared with the
main test.
In the third test, I sort mergers by the size of target funds. Since I am interested
in the total amount of naive money acquired through mergers, I aggregate the AUM
of all the target funds if mergers involve multiple target funds at the same time.
Mergers of one share class into another share class of the same fund are not included.
Since mergers occur at different points of time, I cannot take a portfolio approach
here: I need to estimate the performance of individual funds. This brings up the
concern of reverse-survivorship bias. In order to address reverse-survivorship bias,
5http: //mba. tuck. dartmouth. edu/pages/f aculty/ken. french/data-library. html
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I only include acquiring funds that have at least 12-month returns before and after
mergers (24-month returns at minimum). Since I only consider acquiring funds that
survive for longer than 12 months after mergers, there is no reverse-survivorship bias.
However, there can be survivorship bias for after-merger performance6 . Since the bias
is upward, the magnitude of the underperformance estimate is never overestimated by
the bias. For the performance of target funds, there is a concern about selection bias,
since negative idiosyncratic shocks are likely associated with their attrition. Thus,
the performance of target funds is likely downward-biased.
1.4.4 Results
Performance-Fund flow double-sort
[See table 11
The past year's underperformance predicts this year's underperformance'. In Ap-
pendix Table 1, when funds are sorted on the past year's FFC4F, poor-performing
funds tend to underperform in the next year. However, the difference in the next year's
performance between the best-performing funds and the worst-performing funds is
only marginally significant (at the 10% level), when the difference in performance is
measured by the FFC4F alpha. In addition, when that difference is measured by the
CAPM alpha, the difference is not statistically significant.
Similarly, the past year's fund flow predicts this year's underperformance. In
Appendix Table 2, when funds are sorted on the past year's fund flow, funds that
receive large flows tend to underperform in the next year. However, the difference in
the next year's performance between the funds receiving the largest flow and those
receiving the smallest flow (or the largest outflow) is only marginally significant (at the
10% level), when the difference in performance is measured by the FFC4F alpha. Yet,
when the difference of performance is measured by the CAPM alpha, the difference
becomes quite significant (at the 1% level).
6I do not have survivorship bias for before-merger performance, because acquiring funds must
survive until the point of mergers in order to acquire target funds.
7This is a well known empirical regularity since Carhart (1997).
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When funds are double-sorted on performance and fund flow, the next year's net
performance measured by the FFC4F alpha is perceptibly aligned: the (risk-adjusted)
performance of funds that previously outperformed and received small flows is not dis-
tinguishable from zero, and funds that previously underperformed and received large
flows keep significantly underperforming. The performance difference between best-
performance-smallest-flow funds and worst-performance-largest-flow funds is about
4% annually (both for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios), and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level.
When the next year's performance is measured by the CAPM alpha, the re-
sult is qualitatively quite similar, and can be seen in Appendix Table 4. Quan-
titatively, the annual performance difference between best-performance-smallest-flow
funds and worst-performance-largest-flow funds is 4.35% for equal-weighted portfolios,
and 5.18% for value-weighted portfolios. Those differences are statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Return gap-Fund flow double-sort
[See table 21
The past year's small return gap predicts this year's underperformance. In Appendix
Table 3, when funds are sorted on the past year's return gap, funds with small return
gaps tend to underperform during the next year. In Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng
(2008), the return gap predicts the short-run outperformance (in the next quarter)
of funds. Yet, in this chapter, the return gap does not predict outperformance in the
long run (in the next year).
Small return gaps do not predict underperformance as well as other variables (un-
derperformance and large flows) do. In Appendix Table 3, only the equal-weighting
scheme combined with the FFC4F alpha as the performance measure generates a sta-
tistically significant difference in performance between funds with the largest return
gap in the past year and those with the smallest return gap.
When funds are double-sorted on return gap and fund flow, the next year's net per-
formance measured by the FFC4F alpha is aligned: the (risk-adjusted) performance
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of funds that previously had large return gaps and received small flows is not distin-
guishable from zero, and funds that previously had small return gaps and received
large flows keep significantly underperforming. The annual performance difference
between largest-return gap-smallest-flow funds and smallest-return gap-largest-flow
funds is 2.42% for equal-weighted portfolios, and 3.14% for value-weighted portfolios.
These differences are statistically significant at the 5% level.
When the next year's performance is measured by the CAPM alpha, the perfor-
mance pattern is less evident, as can be seen in Appendix Table 5. This is partly due
to the finding (in Appendix Table 3) that the return gap does not predict the next
year's CAPM alpha very well. However, the annual performance difference between
largest-return gap-smallest-flow funds and smallest-return gap-largest-flow funds is
still statistically significant at the 5% level: the difference is 2.36% for equal-weighted
portfolios, and 3.75% for value-weighted portfolios.
Performance of funds before/after mergers
[See table 3]
As predicted, the difference between the performance of acquiring funds after merg-
ers and that before mergers increases with the size of target funds. In particular, the
difference is pronounced for funds that acquire target funds the size of which is in
the biggest quintile. The after-merger performance of those acquiring funds is 1.57%
lower than the before-merger performance of the same funds, and statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level, when the FFC4F alpha is used as the performance measure.
When performance is measured by the CAPM alpha, funds that acquired the largest
target funds perform 1.64% lower after mergers than they did before mergers, and
the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
There are other interesting aspects that this chapter does not address. While
target funds significantly underperform acquiring funds before mergers, the magnitude
of underperformance tends to decrease with the size of target funds. After mergers,
the combined funds perform better than target funds, except for those which acquired
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the largest target funds. Funds that acquired the smallest target funds seem to
improve their performance after mergers, but the improvement is only statistically
significant when the performance is measured by the CAPM alpha.
1.5 Discussions and Conclusions
The main empirical challenge for the predictions of the model is that neither the
skill of managers nor the amount of invested naive money is observable. In order to
address this challenge, I employ mismatches between changes of the perceived skill of
managers, measured by the recent risk-adjusted performance of funds, and the changes
of fund size. While this identification strategy results in the empirical pattern of future
fund performance as predicted by the model, it cannot still perfectly distinguish 'naive
money' from 'smart money'. Using more micro-level data in order to identify naive
money would lead to more convincing empirical results for the predictions of the
model.
In conclusion, this chapter proposes a theoretical framework that seriously takes
into account the role of unsophisticated investors in AM markets. The model predicts
that the skill of active managers is "overpriced" once the amount of capital from
unsophisticated investors exceeds the size that fairly prices the skill. Overpriced
funds underperform the passive benchmark, while fairly priced funds perform the
same as the benchmark. The mechanism of the model delivers several predictions on
the fund performance dynamics, which are empirically tested and supported.
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Figures
Figure 1: Types of investors and types of funds
The following figure illustrates two types of investors, sophisticated (smart) investors
and unsophisticated (naive) investors, and two types of funds, active funds and passive
benchmarks. Among active funds, smart investors never choose to invest in active
funds with negative net alpha, while naive investors do invest in those with negative
net alpha.
Sophisticated Naive
Investors Investors
Passive Zero Negative
Benchmarks net alpha net alpha
(e.g., Index Funds)
Active Funds
Types of investors and types of funds
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Figure 2: Mechanism of skill overpricing
The following figure illustrates the mechanism that excessive inflows of naive money
overprice the skill of managers.
Fair Size
f
Smart
Money
Naive
Money
Naive
Money
Mechanism of skill overpricing by naive investors
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Tables
Table 1: Performance-Fund flow double sort
The tables show the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model (FFC4F) monthly alpha
for 25 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The 25 (5 x 5) portfolios are double-sorted
on the previous year's performance and the previous year's fund flow (firstly on the
performance and then the flow). The previous year's performance is measured by
FFC4F, and the previous year's fund flow is the percentage growth of the previous
year's AUM adjusting for the net return. The portfolios are rebalanced at annual
frequency on the 1st of January each year.
Table la: Equal-weighted portfolios
Flow
12 x a Low 2 3 4 High
Low -1.83** -1.67* -2.87*** -2.71*** -3.62***
2 -1.18** -1.41*** -1.05** -1.63*** -1.75***
FFC4F a 3 -1.03** -0.85* -1.14*** -1.41*** -1.36***
4 -0.78 -0.47 -0.74 -1.18** -1.23***
High 0.39 -0.21 -0.53 -0.78 -2.16**
(High a & Low flow) minus (Low a & High flow): 4.02*** (std err: 1.22)
Standard errors
Flow
12 x a Low 2 3 4 High
Low 0.81 0.91 1.03 0.86 0.86
2 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.50
FFC4F a 3 0.49 0.48 0.41 0.40 0.41
4 0.57 0.65 0.58 0.50 0.46
High 0.89 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.98
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Table 1b: Value-weighted portfolios
12 x a
FFC4F a
Low
2
3
4
High
Flow
Low 2
-2.17**
0.07
-1.54**
-1.64**
-0.27
4 High
-2.63***
-1.27*
-1.12*
-1.03*
-1.89*
-4.41***F
-2.14***
-1.61***
-1.89***
-2.97**
3
-2.68***
-0.68
-1.22**
-0.09
-0.07
-2.69***
-0.61
-1.27***
0.05
-0.20
(High a & Low flow) minus (Low a & High flow): 4.14*** (std err: 1.41)
Standard errors
12 x a
Low
2
FFC4F a 3
4
High
Flow
Low 2 3
0.94 0.74
0.90 0.58
0.63 0.56
0.76 0.72
0.88 0.86
0.77
0.52
0.46
0.60
0.87
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4 High
0.77
0.70
0.65
0.59
1.01
0.99
0.56
0.62
0.55
1.16
Table 2: Return gap-Fund flow double sort
The tables show the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model (FFC4F) monthly alpha
for 25 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The 25 (5 x 5) portfolios are double-sorted on
the previous year's return gap and the previous year's fund flow (firstly on the return
gap and then the flow). The previous year's return gap is measured as in Kacperczyk,
Sialm and Zheng (2008), and the previous year's fund flow is the percentage growth of
the previous year's AUM adjusting for the net return. The portfolios are rebalanced
at annual frequency on the 1st of January each year.
Table 2a: Equal-weighted portfolios
Return Gap
12 x a
Low
2
3
4
High
Low
-1.88***
-0.87
-1.14*
0.19
-0.24
2
-2.00**
-1.27**
-1.19*
-0.70
-0.63
Flow
3
-2.03***
-0.73
-0.64
-0.63
-0.51
4
-1.99***
-1.67***
-0.96
-1.20*
-0.44
High
-2.66***
-1.17**
-1.87***
-1.52*
(High return gap & Low flow) minus (Low return gap &
2.42**
(std err: 1.17)
Standard errors
Return Gap
12 x a
Low
2
3
4
High
Flow
Low 2 3
0.71
0.58
0.69
0.80
0.89
0.85
0.54
0.63
0.75
0.93
0.67
0.46
0.50
0.66
1.02
40
High flow):
4 High
0.73
0.46
0.65
0.67
0.89
0.76
0.48
0.49
0.52
0.81
Table 2b: Value-weighted portfolios
Return Gap
12 x a
Low
2
3
4
High
Low 2
-2.23**
-0.18
-1.42*
-0.62
0.56
-1.34
-2.62***
-0.70
-0.49
-0.23
Flow
3
-1.71*
0.02
-1.27**
-0.03
0.22
(High return gap & Low flow) minus (Low return gap & High flow):
3.14**
(std err: 1.49)
Standard errors
12 x a | Low 2
Return Gap
Low
2
3
4
High
1.10
0.67
0.73
0.78
1.01
1.01
0.72
0.77
0.88
1.04
Flow
3
0.96
0.69
0.51
0.76
1.05
4 High
1.00
0.60
0.74
0.67
0.92
1.14
0.72
0.66
0.62
1.03
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High
-2.58**
-1.46**
-0.67
-2.38***
-2.99***
4
-1.33
-0.46
-0.54
-1.88***
-1.59*
Table 3: Performance of funds before/after mergers
The tables show the performance of target and acquiring funds before mergers, and
the performance of acquiring funds after mergers, for mergers in period 1991-2016.
When a single fund acquires multiple target funds at the same time, those target
funds are aggregated, and their returns are value-weighted. The significance level is
based on the p-value of the null that the difference in the average performance before
mergers and that after mergers is zero.
Table 3a: FFC4F alpha (annualized)
FFC4F a
Target Before After Before-Target After-Target After-Before
Total 1 -2.95 -0.86 -1.02 2.09*** 1.93*** -0.16
-3.47
-2.83
-3.42
-3.17
-1.86
-1.32
-0.45
-0.89
-1.30
-0.35
-0.41
-0.84
-1.32
-0.63
-1.92
2.15***
2.38***
2.53***
1.88***
1.51**
3.06***
1.99***
2.10***
2.55***
-0.06
p-values
FFC4F a
Before-Target After-Target After-Before
Total 0.00 0.00 0.55
Small
2
3
4
Big
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.93
0.13
0.52
0.48
0.26
0.01
42
Small
2
3
4
Big
0.91
-0.39
-0.43
0.67
-1.57***
Table 3b: CAPM alpha (annualized)
CAPM a
T. at B fr Aft B fr Tp t+ A ftT r +
Total -2.96 -0.29 -0.15 2.66*** 2.80*** 0.14
Small
2
3
4
Big
-3.91
-2.68
-2.34
-3.60
-2.25
-1.50
-0.20
0.56
-0.26
-0.07
1.82
-0.42
-0.10
-0.35
-1.70
2.41***
2.48***
2.90***
3.35***
2.18***
5.73***
2.26***
2.23***
3.26***
0.55
3.32***
-0.22
-0.67
-0.09
-1.64**
p-values
Before-Target
FFC4F a
After-Target After-Before
Total 0.00 0.00 0.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.42
0.00
0.74
0.33
0.90
0.02
43
Small
2
3
4
Big
Aft B f
Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1: Performance single sort
The tables show the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model (FFC4F) monthly alpha
and the CAPM monthly alpha for 10 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The 10 portfolios
are sorted on the previous year's performance. The previous year's performance is
measured by FFC4F. The portfolios are rebalanced at annual frequency on the 1st of
January each year. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Appendix Table la: FFC4F alpha (annualized)
FFC4F a
Equal-weighted I Value-weighted
Low -2.90** (1.15) -3.75*** (0.97)
2 -2.21*** (0.56) -2.62*** (0.56)
3 -1.47*** (0.46) -0.72 (0.55)
4 -1.34*** (0.44) -1.08** (0.47)
5 -1.42*** (0.38) -1.24*** (0.48)
6 -0.90** (0.40) -1.29*** (0.43)
7 -1.13** (0.47) -0.80** (0.38)
8 -0.64 (0.51) -0.47 (0.54)
9 -0.85 (0.60) -1.00* (0.59)
High -0.47 (0.99) -1.31 (1.04)
High-Low 2.43* (1.43) 2.44* (1.38)
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Appendix Table 1b: CAPM alpha (annualized)
CAPM a
Equal-weighted I Value-weighted
Low -2.62** (1.33) -3.68*** (1.07)
2 -1.73** (0.71) -2.52*** (0.62)
3 -1.10** (0.56) -0.66 (0.55)
4 -0.98* (0.50) -0.96** (0.46)
5 -0.99** (0.46) -1.04** (0.49)
6 -0.46 (0.46) -0.98** (0.48)
7 -0.87* (0.52) -0.63 (0.39)
8 -0.35 (0.58) -0.62 (0.56)
9 -0.81 (0.73) -1.13 (0.74)
High -0.35 (1.41) -1.70 (1.50)
High-Low 2.27 (1.48) 1.98 (1.50)
Appendix Table 2: Fund flow single sort
The tables show the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model (FFC4F) monthly alpha
and the CAPM monthly alpha for 10 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The 10 portfolios
are sorted on the previous year's fund flow. The previous year's fund flow is measured
by the percentage growth of the previous year's AUM adjusting for the net return.
The portfolios are rebalanced at annual frequency on the 1st of January each year.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Appendix Table 2a: FFC4F alpha (annualized)
FFC4F a
Equal-weighted Value-weighted
Low -0.85 (0.55) -1.28* (0.70)
2 -1.12* (0.61) -0.83 (0.68)
3 -1.23** (0.60) -1.34** (0.62)
4 -1.09** (0.53) -0.78 (0.50)
5 -1.13** (0.52) -0.68 (0.45)
6 -1.38*** (0.50) -0.72* (0.41)
7 -1.24** (0.49) -0.66 (0.50)
8 -1.56*** (0.51) -1.57*** (0.57)
9 -1.55*** (0.51) -1.68*** (0.53)
High -2.09*** (0.59) -2.94*** (0.78)
High-Low -1.24* (0.65) -1.66* (0.87)
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Table 2b: CAPM alpha (annualized)
CAPM a
Equal-weighted Value-weighted
Low 0.05 (0.82) -0.22 (1.02)
2 -0.28 (0.73) 0.24 (0.76)
3 -0.63 (0.68) -0.57 (0.64)
4 -0.81 (0.59) -0.36 (0.51)
5 -1.06* (0.59) -0.72 (0.45)
6 -1.29** (0.56) -0.95** (0.40)
7 -1.18* (0.61) -1.17** (0.53)
8 -1.46** (0.68) -1.96*** (0.67)
9 -1.43** (0.73) -1.88*** (0.67)
High -2.02** (0.90) -3.15*** (1.14)
High-Low -2.07*** (0.69) -2.93*** (0.94)
Appendix Table 3: Return gap single sort
The tables show the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model (FFC4F) monthly alpha
and the CAPM monthly alpha for 10 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The 10 portfolios
are sorted on the previous year's return gap. The previous year's return gap is
measured as in Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) The portfolios are rebalanced at
annual frequency on the 1st of January each year. The standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
Appendix Table 3a: FFC4F alpha (annualized)
FFC4F a
Equal-weighted Value-weighted
Low -2.17*** (0.75) -1.78* (1.01)
2 -2.03*** (0.56) -2.21** (0.88)
3 -1.32*** (0.43) -1.47** (0.63)
4 -1.03*** (0.39) -0.25 (0.53)
5 -0.94* (0.51) -0.88* (0.52)
6 -1.10** (0.49) -1.01* (0.53)
7 -0.96* (0.54) -0.77 (0.48)
8 -0.75 (0.67) -2.06*** (0.64)
9 -0.69 (0.82) -1.16 (0.72)
High -0.65 (0.84) -1.32 (0.85)
High-Low 1.52** (0.74) 0.47 (0.88)
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Table 3b: CAPM alpha (annualized)
I CAPM a
Equal-weighted Value-weighted
Low -1.82 (1.20) -1.99 (1.40)
2 -1.28 (0.92) -2.22* (1.27)
3 -0.84 (0.64) -1.44* (0.77)
4 -0.49 (0.57) -0.33 (0.60)
5 -0.48 (0.57) -1.06* (0.55)
6 -0.78 (0.57) -1.05** (0.54)
7 -0.64 (0.61) -0.95* (0.49)
8 -0.54 (0.74) -2.52*** (0.69)
9 -0.67 (0.94) -1.22 (0.97)
High -0.66 (1.37) -1.50 (1.45)
High-Low 1 1.16 (0.75) 0.49 (0.88)
Appendix Table 4: Performance-Fund flow double sort - CAPM
a
The table shows the CAPM monthly alpha for 25 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The
25 (5 x 5) portfolios are double-sorted on the previous year's performance and the
previous year's fund flow (firstly on the performance and then the flow). The previous
year's performance is measured by FFC4F, and the previous year's fund flow is the
percentage growth of the previous year's AUM adjusting for the net return. The
portfolios are rebalanced at annual frequency on the 1st of January each year.
Appendix Table 4a: Equal-weighted portfolios
Flow
12 x a
Low
2
FFC4F a 3
4
High
Low 2 3
-0.70
-0.32
-0.16
0.02
0.85
-0.92
-0.93*
-0.35
-0.06
-0.01
4
-2.97**
-0.89
-0.90**
-0.71
-0.90
High
-2.66***
-1.52***
-1.07**
-1.09*
-0.80
-3.50***
-1.53**
-1.09**
-1.12*
-2.00
(High a & Low flow) minus (Low a & High flow): 4.35*** (std err: 1.19)
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Standard errors
12 x a
Low
2
FFC4F a 3
4
High
Flow
Low 2 3
1.08
0.67
0.60
0.67
1.08
1.02
0.54
0.52
0.70
0.90
1.18
0.55
0.43
0.63
1.00
Appendix Table 4b: Value-weighted portfolios
12 x a Low
Low
2
FFC4F a 3
4
High
-1.08
0.91
-0.48
-0.58
0.46
Flow
2 3
-2.09***
0.01
-0.40
0.23
-0.12
4
-2.49***
-0.53
-0.85*
-0.41
-0.90
High
-2.96***
-1.52**
-1.63**
-1.25**
-2.06
-4.73***
-2.53***
-1.98***
-1.94***
-3.07*
(High a & Low flow) minus (Low a & High flow): 5.18*** (std err: 1.40)
Standard errors
12 x a I Low
Low
2
FFC4F a 3
4
High
1.22
0.94
0.72
0.92
1.08
2
0.79
0.62
0.59
0.81
0.84
Flow
3
0.81
0.51
0.47
0.65
0.99
4 High
0.84
0.69
0.66
0.61
1.38
1.10
0.65
0.74
0.66
1.69
48
4 High
0.99
0.58
0.49
0.56
1.16
1.03
0.62
0.53
0.60
1.49
Appendix Table 5: Return gap-Fund flow double sort - CAPM
a
The table shows the CAPM monthly alpha for 25 portfolios from 1992 to 2016. The 25
(5 x 5) portfolios are double-sorted on the previous year's return gap and the previous
year's fund flow (firstly on the return gap and then the flow). The previous year's
return gap is measured as in Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008), and the previous
year's fund flow is the percentage growth of the previous year's AUM adjusting for the
net return. The portfolios are rebalanced at annual frequency on the 1st of January
each year.
Appendix Table 5a: Equal-weighted portfolios
Flow
12 x a Low
Return Gap
Low
2
3
4
High
-1.06
0.36
-0.18
0.95
0.08
2 3 4
-1.07
-0.70
-0.68
-0.28
-0.61
-1.81*
-0.71
-0.42
-0.57
-0.76
High
-1.58
-1.32**
-0.98
-1.28*
-0.72
-2.28*
-0.88
-0.89
-1.68***
-1.30
(High return gap & Low flow) minus (Low
2.36**
(std err: 1.16)
Standard errors
return gap & High flow):
Return Gap
12 x a
Low
2
3
4
High
Flow
Low 2 3
1.14
0.87
0.79
0.87
1.12
1.15
0.64
0.68
0.81
1.08
0.98 1.15
0.56 0.58
0.54 0.69
0.69 0.73
1.16 1.24
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4 High
1.18
0.71
0.60
0.65
1.34
Appendix Table 5b: Value-weighted portfolios
12 x a I Low
Return Gap
Low
2
3
4
High
-0.96
1.22
-0.74
0.14
0.98
2
-0.57
-2.06**
-0.27
-0.20
-0.20
Flow
3
-1.97
-0.61
-1.45***
-0.11
-0.37
4
-1.67
-0.67
-0.99
-2.58***
-2.16
(High return gap &
Return Gap
Low flow) minus (Low return gap
3.75**
(std err: 1.47)
Standard errors
12 x a
Low
2
3
4
High
Flow
Low 2 3
1.59
0.95
0.79
0.90
1.35
1.25
0.80
0.77
0.88
1.15
1.26
0.75
0.55
0.74
1.18
& High flow):
4 High
1.41
0.72
0.75
0.71
1.43
1.49
0.88
0.71
0.70
1.52
50
High
-2.76*
-1.66*
-0.92
-2.83***
-2.89*
Chapter 2
IO of Active Mutual Funds
2.1 Introduction
This chapter theoretically addresses the decisions of active mutual fund managers
under an assumption that a significant portion of investors in mutual fund markets
are unsophisticated. In particular, this chapter focuses on the managerial choice of
fees, effort, idiosyncratic risk, marketing and the pursuit of private benefit. The key
variables that govern the choices of managers are the skill of managers and the amount
of invested naive money. To be more precise, the relative magnitude of fee profits
that managers can earn from naive investors compared to that from smart investors
is the most crucial variable that determines the managerial choices.
If funds attract more naive money, managers raise fees and reduce their effort to
create value for investors. Since naive investors are less sensitive to fees than smart
investors are, increasing fees leads to higher fee profits from naive investors and lower
fee profits from smart investors. If the amount of invested naive money increases,
marginal fee profits from naive investors increase while those from smart investors
decrease. As a result, managers would want to charge higher fees when more naive
money flows into their funds. Because managerial effort is compensated by smart
investors, as marginal fee profits from smart investors decrease, managers choose to
reduce their effort.
Managers choose to bear the maximum idiosyncratic risk when the magnitude of
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expected profits from naive investors is the same as that from smart investors because
fee profits follow the same payoff structure as a call option. When there is only a
small amount of invested naive money, fee profits are determined by smart investors,
and the magnitude is fixed at a certain level that reflects managers' skill. Hence, fee
profits from smart investors can be thought of as the strike price. In contrast, when
excessive naive money flows into funds, fee profits are determined by naive investors,
and are proportional to the amount of invested naive money. Since the call option
vega, which is the sensitivity of option price to changes in the volatility of the stock,
is maximized when stock price is the same as the strike price, the marginal benefit
of increasing idiosyncratic risk is maximized when the magnitude of expected profits
from naive investors is the same as that from smart investors.
As funds receive more naive money, managers choose more marketing and pursue
more private benefit. Since the marginal benefit of marketing is proportional to the
probability that naive money dominates funds, the marginal benefit increases as more
naive money flows into funds. Hence, managers would want to increase the level
of marketing if they receive more capital from naive investors. Similarly, because
the marginal cost of private benefit obtained by sacrificing returns to investors is
proportional to the probability that smart investors are the marginal investors, the
marginal cost decreases as funds attract more naive money. As a result, managers
choose to pursue more private benefit as more naive money is invested in their funds.
In the remainder of the chapter, section 2 presents the baseline model. Section
3 discusses the equilibrium of the model and its implication for managerial decisions
of fees and effort. Section 4 discusses the extensions of the baseline model with
the endogenous choice of i) idiosyncratic risk, ii) marketing, and iii) private benefit.
Section 5 discusses the limitations of the model and future directions for research,
and summarizes the conclusions.
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2.2 Baseline Model
Managers have skill, and the skill is captured by a parameter a. Managers choose an
effort level et in each period. The AUM of funds in time t is denoted by qt. Managers
generate value subject to decreasing returns to scale.
In time t, a manager generates
At = (aet )-aqt (2.1)
dollar amount of value in expectation, where 0 < a < 1. As a result, the gross excess
return on the fund in time t is
Rex' = At+ Ct ,Et ~ N(0, U2),
where ct is an idiosyncratic component of the gross excess return, and the distribution
of et follows a normal distribution with zero mean and the standard deviation of o.
The fund charges fees ft that is proportional to the AUM of the fund in time t.
Fees ft in time t is determined in the previous period t - 1. Therefore, the net excess
return on the fund in time t is
rex = - ft + Cet.t qt
In each period, the fund bears costs that are proportional to the AUM, and costs
of fixed amount:
Oqt + F.
In addition, the fund also bears an effort cost ,e(et) that is convex in the level of
a managerial effort et. For the sake of analytic convenience, I choose the following
quadratic form of Pe(et):
XVe ( -t) 2a(et)2
2
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As a result, the net profit to the fund is given by
(ft - #)qt - F - Ie(et) ,
and the objective of the manager in time t is to maximize the discounted sum of
expected profits:
00
max I StEt [(fs - #)qs - F - Te(es)] ,{fs+1,es} =t,t+1,... S=t(1 r )
where rf is the constant risk-free rate. Fee profits are discounted at the risk-free rate
since all the shocks in the model are idiosyncratic. Funds cannot choose to exit.
There are two types of investors: smart investors (sophisticated investors) and
naive investors (unsophisticated investors). Smart investors invest in a fund as long
as the net expected excess return (net alpha) of the fund is greater than or equal to
zero1 . In contrast, naive investors invest in a fund partly based on the fund's recent
performance and partly based on unmodeled reasons. In addition, the amount of
capital invested by naive investors (naive money) responds to fees: higher fees lead
to lower amounts of invested naive money in the fund. The amount of invested naive
money in a fund is modeled as
q = max{, qt"} , = g(ft) g +_Y(ft)Ut_1+_e(ft)- , ut - N(O, 1) , (2.2)
where g(f) is a decreasing function in f, and captures the responsiveness of naive
investors to fees. A' captures the expected value of the invested naive money in time
t measured in time t - 1, and is modeled as
where p captures how sticky naive money is.
'One crucial assumption is that smart investors can diversify idiosyncratic risk by themselves.
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I make the following assumption:
(ft - 0)-yN(ft) - u = const , (ft - 0)'yE(ft) = c = const. (2.3)
This assumption assures that a fee choice ft only affects the mean of the distribution
of (ft - #)qt", which determines fee profits from naive investors. Therefore, under the
assumption (2.3), changes in fee choices ft do not affect the volatility of fee profits
from naive investors. In an extended version of the model, the optimal choice of
volatility (of fee profits from naive investors) will be examined2
For the sake of analytic convenience, I choose the following form of g(ft):
g(ft) 1 - ft
K
I make an additional assumption on the value of K:
2
K > - - 1) 0. (2.4)
Since K is the inverse sensitivity of naive money to fees, large K means that naive
investors are insensitive to fees. Assumption (2.4) implies that, roughly speaking,
naive investors are less sensitive to fees than smart investors are.
2.3 Equilibrium
As benchmark cases, I consider two cases: one where there are no naive investors and
the other where there are no smart investors. Then, I solve for the equilibrium of
general cases.
2 This analysis provides the marginal benefit of increasing the volatility of fee profits from naive
investors. Suppose that changes of fees affect both the mean and the volatility of fee profits from
naive investors. Adding the marginal benefit of increasing the volatility to the marginal benefit of
increasing the mean, one can easily figure out the marginal benefit of increasing fees in this case.
The marginal cost stays the same for the same fees.
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2.3.1 First benchmark - no naive investors
Investors' capital allocations
Smart investors competitively provide capital to a fund as long as the net alpha of
the fund is positive. In contrast, smart investors do not provide capital to the fund if
the net alpha is negative. Therefore, in equilibrium, the net alpha of the fund is zero
i.e.,
At At
Et [r] = -ft = 0 4=> qt - =q
qt ft
where q* is the fair size of the fund. From (2.1) the AUM of the fund reads
qt = (aet)laqi <--> qt = aet(ft)-ift
Managers' decisions
Fee profits in time t read
(ft - #)qt - F - e- F - -a(et)22
Since the effort choice et in time t only affects fee profits in time t, given ft, the
optimal choice of et solves the following first-order condition:
a(ft - 0)(ft)-ct - aet = 0 +-> et = (ft - 0)(ft)- .
As a result, fee profits in time t can be written as
1 1 2
2a [(ft - #)(ft)~- ] - F .
The proportional fee ft is determined in the previous period t - 1. The optimal fee
choice maximizes expected fee profits in time t:
1 1 2
ft = arg max a [(ft - 0)(ft)-1- - F,
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which leads to the following first-order condition:
[(ft - )(ft)-1a] (f)1-C (ft - (ft - ) = .dft1-a
Therefore, the optimal choice of ft is
1ft= - f 1 Sf > #
a
2.3.2 Second benchmark - no smart investors
Since there are no sophisticated investors, investors' capital allocation decision is
given by
qt = qu = max {0, 4"} ,
where q' is given by (2.2). Fee profits in time t read
(ft - #)qu - F - Ia(et )2
The optimal choice of et is zero, since fee revenues are unaffected by the choice of et
but there are costs associated with positive et. Define
Qt"(ft ; At') _ (ft - #)g(ft)i4 + .ut-i + i'Ct- 1 .
Note that the distribution of Qu"(ft) in time t - 1 is a normal distribution with the
mean of
and the variance of
'.I 2 or 2f Y U*
Fee profits now read
(ft - #)q' - F = max{0, Q"(ft)} - F.
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The optimal choice of fee ft maximizes the expected profits in time t:
f, = arg max Et- 1 [max {0, Q"(ft)} - F]ft
Since only the mean of QY(ft) is affected by changes in ft, the optimal choice of
ft maximizes the mean of Q"(ft). The optimal ft satisfies the following first-order
condition:
d + r, _ #+(ft - ) 1 -- Jt = -(+#- 2ft) = 0 - ft 2 f
dft [ K 2
Therefore, when there are no smart investors, the optimal choices are et = 0 and
ft = 0$'. Note that assumption (2.4) guarantees that fu is greater than f8 .
2.3.3 General cases
Investors' capital allocations
Smart investors competitively provide capital to a fund as long as the net alpha of the
fund is positive. Therefore, in equilibrium, the net alpha of the fund is nonpositive ,
i.e.,
Atf At qEt [rt"| = -f ; -> qt ;> -- tq,qt ft
where the the net alpha of the fund is zero at qt = q* (fair size). The AUM of a fund
is the sum of capital invested by smart investors (smart money) and capital invested
by naive investors (naive money):
qt = q' + q'
If the amount of invested naive money in a fund is smaller than q*, smart money
flows into the fund until the fund reaches the size q*, at which the net alpha of the
fund becomes zero:
q=q* ,q'=q*-q".
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If the amount of invested naive money is greater than qt*, smart investors withdraw
their capital invested in the fund since the net alpha of the fund is negative. However,
because investors cannot short-sell funds, the amount of capital qt invested by smart
investors cannot be negative. As a result, smart investors choose to invest zero amount
of capital in those funds in which the amount of invested naive money is greater than
q*:
qt = q' ,' q= 0.q>=O
Therefore, the equilibrium AUM of a fund is either the fair size q*, if the amount of
invested naive money is smaller than the fair size, or the amount qu of invested naive
money, if the amount qu is greater than the fair size:
qt = max {q*, q}= max ,t qu .(2.5)
Combining (2.1) and (2.5) leads to
q(=max { (ae) qq
When qu is smaller than the fair size
qt, = t qtq -4 g aet (ft )-6
As a result, qt can be rewritten as
qt = max aet(ft)- qt}
Managers' decisions
Fee profits in time t read
(ft - #)qt - F - 'I'g(et) = max I(ft - #)aet(ft) ,(ft - #)q - F a(et)1 2
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Since the effort choice et in time t only affects fee profits in time t, given ft, the
optimal choice of et solves
et = arg max {(ft - #)aet(ft)-a , (ft - #)q} - F - a(et)2
Suppose that the amount q' of invested naive money is smaller than the fair size of the
fund. In this case, the optimal choice of et solves the following first-order condition:
1 1
a(ft - 0)(ft)-1 - aet = 0 4--> et = (ft - #)(ft)-1- . (2.6)
In contrast, suppose that the amount qu of invested naive money is larger than the
fair size of the fund. In this case, the marginal cost of effort et is always negative for
et > 0:
[(ft - 0),qu - F - -a(et)2= -act < 0 .det 2
As a result, in this case, the optimal choice is et = 0.
In the former case where q' is smaller than the fair size, fee profits net of costs in
time t can be written as
ja [ft - #)(ft)-Q] - F.
In the latter case where qu is greater than the fair size, fee profits net of costs in time
t read
(ft - #)qt - F.
Therefore, the threshold q' above which naive money dominates is determined by
(ft - #)qu - F = a [(ft - )(ft)- - F - ~ = 2a(ft - k)(ft)~ .l
To summarize, if the amount of invested naive money is smaller than the threshold q,
the manager chooses et as determined in (2.6). In contrast, if the amount of invested
naive money is larger than qu, the manager chooses et = 0. As a result, fee profits in
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time t can be written as
max {a 2(ft - #)(ft) i
Define
Q (ft) a (ft (2.7)
where the value of Q8(ft) is maximized at ft = fS = q. Then, fee profits in time t
can be rewritten as
max {Q8 (ft), (ft - #) max {0, q~,"}} - F = max {Q5 (ft), Q'(ft)} - F ,
where the equality comes from the fact QS(ft) > 0. The optimal choice of ft maximizes
the expected fee profits in time t:
ft = arg max Et_ 1 [max {Qs(ft), Qu (ft)}] - F
ft
The following proposition characterizes the range of the optimal f t :
Proposition 2.1 The optimal ft is between fs and fu, i.e., fs < ft < fu.
Proof. The optimal ft solves the following first-order condition:
d Et[max{Qs(ft ), Qu"(ft )}] = 0dft - (2.8)
Define
Q (ft; p) = (ft -_) ( - ft) q 2 = 2+ 2 2
where ItQ(ft) is the mean and ou is the variance of Q"(ft), respectively. Note that
PQ(ft) is maximized at ft = fu = > fs. Then, the FOC (2.8) can be written as
d
dft II Q (ft)-00 dxcOQ + If (x - ipt(ft) dx 0O-Q ) OQ
where yo(x) is the probability distribution function (PDF) of the standard normal
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12
- #) (ft)-1 ,t
QS ft) X - PtQ( f )
U-Q
distribution function. Substituting y = -t(ft) leads to
cYQ
/00 
aQt t 
t (Qs(ft) - pQ(f,) ) (y) dy
dy] =0,
which reads
dQd P tQ (ft)dft + 
Qs(ft) -( q(ft)
+<9Q - Ptut)) = 0,
where <b(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal
distribution function. The left-hand side can be written as
(1 - 04M) d (ft)
which is the marginal fee profits to the manager as ft increases, and a(ft) is defined
by
aMft)dt - <ut
UQ
where 0 < a(ft) < 1. pu?(ft) and QS(ft) are both smooth functions and have only
one maximum, respectively. Since p?(ft) is maximized at ft = f' and QS(ft) is
maximized at f' < f',
d
dft
> 0
= 0
< 0
if ft < fU
if ft = fu
if ft > fu
dQS(ft)
dft
> 0
= 0
< 0
if ft
if ft
if ft
< fS
= fS
> fs
Therefore at ft = fs,
(1 - aeUS) d t( )
d
+ ZfUS) QQSfS) > 0.dft
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+UQ I-Q-0(f _t) _(ft ) w (Y)
C 
aQ
d Qs (f)
dft
+ OZ(ft) Qd ,S(t
d PQ( ft)+
As a result, the manager can increase fee profits to the fund by increasing fees at
ft = fS, which implies the optimal ft is strictly greater than fs. On the other hand,
at ft = fu,
dd(1 - a(fM)) d Q(fU) + a<UU)-Q5(f") < 0.dft dft
As a result, the manager can increase fee profits to the fund by decreasing fees at
ft = f", which implies the optimal ft is strictly smaller than fu. In sum, the optimal
fee choice ft satisfies fs < ft < f". m
The intuition of this result is as follows: due to the existence of naive investors,
who are relatively less sensitive to fees than smart investors are, managers want to
choose fees that are higher than f'. However, since there is a possibility that they
only receive small amounts of naive money, managers would not want to increase fees
up to fu.
2.3.4 Comparative statics
The skill of a manager (captured by a) and the amount of invested naive money in
the fund (captured by ft) affect the optimal choices of et and ft. In the benchmark
cases where there are either no naive investors or no smart investors, optimal et and
ft are affected neither by the skill of the manager nor by the amount of invested naive
money. However, in general cases where investors are a mix of both smart and naive
investors, both skill and the amount of invested naive money affect the optimal choice
of et and ft.
The following proposition characterizes how the optimal choices are affected by
the skill of a manager:
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that there exists a unique ft that satisfies the first-order
condition (2.8). As the skill a of a manager increases, the optimal fee ft decreases.
The optimal effort et becomes flrst-order stochastically dominant as a increases.
Proof. By the definition (2.7) of QS(ft),
Q"(ft ; a) = 1-a [(ft - #)(ft)-1 ,2
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QS(ft) is proportional to a. In contrast, Qu"(ft) is not affected by changes of a. Denote
the optimal fee choice before an increase of a by f . At ft,
d 2 a d(I - cv(ft; a)) dtpt (ft') + a (ft; a) dftQ'(ft; a) = 0,
which implies that the marginal fee profit is zero at f = ft.
finitesimal increase of a by 6a. At fe?,
(1- a(ft; a + 6a))4d p't(fto) + a(ft; a + 6a)d Q(ft;
Now consider an in-
a 6a) < 0,
since
a(ft; a + 6a) > a(ft; a) dQ(ft; a + da) < Q(fo; a) < 0df a dft
Denote the optimal fee choice after the increase of a by ft. From the above analysis,
f,' < ff. Since fs < ft < ft < fu, the optimal choice of et when naive money does
not dominate satisfies
et(ft) = (fN - #)(f1< ) > (12 - 0)#)(ff- = t)
because
et(ft) = -_ (ft) (ft - a < 0 , Vft > fs - -
In addition,
pQ~f ) > pfIt(fti),
since
dQ 2d fg- (fu _ ft) > 0 , Vft < f" .
dft Ke
Since the variance of Q"(ft) is unaffected by the fee choice ft, Qu(fft) first-order
stochastically dominates Q"(ft). On the other hand, QS(fF; a) is smaller than QS(ft; a+
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6a):
QS(ft?; a) = 2a (ft - (ft) < 2(a+6a) [(ft - 0)(fi)-i = QS(fl; a+-a).
The optimal choice of et is given by
(ft - ) (f )~1 , Qu(ft ) Qs(ft; a)
et(f?; a) =
0 Q(f) > Qs(fo; a)
(ft - )(ft) )- , Qu(f) < Qs(fl; a + 6a)
et(ft ; a + 6a) =
0 , Qu(fl) > QS(fl; a + 6a)
Therefore, et(f,; a + 6a) first-order stochastically dominates et (ft; a). m
The intuition of the result is as follows: as the skill of managers increase, because
smart investors provide more capital to managers with higher skill, it becomes less
likely that naive money dominates those funds. Hence, marginal fee profits from
naive investors decreases as managers' skill increases. On the other hand, marginal
fee profits from smart investors increases as managers' skill increases. Therefore,
managers face less incentive to increase fees when their skill is high. Managers also find
it optimal to increase their effort because their effort is more likely to be compensated
by smart investors when their skill is high.
The following proposition characterizes how the optimal choices are affected by
the amount of invested naive money:
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that there exists a unique ft that satisfies the first-order
condition (2.8). As j4 (capturing the amount of invested naive money) increases,
the optimal fee ft increases. The optimal effort et becomes first-order stochastically
dominant as gi decreases.
Proof. First note that Qs(ft) is unaffected by changes of A. On the other hand,
P Q(ft; q) = (ft - #) f1 - q
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is proportional to A'. Denote the optimal fee choice before an increase of it by f?.
At f1?,
d Q(1- q(ft; A d pt(ft; At)t/ft) + a(ft; q)-dQs(ft) = 0,tdft
which implies that the marginal fee profit is zero at f = f0 . Now consider an in-
finitesimal increase of Aj by 6/Aq. At ff,
(1 - o(f?; A, + ) _ (t ; + ) + a(fto; Aq + 6Aq) dQ(ft) > 0dft Q dft
since
aO(fl; /4 + Sjq) < C(ft ; Aq) > 0 .
Denote the optimal fee choice after the increase of a by ft. From the above analysis,
fl > fO. Since fS < f < ff < f u, the optimal choice of et when naive money does
not dominate satisfies
et(f11) = (ft - #)(f1)- < (ft - #)(ft) = et(ff')
because
de
dtet(ft) =
a (
- (fi)1 -a a -1 ft < 0 Vft > f8 =
1
-# .
As a result,
Qs (fo) - ~a [(feo
In addition,
p?(f ; At) < , (f ; At + 3jq),
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> -a 'f-~(t2 L (fl-0 f = QS (ft)
d Q~t;A
dft li dtA
-
mfto)-1-1- 1 2
since
= (fo -) - At < (f, - #) ( - f
<ft - # 
- (A + 
_Aq) = pQ(ft; Aq+ Aq)
Because the variance of Q(ft; 4) is unaffected
first-order stochastically dominates Qt(f?; 1).
by the fee choice ft, Q"(ft; 4 + 6Aq)
The optimal choice of et is given by
et(ftl; j4)t
et(ft'; t1 + jt)
= t (f -#)(ft)n
0
= { - 1)(f)-
0
,U Q(fto; Aq) < Q5~,0
,U Q(fto; Aq) > QS (fto)
,u Q(ftl; Aq" + Jbq) < Qs (ft)
,Q,"(ft,; Aq + 6Aq) > Qs (ftl)
Therefore, et(f?; 14) first-order stochastically dominates et(fj; 14 + 6*).
The intuition of this result is quite similar to the intuition of Proposition 2.2. As
the amount of invested naive money increases, it is more likely that naive money
dominates those funds. Marginal fee profits from naive investors increases as the
amount of invested naive money increases. On the other hand, marginal fee profits
from smart investors decreases as the amount of invested naive money increases.
Therefore, managers have more incentive to increase fees when they expect more
naive money invested in their funds. Managers also find it optimal to decrease their
effort because their effort is less likely to be compensated by smart investors due to
the dominance of naive money.
2.3.5 Numerical examples
For the baseline numerical computation, I make the following parameter choices:
= 0.5 , # = 0.003 , K=0.027 , rf = 0.03 , -, = 0.1 ,
ja=1.2 , je=16 , a = 0.00015 , fiq = 100 , F =O0. (2.9)
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pQ(ftO; Aq)
Figure 1 plots variables of interest in the baseline model:
[See figure 11
Comparative statics with respect to changes of a is plotted in Figure 2:
[See figure 2]
Similarly, Comparative statics with respect to changes of A' is plotted in Figure 3:
[See figure 31
2.4 Extensions
I consider three extended versions of the baseline model by incorporating choices of
i) idiosyncratic risk, ii) marketing and iii) private benefit.
2.4.1 Idiosyncratic risk
In this version of the model, managers are allowed to choose the variance o2 of the
idiosyncratic risk c, of the fund return in each period. Denote the variance in time t
bya ,. There are costs associated with the choice of idiosyncratic risk:
The objective of a manager is to maximize
max _1Et [(fs - -)q- F - (e(es) - (
{f1,es,a,,} St (1 + rj)
Changes in o do not affect capital allocation decisions of smart investors since smart
investors can diversify idiosyncratic risk by themselves. Therefore, the optimal choice
of et is the same as in the baseline model. On the other hand, changes in a 2 affect
the distribution of invested naive money in time t + 1. Therefore, a manager chooses
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oQt that maximizes
-y(o-) Et [(ft+i - O)qt+1 - F - 4'e(et+1)]
which leads to the following first-order condition:
1
O (1 a r Et [max {Ql(ft+1), Q' +1(ft+1; JE,t)}] = 0 , (2.10)
_ aot +(I1+ rf) a (0,2t) t
where the first term is the marginal cost of increasing o , and the second term is the
marginal benefit.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of o-,,t:
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that there exists a unique solution to the first-order con-
dition (2.10). The optimal choice of o,, is the largest when the expected profits from
naive investors are of the same magnitude of profits from smart investors, i.e.,
QS~fQQ'(ft+1) = lit+1(ft+1)-
As Qs(ft+i) deviates from pt+1 (ft+1), the optimal o-E,t decreases.
Proof. Given ft+i, the marginal benefit of increasing o can be written as
1 d [f Q(ft+l)
(I+ rf)dO + _co;
+JQ0.
QS, ) x - IQ 1 (ft+1) dxQ1(ft+1)+
x - /I+1(ift+1) dx
(ft+I) UQ,t 0~Q,t
where
2 1 + '2 2U 'Y . 7f~Ot
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Substituting y = x+ (fti) leads to
O-Q't
[bPLQ (ft+,) +(1 2+rf) ut+(I+ rf ) do F,
f C t (Q(f+) - t +1(ft+1
x p (y) dy + o-Q,t _s ,t+i) ?+(  yp (y) dy
Therefore, the marginal benefit of increasing o is
1 1 dQt I0 Q yp (y) dy
(1 + rf) 2O-,,t du S (ft+)-+(ft+1
where
do-Q,t 
_ ' 0_(j______ 
___
d o -o,,2 t 2 
-2 E d__+ Y 2 2 UQ,_
Then, the FOC (2.10) reads
1 ^2 0y
(1+ rj) 2 uQt ]S(f-t+1)Q +(ft+) yp(y)dy=0.
OQ,t
Note that there exists a solution to this FOC. At -,cr = 0, the marginal benefit of
increasing o net of cost is
1 2 [ 0 C
(1 + r7) 2 uQot J 4(f-t+i-)+i(ft+i)
'Q't
y~p (y) dy > 0.-
On the other hand, as or,, - oc, the marginal benefit of increasing a2t net of cost
becomes
lim 2 +
1 ^~2
(1 + rf) 2o-Q,t JQS(f-+)PIQ(ft+i) 'Q'
Therefore, there exists o,, that satisfies the FOC (2.10).
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y (y) dy] - -oo .
Define A'-' QS(ft+1 ) - i+,1 (ft+1). Also define
(Os- )h K t )
First note that h(z) is maximized at z = 0:
h'(z) = d 100 y~p(y)dy = -zp(z) =
and h(z) decreases as IzI increases. Denote the optimal om,, at A-I by c-e(At4;).
For A'-' 74 0, consider a transformation A'-' -+ 0, the marginal benefit of increasing
of, net of cost at o-,,t(AS4') is
1 )2
-'Orf t(Ats+-") + (I+,_)2Qt(a , h (0) > 0,(1 rf) 2-Qt(-E,t(AS+1))
for an arbitrary A'-u # 0. Therefore,
o-Et(0) > o0,t(At4-1") , VAi'+- 7 0.
Now consider the following transformation for A'-' $ 0:
At- -+ AS-U(1 + 6) ,
which is an infinitesimal expansion of A'-u in the direction of A'-u.
marginal benefit of increasing o t net of cost at o-,t (A "U) is
Then, the
1 h
, + (1 + rf) 2aQ,t(aE,,t(As-U)) AS-(_ + 6)t+1 < 0.
-Q't (O'et (A U-))
Therefore, as A'-u deviates further from zero, the optimal choice of ott decreases
more. m
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S(ft+) t (ft+1) yp(y)dy.
UQ,t
>0
=0
< 0{ , z<0z =0z>0
The intuition of this result is as follows: the expected fee profits
I 1Et [max {Qs(ft+1), Q,"+(ft+1; a,,t )
has a call option-like payoff structure as a function of the realization of Q i"(ft+1; 0,,t),
which can be interpreted as fee profits from naive investors. When the realized value
of Q+l(ft+1; o,,t) is lower than Q8(ft+1), i.e., when naive money does not dominate,
fee profits are determined by smart investors at Q8 (ft+1). On the other hand, when
the realized value of Qu+1(ft+i; oe,t) is higher than QS(ft+1), i.e., when naive money
dominates, fee profits are determined by naive investors at Q+i(ft+1; ort). Therefore,
Q5(ft+1), which can be interpreted as fee profits from smart investors, serves as the
strike price of the call option. Since a call option vega (the sensitivity of an option's
price to changes in the volatility of its underlying) is maximized at the strike price,
the marginal benefit of increasing o-,, is maximized at
QS(f+)
The marginal benefit decreases as Qs(ft+i) deviates from /i+ 1 (ft+1). Since the marginal
cost of increasing ot is increasing in a,,t, the optimal choice of or,, is maximized when
the marginal benefit is maximized.
Denote the optimal choice of a,, given fee ft+1 by o,,t(ft+1). The optimal fee ft+
solves
a
aj Et [max {QS(ft+1), QY+1(ft+i; 0o,t(f +1))}] 0aft+1 t
The range of the optimal ft+1 is between fs and fu as in the baseline model:
Corollary 2.1 The optimal ft+i satisfies fS < ft+1 < fu.
Proof. Since Proposition 2.1 holds regardless of the value of o, the optimal choice
of ft+1 lies between fs and fu regardless of the choice oc,t(ft+i). n
The following proposition characterizes how the optimal choice of o,, is affected
by changes of a and /t+:
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Proposition 2.5 Suppose that there exists a unique solution to the first-order condi-
tion (2.10). As a and A'+1 changes, the optimal choice of o-,t is the largest when the
expected profits from naive investors are of the same magnitude of profits from smart
investors, i.e.,
Q(ft+1(a, i4+1);a ) =( , A'+); 1)
As Qs(ft+1(a, iZ+1); a) deviates from p, 1 (ft+1(a, f{,1); f{,1), the optimal o,,t de-
creases.
Proof. The marginal benefit of increasing utis
1C '~ 00
(I + rf) 2oQ,t Jt(+1( t1h)+1(f+1( ?+ 1); t+1)y ()y,
OQ,t
which is maximized at, given oUQt,
Q(ft+(a, jZ+);a) = pt2 1(ft+l(a,/1);/4 +) , (2.11)
and decreases as Qs(ft+i(af+,1);a) deviates from p1 ti(ft+1(a, ti);/ t4+). There-
fore, following the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2.4, the optimal choice of
o,,t is maximized when (2.11) holds. In addition, the optimal choice of o-,, decreases
as Qs(ft+l(a, 4'1); a) deviates from ptl (ft+i(a, iZ+i); P1+1). *
The intuition of this result is the same as that of Proposition 2.4.
2.4.2 Marketing
In this version of the model, managers can choose the level of marketing mt. In the
context of the model, I define marketing as activities that attract capital from naive
investors by spending costs3 . By choosing mt, a manager can increase the mean of
jiq+1 by mt:
t+1 I+ + mt,
3In this context, marketing may be interpreted as deceiving and alluring unsophisticated investors.
Another interpretation is that marketing reduces search costs for unsophisticated investors. Since
sophisticated investors in this model do not face any frictions (including search frictions), such
reduction of search costs only affects capital allocation decisions of naive investors.
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by incurring marketing costs
1 2
mkm,(t)=2..M
The objective of a manager is to maximize
max (1 1 _t t [(f - )q F -4fe(es) - 4Im(mt)]
{/S+1,es,mns}I,.t'+ ... ~ (1 + r )s
Changes in mt do not affect capital allocation decisions of smart investors. Therefore,
the optimal choice of et is the same as in the baseline model. On the other hand,
changes in mt shift the mean of invested naive money in time t + 1. A manager
chooses mt that maximizes
1
-xIm(mt) + Et [(ft+1 - O)qt+l - F - 'e(et+i)](t+ r)
which leads to the following first-order condition:
1 D
-1mmt Et [max { QS(ft+i), Q'+1(ft+1; mt)}] =0
-,nt +(I+ rf) amt t (2.12)
where the first term is the marginal cost of increasing m, and the second term is the
marginal benefit.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of mt:
Proposition 2.6 Suppose that there exists a unique solution to the first-order con-
dition (2.12). Given ft+1, the optimal choice of marketing mt decreases in a and
increases in Pf.
Proof. First note that for m1
/I+,(ft+1; Mt) = (ft+i - 0) 1 + (iZ+1 + i).
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Given ft+1, the marginal benefit of increasing mt can be written as
1 d
(1 + rf) dmt
[f9(ft+ i)LI-00
- I +1(ft+I; mit) dx
OQ cQ
+ JQS(fti+)
Substituting y = 1(ft+i;mt) leads toUQ
1 d
(1 + 77) dmt E ,i+,(ftmi;Mt) + (Qsf+ 1) - 4++(ft+iIMt))100 '
xp (y) dy + cQ (ft+i mt) y(p (y) dy
which can be simplified as
1
(1+ r) ( ( 
Db QS(Ut
+1) - I-It (ft+i; mit)
acQ
d Q
dmt '
Hence, the FOC (2.12) reads
SQS(ft+) - -t+1(ft+1; mit)
07Q-mmt + 1 1(1 + rf) ( dd I-+1(ft+1; mit) = 0
Note that there exists a solution to this FOC. Since the mean Pt+1(ft+i; mit) of the
profits Q"+1(ft+1; mit) from naive investors is increasing in mt, at mt = 0 the marginal
benefit of increasing mt net of cost is
1
(1 + r)
Q (t+1) - PL+(ft+1; mt = 0))
- <b ) dQdP Q+1(ft+1; mt = 0) > 0.dmt t
On the other hand, as mt - 00, the marginal benefit of increasing mt net of cost
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X-pQ (ft+I;m) dx
GQ (7Q
rn 1lim - [ mmt + I I
d
x p;-t~ 1(ft+,; mnt)
= lim
mt -400
1
- .mmt + (1+ (ft+1 - )
Q(ft+1 ) - I-4I+(ft+,; mrt)
- <bQ
Therefore, there exists mt that satisfies the FOC (2.12).
Given ft+,, the optimal choice of mt decreases in a. Denote the optimal choice of
mt at a by m(a). Since
1 1 2Q(ft+1; a) = a [(ft+i - #)(ft+1) -
changes in a affect Qs(ft+,; a), but does not affect Q+i(ft+,). Consider an increase
in a: a - a + 3a.
/ I-) --
-(m1 ((a) + 1- ( Q'(ft+1; a + 6a) - pt+1(ft+; mt(a))(1I + rf) QJ
dQ
X dmt Pt+ 1(ft+,; mt (a)) < 0.
Therefore, mt(a + 6a) < m(a), i.e., mt decreases in a given ft+,.
Given ft+,, the optimal choice of mt increases in A'+1. Denote the optimal choice of
mt at /i+1 by me(f4+ 1). Changes in Lq+1 do not affect Qs(ft+,) but Qu"1(ft+i; q1 1) by
increasing the mean pt+l(ft+1; Aq+1). Consider an increase in Aq+1: A+1 _+ g 1 +6Aq.
At mt(Aq41),
pi~(ft+; Aq+1, mt(Aq+ 1)) < 1 (ft+ 1 + , mt(+
and
d Q
dmt 1 ft P7 1
dQ
dmt I~t 1(t 4+~ mt 1 )
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becomes
1/ --
As a result,
1 Q"(Ita) - 1 (ft+; ill + t;m qM )
-Emmt(+1) + (1+) - (t+<tt+ (1 + rf) O-Q
dQ
x -- Q 1 (ft+1; Aq+I + 6iq, Mt(Aq)>
dmt t +t+)
Therefore, mt (AI + 6Aq) > mt(A, 1), i.e., mt increases in iq 1 given ft+1- U
The intuition of this result is as follows: the marginal benefit of increasing mar-
keting mt is proportional to the probability that naive money dominates. This is
because mt simply shifts the expected amount A+1 of naive money. Given fee ft+1,
an increase in a leads to a lower probability that naive money dominates. On the
other hand, an increase in My raises the probability that naive money dominates
funds. Therefore, the marginal benefit of increasing mt becomes lower as a increases,
and becomes higher as A increases. Since the marginal cost of marketing is an in-
creasing function of mt, the optimal mt, given ft+1, is decreasing in a and increasing
in 11j 
.
Denote the optimal choice of mt given fee ft+1 by mt(fi+i). The optimal fee ft+1
solves
a
Et [max {Q'(ft+1; mt (ft+1)), Qt' 1(ft+1)}= 0 . (2.13)
'9ft+i t
The range of the optimal ft+1 is between fS and f" as in the baseline model:
Corollary 2.2 The optimal ft+1 satisfies fS < ft,+ < fu.
Proof. Choosing mt is equivalent to shifting g4:
k1+ - q 1 + Mt.
Since Proposition 2.1 holds regardless of the value of f{q, the optimal choice of ft+1
lies between f- and f". m
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of ft:
Proposition 2.7 Suppose that there exists a unique solution to the first-order con-
dition (2.13). The optimal ft+1 decreases in a and increases in kt+i
77
Proof. The FOC (2.13) can be written as
d Q,5(ft+1) - pf.(ft+ 1; M't(ft+ 1))
d +1(ft+1; mt(ft+)) + (-dft+t 0)
d I
x d Q(ft+1) - mt+ 1 (ft+1; mt(ft+1))) 0.dft+i +
Consider an increase in a: a -+ a+6a. Denote the optimal ft+i at a by ft+i(a). From
Proposition 2.6, mt(ft+1; a) decreases in a. Note that given ft+1
Q(ft,; a+6a) > Q(ft+1; a), A' 1(ft+)+mt(ft+1; a+6a) < A'+1 (ft+i)+mt(ft+1; a),
and
d d
df Q (ft+; a + a) < d Q (ft+1; a) < 0,dft +1 dft+ 1
0 < dpAdI 1 (ft+1; mt(ft+1; a + 6a)) <dft+i d f A Q1(ft+1; m(ft+1; a)).dft+1 t
d
d1+ +1(ft+1 (a); m(ft+1 (a); a + 6a))dft + 1
Qs (ft+1(a); a + 6a) - p+1 (ft+1(a); m(ft+1(a); a + 6a))
O Q
x (Q(ft+1(a); a + 6a) - pt+1(ft+1(a); m(ft+1(a); a + 6a)) <0.
Therefore, the optimal ft+i (a) is decreasing in a.
Similarly, consider an increase in t4+1: Z1 A-+1 + 6Aq. Denote the optimal
ft+1 at Aq+1 by ft+i(Aq+1). From Proposition 2.6, mt(ft+i;i4+1) increases in A+
Note that given ft+1
Q41 (ft+1; Aq+1 + 6Aq, Mt(ft+1; Aq+1 + 6Aq)) > IQ 1(ft+1; 1+1,mt(ft+1;/4 +))
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Then,
and
d
I +(ft+1; I  ,mt(ft+1; fZ+1  6k')) dft+1 t +t
d ~ ~
> Q 1 (ft+j; g +1, mn(ft+1; Aq+1)) > 0-> dft + 1 A +
In contrast, given ft+1, Qs(ft+i) is unaffected by changes in ji+1. Then,
d Q + + (A q+1); g+1 + 6 q', mt(ft+ ( +1 ); f4q1 + 6k'))dft+l 1 U + t +
, 
Q1(ft+1(i)) -11(ft.1(g4 );i4Z+ 5k', mt(ft+i4+1); Aq+
xq Qq"(Mt+((tZ+ ( 0rQJ
dft+1
-P 1 (ft+ 1 ( +1 ); Aq+I + 6A, M (ft+1(Aq +1); jZ1+o") > 0.Q tq + 6k')))
Therefore, the optimal ft+1 (A+1) is increasing in f4+1. .
The intuition of this result is as follows: for fixed ft+,, marketing mt decreases as
a increases, and increases as Pt+1 increases as shown in Proposition 2.6. This implies
that the choice of mt reinforces the effect of changes in a and j4+1. As a increases,
naive money becomes less likely to dominate funds, and the corresponding decrease
of mt makes naive money even less likely to dominate. A similar argument applies to
changes in fL+ 1 -
Therefore, as a increases, marginal fee profits from naive investors decrease, and
marginal fee profits from smart investors increase. Hence, managers have incentive to
lower fees as a increases. In contrast, as Lq+1 increases, marginal fee profits from naive
investors increase, and marginal fee profits from smart investors decrease. Hence,
managers would want to raise fees as ft+1 increases.
The following corollary confirms that the result of Proposition 2.6 holds without
fixing fees ft+,, i.e., ft+, optimally responds to changes in a and 4q 1:
Corollary 2.3 Suppose that there exist unique solutions to the first-order conditions
(2.12) and (2.13). The optimal choice of marketing mt decreases in a and increases
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Proof. Following the logic of Proposition 2.6, and using the result of Proposition
2.7,
1
-Emmt(a) + r)(I + rf)
(Qs(ft+1(a + 6a); a + a) - p (ft+1(a + 6a); m (a))
d
X d +1(ft+1(a + 6a); mt(a)) < 0 .dmt
Therefore, mt(a) is decreasing in a. Similarly,
1 dQ
Emmnt(4+ 1 ) + (1 ) yd [t+1(ft+1(/+1 + 6j5); Aq+ 1 + 6ji,mj(f4 1)) x (it+ (I+ rf) dmt t1 t t +)
Q( t.1A4+SA) 
- p1(t+1A+ t+") I 4+ JAq; Mt(i t+))f
> 0 .
Therefore, mt((A+ 1) is increasing in A+1. *
2.4.3 Private benefit
In this version of the model, managers can choose to gain private benefit by sacrificing
dollar value that they generate for investors 4 . To be more specific, in time t, managers
gain
8(bt) ,
where bt captures the amount of value that managers sacrifice. Choosing bt [0, 1]
decreases the value of a as follows:
a -- a(1 - bt)
'Soft dollars may be thought of as an example. Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2002) documents
that soft-dollar trades incur higher costs.
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bt is determined in the previous period t - 1. The marginal gain E'(bt) of private
benefit decreases in bt, i.e., 6(b,) is convex in bt. For analytic simplicity, I choose the
following form of 0(b,):
E)(bt)= bt - b .
The object of a manager is to maximize
max 1 _t Et [(f, - #)q, - F - Qe(e,) + Eb(bt)]
{fs+1,esbs+I}stt+... (1+ rS)t 
Since the optimal choice of et does not explicitly depend on a, the optimal et is the
same as in the baseline model. Hence, QS(ft; bt) can be written as
1 1 2_Q(ft;bt) =-a(1 - be)(f-#)f)-- .
2
On the other hand, Q"(ft) is unaffected by changes in bt. A manager chooses bt that
maximizes
e(bt) + Et_ 1 [(ft - #)qt - F - Te(et)]
which leads to the following first-order condition:
a
b(1 - bt) + Et- 1 [max {QS(ft ; bt), Q;"(ft)}] = 0 , (2.14)
where the first term is the marginal private benefit of increasing bt, and the second
term is the marginal cost. Note that the existence of a solution to the FOC (2.14) is
guaranteed if b is sufficiently large:
b > -a(I - 0')2 - ,(2.15)2 a-
because
b Qs(ft bt = 0) > Et_ 1 [max {Qs(ft; bt), Q'"(ft)}]
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and
0 < b Et-1 [max {Q8 (ft; bt), Q(ft )}]
bt=1
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of bt:
Proposition 2.8 Suppose that there exists a unique solution to the first-order con-
dition (2.14). Given ft, the optimal choice of bt decreases in a and increases in A.
Proof. Given ft, the marginal cost of increasing bt can be written as
(x - dxI +
c Y-Q
Substituting y - 4(ft) leads to
A (f ) + Q S (ft;bt) M (ft)
1 00
O
7Q (Qs(ft; bt) - pQ(ft)) W (y) dy
which can be simplified as
Q8 (ft; bt) - pQ(ft)
- ) Qs(ft; bt) - p (ft) (f;b)= -b Q (f; b)
Hence, the FOC (2.14) reads
Q (fbt) 
-t (ft)
O-Q Q
8(ft; bt) = 0 -
Given ft, the optimal choice of bt decreases in a. Denote the optimal choice of bt at
a by bt(a). Changes in a affect Qs(ft; a, bt), but does not affect QI(ft). Consider aii
increase in a: a -> a + 6a.
b(1 - bt(a)) - (D - f)) Q(ft; a + 6a, bt (a)) < 0 -Qs(ft; a + a, bt (a))
\ 3UQ
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d
dbt EJ Q(ft;b)DO Q' (ft; bt) sp QSxfbft)) dxJQ.~tb)x O OQ r
J7Q QS -(ft -bt) -sit (ft) yeo (y) dy]
< D ( dQS(ft; bt)
Abt
4b(1- bt) 
- D (
Therefore, bt(a + 6a) < bt(a), i.e., bt decreases in a given ft.
Given ft, the optimal choice of bt increases in pq. Denote the optimal choice of
bt at /j by b,(/4). Changes in /4 do not affect QS(ft; bt) but Q'"(ft; /4) by increasing
the mean ptQ (ft; /4). Consider an increase in /4: Al4 Al + 6[L. Since
Q (ft; /4) < PQ (ft; /4 + 6/i)
at b (/4),
(b(1 - bt(/4)) - (f; bt(g)) - [Q?(ft; [Lt + 6i Q(f; b(/4)) > 0.9TQ/
Therefore, bt(/4 + 6/i) > bt(g4), i.e., bt increases in A given ft. *
The intuition of this result is as follows: the marginal cost of increasing bt is
proportional to the probability that naive money does not dominate. This is because
bt simply shifts the skill a of managers. Given fee ft+1, an increase in a leads to a
lower probability that naive money dominates. On the other hand, an increase in /t+1
raises the probability that naive money dominates funds. Therefore, the marginal cost
of increasing bt becomes higher as a increases, and becomes lower as Aq+1 increases.
Since the marginal private benefit is a decreasing function of bt, the optimal bt, given
ft+i, is decreasing in a and increasing in /4+1-
Denote the optimal choice of bt given fee ft by bt(ft). The optimal fee ft solves
Et_1 [max {Q(ft; bt(ft)), Q"(ft)}] 0. (2.16)a ft
The range of the optimal ft is between fs and f u as in the baseline model:
Corollary 2.4 The optimal f t satisfies f S < ft < fu.
Proof. Choosing bt is equivalent to shifting a:
a -+ a(1 - bt)
Since Proposition 2.1 holds regardless of the value of a, the optimal choice of ft lies
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between fS and fu. m
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of ft:
Proposition 2.9 Suppose that there exists a unique solution to the first-order con-
dition (2.16). The optimal ft decreases in a and increases in f4.
Proof. The FOC (2.16) can be written as
d Q (QS(ft; bt(ft)) - p'?(ft) d (Q(ft; bt(ft)) 
- pa(ft)) 0.
df+ tQ dft t
Consider an increase in a: a -+ a + 6a. Denote the optimal ft at a by ft(a). From
Proposition 2.8, bt(ft; a) decreases in a. Note that given ft
QS(ft; a + 6a, bt(ft; a + 6a)) > QS(ft; a, bt(ft; a))
and
d ddQ(ft; a + 6a, bt(ft; a + 6a)) < Qs(ft; a, bt (ft; a)) < 0
dft dft
Then, at ft(a)
d Q8 (ft(a); a + 6a, bt(ft; a + 6a)) - pQ (ft(a))
pAt(ft(a)) + <bdft O-Q
x d Qs(ft (a); a + 6a, bt (ft; a + 6a)) - pQ (ft (a))) < 0 .
Therefore, the optimal ft(a) is decreasing in a.
Similarly, consider an increase in f': Al + A + 6fAq Denote the optimal ft at P
by ft(A'). From Proposition 2.8, bt(ft; /41) increases in N. Note that given ft
Q(ft; bt(ft; A + 617)) < Qs(ft; bt(ft; A)) , pQ(ft; A + (Sq) > pt?(ft; AN)
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and
d d0 > - Q(ft; bt(ft; i4 + 5fq)) > -Qs(ft; bt(ft; 4))dft tdft
d ddp (ft; + 6 A) > d (ft; g) > 0.dft dft
Then, at ft(pq)
d d yft(g1); + 6/a)dft t
QS(ft(g); b(ft(g4);/4 + 6i'q)) - p?( ft(64);/4+6/L)
Therefore, the optimal ft(/4) is increasing in /4.
The intuition of this result is as follows: for fixed ft+i, be decreases as a increases,
and increases as 41+ increases as shown in Proposition 2.8. This implies that the
choice of be reinforces the effect of changes in a and /4*+. As a increases, naive money
becomes less likely to dominate funds, and the corresponding decrease of be makes
naive money even less likely to dominate. A similar argument applies to changes in
Therefore, as a increases, marginal fee profits from naive investors decrease, and
marginal fee profits from smart investors increase. Hence, managers have incentive to
lower fees as a increases. In contrast, as j4+ increases, marginal fee profits from naive
investors increase, arid marginal fee profits from smart investors decrease. Hence,
managers would want to raise fees as A/+1 increases.
The following corollary confirms that the result of Proposition 2.8 holds without
fixing fees ft, i.e., f optimally responds to changes in a and (f:
Corollary 2.5 Suppose that there exist unique solutions to the first-order conditions
(2.12) and (2.13). The optimal choice of marketing mt decreases in a and increases
in A .
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Proof. Following the logic of Proposition 2.8, and using the result of Proposition
2.9,
Q8(ft (a + 6a); a + 6a, bt(a)) - p? (ft(a + 6a))
46(1 - bt(a)) - D<Ib
x Q5 (ft(a + 6a); a + 6a, bt(a)) < 0 .
Therefore, bt(a) is decreasing in a. Similarly,
SQs(fM +j ~); bt(j4)) -Qb(fI - bt)(A')) - D 0.
xs (ftfq + 6Aq); bt(Aq)) > 0.
(ft(f4 + 6jp); 4M + 65q)
Therefore, bt(/a+ 1) is increasing in 4+ 1. *
2.4.4 Numerical examples
In addition to the parameter choices (2.9) of the baseline model, I make the following
parameter choices:
S= 0.2 , m = 0.0002 , 'b= 0.5. (2.17)
An extension of the baseline model with the endogenous choice of cr,t_ is plotted
in Figure 4, 5 and 6. Figure 4 plots the optimal oE as a function of ft:
[See figure 41
Figure 5 plots the optimal a, as a function of a:
[See figure 51
Figure 6 plots the optimal o, as a function of A4:
[See figure 6]
An extension of the baseline model with the endogenous choice of marketing mt_1
is plotted in Figure 7 and 8. Figure 7 plots comparative statics with respect to changes
of a:
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)
[See figure 7J
Figure 8 plots comparative statics with respect to changes of jq:
[See figure 81
An extension of the baseline model with the endogenous choice of bt, which reflects
private benefit that managers gain by sacrificing returns to investors, is plotted in
Figure 9 and 10. Figure 9 plots comparative statics with respect to changes of a:
[See figure 91
Figure 10 plots comparative statics with respect to changes of g4:
[See figure 101
2.5 Discussions and Conclusions
For analytic simplicity, this chapter makes several assumptions. However, relaxing
some of them may provide interesting perspectives on how unsophisticated investors
affect decisions of mutual fund managers. One crucial assumption is that there is
no information asymmetry between managers and investors. If managers know more
about their skill than investors, managers may want to make decisions, particularly
those which are easily observable by investors (e.g., fees), in order to signal their skill.
The signaling channel is not investigated in this chapter, and remains to be explored.
In addition, this chapter concerns only the short-term effect of managerial choices.
The infinite-horizon model in this chapter can be reduced to a two-period model
since managerial choices do not affect the future dynamics of invested naive money.
If managers' decisions influence the accumulation of naive money invested in funds,
the managers have incentives to adjust their decisions in order to receive more naive
money in the future. How the long-term effect influences managerial decisions remains
a topic for future research.
In conclusion, this chapter builds a model on how naive money affects the decisions
of active mutual fund managers, particularly fees, effort, idiosyncratic risk, marketing
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and private benefit. The model shows that more naive money is associated with higher
fees, lower managerial effort, more marketing and seeking greater private benefit. In
addition, the model proves that managers choose to take higher idiosyncratic risk
when expected fee profits from naive investors are close to those from smart investors.
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Figures
Figure 1: Baseline model
The following figures plot (a) the value of QS(ft) and a4(ft) as functions of fee ft,
(b) the expected fee profits Et_, [max{Q9(ft), Qu(ft)}] - F net of costs as a function
of fee ft, (c) the maximum effort et as a function of fee ft, and (d) the optimal choice
of effort et as a function of the realization of Qu" for two different fees ft = 1% and
ft = 1.2%. Parameter choices are given in (2.9).
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Figure 2: Baseline model - changes of a
The following figures plot (a) the value of QS(ft) and pi'(ft), (b) the optimal fee
choice ft, and (c) the maximum effort et as functions of a. Parameter choices are
given in (2.9).
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Figure 3: Baseline model - changes of ^q
The following figures plot (a) the value of QS(ft ) and i'?(ft), (b) the optimal fee
choice ft, and (c) the maximum effort et as functions of /4. Parameter choices are
given in (2.9).
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Figure 4: Extensions - Endogenous choice of a,
The following figures plot (a) the value of QS(ft) - pt(ft) and
of o-,t_1 as functions of fee ft. Parameter choices are given in
(b) the optimal choice
(2.9) and (2.17).
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Figure 5: Endogenous choice of o-, - changes of a
The following figures plot (a) the value of Qs(ft(a); a) - pt(ft(a))
choice of o-e,t-1 as functions of a. Parameter choices are given in
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Figure 6: Endogenous choice of or - changes of j
The following figures plot (a) the value of QS(ft(,4)) - p4(fi(14); j) and (b) the
optimal choice of u-,t_1 as functions of A'. Parameter choices are given in (2.9) and
(2.17).
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Figure 7: Endogenous choice of mti - changes of a
The following figures plot (a) the optimal choice of marketing mt_ 1, (b) the optimal
fee choice ft, and (c) the maximum effort et as functions of a. Parameter choices are
given in (2.9) and (2.17).
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Figure 8: Endogenous choice of mt-i - changes of j4
The following figures plot (a) the optimal choice of marketing m"-1, (b) the optimal
fee choice ft, and (c) the maximum effort et as functions of C4. Parameter choices are
given in (2.9) and (2.17).
15.
E
10-
5
0 100 200 300
(a) Optimal marketing mt-_
0 .0 1 4 . --- -- -----
0.012
0.01
0 100 200 300
-t:
(b) Optimal fee ft
80
QI 75
E 70
-E 65
E 60
55
0 100 200 300
(c) Maximum effort et
Comparative statics with respect to changes of p4
95
Figure 9: Endogenous choice of bt - changes of a
The following figures plot (a) the optimal choice of bt, (b) the optimal fee choice ft,
and (c) the maximum effort et as functions of a. Parameter choices are given in (2.9)
and (2.17).
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Figure 10: Endogenous choice of bt - changes of Pt
The following figures plot (a) the optimal choice of bt, (b) the optimal fee choice ft,
and (c) the maximum effort et as functions of )4. Parameter choices are given in (2.9)
and (2.17).
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Appendix
On the FOC approach
Most of the proofs (including comparative statics) in this chapter use the FOC ap-
proach. Since the objective function (expected fee profits) is smooth, the FOC ap-
proach is legitimate as long as there is a unique local and global maximum. However,
that condition is not guaranteed for all possible range of parameter values. In this
section, I show that all the proofs of this chapter still hold when the uniqueness of
the local maximum is not satisfied.
Since the logic is the same across all the proofs, I choose Proposition 2.2 as a
representative example. In this example, there may exist multiple solutions to the
FOC (2.8), i.e., there are multiple extrema of
h(ft; a) = Et- 1 [max {Qs(ft; a), Q"(ft)}]
Denote ft at the global maximum of h(ft; a) by f*. Even if there exist multiple
extrema, Proposition 2.2 holds locally. This means that as long as other local maxima
are smaller than the current global maximum, the global maximum shifts towards
smallcr ft < ft* as a increases. In order for Proposition 2.2 to be violated, two
conditions must be satisfied: i) another local maximum becomes larger than the
current global maximum as a increases, ii) the new global maximum is located at
ft > ft*. I show that these two conditions cannot hold at the same time.
Suppose that at a certain a, there are two local maxima at the same value, i.e.,
there exist fj* and f2*, where f* < f2*, satisfying
h(f*- a) .= h(f2*; a) = max h(f; a) .
fE[fs',f u]
Suppose that
h(f*; a - 6a) = max h(f; a - 6a) > h(f2*; a - 6a),fGVf lIs,"
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and
h(f*; a + 6a) < h(f2*;a+a) = max h(f;a+6a).fE [fBu]
The slope of h(f; a) can be written as
dh(f; a) (Qs(f; a) - p(f) d
df -UQ j f
(QS(f; a) - P (f) Q(f;a)
UQ }df
Note that
dh(f;a+6) dh(f;a)VfC VfSfu]
df df
Define
dAh(f;a) dh(f;a+ 6) dh(f; a) <0 Vf E [fS Jul
df df df
Then,
h(f2*; a + 6a) - h(f*; a + 6a) = h(f2*; a) - h(f*; a) + dAh(f; a) df
if df
< h(f2*; a) - It(f*; a) = 0 ,
which is a contradiction. Although this proof considers two maxima at the same
value, it can be easily generalized to cases with more than two maxima at the same
value.
From this proof, if there is a transition of the global maximum from one local
maximum to another, the transition must be towards lower ft. Therefore, Proposition
2.2 holds even if there are multiple solutions to the FOC (2.8).
99
100
Chapter 3
IO of the Active AM Industry:
Entries and Exits
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the structure of the active AM industry: in particular, entries
and survivorship. Given that funds have access to the same technology for attracting
naive money, only those whose perceived skill is higher than a certain threshold
enter AM markets. Existing managers choose to exit if their track records are poor
and/or the amount of invested naive money is small. While fund entry and exit
decisions affect the degree of competition in the AM industry, competition also, in
turn, influences the entry and exit decisions of managers. Therefore, competition
among managers and their entry and exit decisions jointly characterize an equilibrium
of the model, which I refer to as an "industry equilibrium." In the long run, the
economy converges to the stationary equilibrium.
Entries of and the long-run survivorship of unskilled managers are of particular
interest, and the model characterizes what components are associated with them, and
how. Among newly entering managers, the portion of unskilled managers is higher if
there are 1) more aggregate investment opportunities, 2) more aggregate naive capital
flows, 3) less supply of skilled managers to the AM industry, and 4) lower entry costs.
These changes induce likely unskilled managers to enter AM markets who would not
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have, absent the changes. Among those changes, only more aggregate naive capital
flows and less supply of skilled managers are associated with a higher probability
of the long-run survivorship of unskilled managers. Only these changes increase the
average flow of naive capital to an individual fund.
When AM markets are heterogeneous in investor sophistication, AM markets with
more sophisticated investors (say, hedge fund markets) naturally differentiate from
AM markets with less sophisticated investors (say, mutual fund markets). In equi-
librium, skilled managers generate more value in hedge fund markets than they do
in mutual fund markets. As a result, relatively high-skilled new managers tend to
enter hedge fund markets. Since the supply of skilled managers to mutual fund mar-
kets decreases, the probability of the long-term survivorship of unskilled managers
increases in mutual fund markets. Therefore, roughly speaking, mutual fund mar-
kets are characterized as markets for naive money with a relatively high portion of
unskilled managers, and hedge fund markets are characterized as markets for smart
money with a relatively high portion of skilled managers.
A certain type of regulations for the AM industry may be detrimental to the wealth
of unsophisticated investors. In the model, unsophisticated investors lose wealth
by investing in underperforming active funds compared with investing in a passive
benchmark (e.g., index funds) with similar risk characteristics. Regulations that
restrict value-generating activities of active funds reduce entries of unskilled managers,
but raise the probability of the long-term survivorship of unskilled managers. Since
funds run by unskilled managers underperform the most, regulations of these types
may harm the wealth of unsophisticated investors. On the other hand, regulations
that discourage activities that induce retail investors to invest in underperforming
funds decrease both entries and the long-run survivorship of unskilled managers.
Therefore, regulations of these types are beneficial to the wealth of unsophisticated
investors. Furthermore, regulations that apply to one type of AM markets may have
unintended long-term effects on the other types. One crucial caveat is that this
chapter does not provide a rationale for retail investor protection, and, therefore, the
regulatory implications of this chapter must not be over-interpreted.
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In the remainder of the paper, section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses
the industry equilibrium implications of the model for the structure of the active AM
industry. In particular, section 4 investigates the structure of the AM industry when
AM markets are heterogeneous in investor sophistication. Section 5 examines the im-
plications of the model for retail investor protection. Section 6 discusses the limitation
of the model and future directions for research, and summarizes the conclusions.
3.2 The Model
There are two types of managers who are different in skill as described in subsection
1.2.1. The information structure and the learning process are the same as in chapter
1, and are described in subsection 1.2.2.
3.2.1 Naive capital
This chapter views unsophisticated investors as irrational: they invest in underper-
forming active funds although those investors have all the information that is available
to sophisticated investors, including the track record of funds. Those unsophisticated
investors can improve returns by investing in passive benchmarks (e.g., index funds)
with similar risk characteristics, but they do not choose to invest in the passive bench-
marks. This is different from the concept of uninformed investors in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980): uninformed investors do not have private information, but may
trade for reasons such as hedging or liquidity needs. Here, unsophisticated investors
have all the information, and there are liquid passive alternatives that provide similar
systematic risk as active funds.
I model capital from unsophisticated investors (naive money) in a reduced form,
and abstract from detailed capital allocation decisions of unsophisticated investors.
naive capital flows to fund (manager) i are as follows:
d~ilt = (b - r/)4,t)dt + /j, (-dWi,t +,7-d~i , (3.1)
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where qi,t is the amount of naive capital invested in the fund, b is the average naive
capital inflow, y is the rate of average naive capital outflow, Wi,t is a standard Brow-
nian motion that captures the component of naive capital flows irrelevant to the fund
performance, o is a parameter that determines the volatility of naive capital flows
that are irrelevant to the fund performance, and a_ is a parameter that determines
the volatility of naive capital flows that respond to the fund performance. Note that
a, may be either positive or negative1 , and
dWi,t - d zi,t = dWi,t - d Zj't = dWi,t - dW,t = 0 ,V j i,
i.e., Wi,t captures the idiosyncratic component of naive money flows, and is orthogonal
to the fund performance.
The process (3.1) is the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) process (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross
(1985)), since the process can be rewritten as
dit= (b - 71i~tdt + aT/q ~t'~~
where
aT V/0ga 2 +a , ord~~ d~
9T aT
and Wi,t is a standard Brownian motion as well. The CIR process as the model of
naive capital flows has several attractive properties: the amount of naive capital is
always non-negative, and possesses a stationary distribution.
I would like to emphasize that insights from the model do not significantly depend
on the process of naive money. The only essential property of naive money that the
model needs is that naive capital invested in a fund is persistent, i.e., unsophisticated
investors reallocate their capital slowly. In fact, in a continuous-time setup without
any jump process, this property is automatically assured. As long as the property is
satisfied, the detail of the process of naive capital does not affect the main qualitative
results of the chapter.
'Empirical studies (e.g., Gruber (1996)) suggest that fund flows positively respond to good per-
formance.
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3.2.2 Fees and operating costs
A fund manager charges a fixed percentage fee f per time, i.e., between time t and
t + dt, investors in the fund pay
fdt
per dollar invested in the fund at time t. For modeling simplicity, I assume that
f is constant and uniform across funds. Each fund pays a fixed operating cost Odt
between t and t + dt as long as the fund exists.
3.2.3 Discount rate and utility
The risk-free rate r is constant and does not change over time. The only relevant
discount rate in the model is the risk-free rate because all the shocks are idiosyn-
cratic. I assume that managers are risk-neutral. Therefore, managers' objective is to
maximize the discounted expected fee profits.
The risk neutrality can be justified if the market is sufficiently complete. In this
case, managers can hedge risk associated with fee profits, and the form of their utility
functions does not matter. Market completeness allows managers to perfectly smooth
out their consumption over time, and the value of the consumption stream needs to
equal the entry value of fee profits net of the entry cost.
3.2.4 Entries and exits
At each point of time, prospective managers are born. The expected skill of a newly
born manager is summarized by the probability p of the manager being H-type. The
prior cumulative distribution of the expected skill of managers born between t and
I + dt is given by
F(p)dt .
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One crucial assumption is that the distribution does not change over time. This
assumption implies that the supply of skilled managers is inelastic. Define
G(1 - p) = F'(p)dp' (3.2)
which is the cumulative distribution measured from p to 1, i.e., G(1 -p) is the reverse-
order cumulative distribution of the prior skill. Another assumption that I make is
that
lim G(1 - p) -+ oo, (3.3)
i.e., skilled managers are scarce, but surely unskilled managers are abundant. This
assumption is needed for the existence of an equilibrium, but is not necessary as long
as lim,+0+ G(1 - p) is sufficiently large.
A new fund needs to pay a lump-sum entry cost <b at entry, and the cost becomes
sunk once the fund starts its operation. A prospective manager enters an AM market
if the value of fee profits net of the entry cost is positive. When a new manager enters
an AM market, she starts with zero amount of naive capital at entry.
Existing managers may exit AM markets. There are two types of exits in the
model: exogenous exits and endogenous exits. I model the exogenous exits as a
Poisson process: between t and t + dt, existing managers independently exit with
probability Adt. On the other hand, at each point of time, existing managers may
endogenously choose to exit if the value of fee profits is not positive. There are no
costs associated with exits.
3.2.5 Competition
There are two types of competition among managers: one is competition for positive
NPV investment opportunities, and the other is competition for naive capital inflows.
These types of competition lead to decreasing returns to scale at the industry level.
One crucial assumption is that high competition drives down both A, the average
value per time that a skilled manager generates, and b, the average naive money
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inflows to a fund. Mathematically, this assumption translates into
A = AhA(N) , b = bhb(N) , (3.4)
where N is the total number of existing managers in the AM industry, A and b are
constants, and hA(N) and hb(N) are smooth monotone (strictly) decreasing functions
in N. Here, I take the total number of managers as the equilibrium variable that
captures the degree of competition in the industry. Taking another sensible variable
(e.g., aggregate capital in the industry) instead as the measure for competition does
not change qualitative results.
3.3 Structure of the AM industry: Entries and Sur-
vivorship
The full characterization of the equilibrium of the model involves the determination
of equilibrium variables A and b. These variables are determined by the number
(measure) of managers by (3.4), which I repeat:
A = AhA(N), b = bhb(N),
where A and b are constants, and hA(N) and hb(N) are arbitrary decreasing functions.
In order to guarantee an interior solution, additional assumptions are made:
lim hA(N) -+ oo , lim h(N) - oo , lim hA(N) -+ 0 , lim hb(N) - 0 ,
N* N- N-oo N-oo
(3.5)
i.e., active funds become extremely profitable if there are no competitors, and become
extremely unprofitable if there are too many competitors.
Since there is no aggregate shock, the model focuses on the stationary equilibrium.
In the stationary equilibrium, the equilibrium variables A and b are constants over
time.
107
3.3.1 Fee revenues
A and b are endogenously determined in equilibrium through competition among
funds. In this subsection, I focus on characterizing fee revenues of active funds by
taking the value of A and b as given. For notational simplicity, I omit indices for
individual managers (funds) unless necessary.
From the analysis in subsection 1.3.2, the net excess return on a fund between t
and t + dt is
drex d~exfdtA(lHdt +dZt)drt = d R - fdt = qt - j dt .
In equilibrium, the net expected excess return (net alpha) is either zero or negative:
Et [dr'x] =p - f) dt = 0 , 4t < qt
qt / 0 , 4t= qt
where qt is the AUM of the fund at t, and qt is the amount of naive capital invested
in the fund at t. From Proposition 1.1, the AUM of the fund is
SptA
qt max f 4 i,
and fee revenues between t and t + dt are given by
fqtdt = max {ptA, f } dt .
3.3.2 Stationary equilibrium
The state variables for an individual fund manager are p and 4. The aggregate state
of the economy is the distribution of agents across states. In order to define the
aggregate state variables formally, define the state space for an individual manager.
The state space of a manager is the Cartesian product S : [0, 1] x [0, oo) with Borel
o algebra B. For any set S E B, p(S) is the measure of managers in the set S. A
stationary equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium is the value function V : S -+ I >O; the surplus
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rate A that a skilled manager generates per time and the average naive capital inflow
rate b; and the stationary measure p* such that
* Given A and b, V(p, 4) is the value function of fee profits.
" Given p*, N = f f p*(p, 4)dpd4 is consistent with the values of A and b by (3.4).
" Prospective managers arrive with prior skill distribution F(p), and chooses to
enter the AM industry if their V(p, 0) is greater than the entry cost (b.
" Managers choose to exit if V(p, 4) = 0. In addition, managers exogenously exit
under the Poisson process with probability Adt between t and t + dt.
* p* is invariant under entries, exits and the transition of states of existing man-
agers, given by
dp = sp(1 - p)dZ, d4 = (b - Q)dt + q/ (odW + azdZ)
3.3.3 Value of fee profits, exits and entries
The following analysis assumes a stationary equilibrium, and takes A and b as given.
Recall that an existing fund bears the operating cost of #dt between t and t + dt.
Value of fee profits
Fee profits between t and t + dt are
(max{pt A, f'i} - 4) dt ,
by Proposition 1.1. The value of fee profits at t can be written as
TD
V = Et [I .- '(u--) (max~pu A, f 4u} - 0) du ,
where TD is the point of time when the manager exits. Under the given information
set at t, the joint distribution of pu and 4u for u > t solely depends on pt and 4t. As
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a result, the state variables for the value of fee profits at t are pt and 4t. Hence, the
value of fee profits can be rewritten as V = V(pt, qt).
TD is determined either by an exogenous exit, with probability Adt between t and
t + dt independently, or by an endogenous exit, where the manager chooses to exit. A
manager chooses to exit if the value of staying is less than (or equal to) the value of
exiting, which is zero. These statements can be translated into dynamic programming
language as follows:
V(pt, 4t) = max {(max{pA , f't} - # ) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)Et [V(pt+dt, 4t+dt)], 0},
where
dpt = spt(1-p)dZ t,
dQt, = (b-rqtdt + \/1 (-dWt + zdz)
When the value is greater than zero, the value function V(p, 4) is smooth, and solves
the following partial differential equation (PDE):
(r+A)V(pj) =V(max)pA, I a} - ) 2 P2(1 _ P)2 + (b - /)
2 apq
+Ia2v(p) 2 2 2V(p, )
2 + o2 (a a 0 sp(1-p) a
There is no analytic solution to the PDE. The following lemmas characterize several
properties of V(p, 4) that can be derived without directly solving for V(p, 4).
Lemma 3.1 V(p, 4) is increasing in p and 4.
Proof. See Appendix. n
Lemma 3.2 V(p, j) is convex in the direction of the diffusion dZ in p and 4, which
is proportional to the vector (sp(1 - p), o ~), i.e.,
a2Vyq a2V(P'4)
sp(1 - p) azV' ] a[2 q SP2() 1 P )l 0-
_______q .92V(p,q)
[Dp~ a42 07[U
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Proof. See Appendix. m
Exits
Since the value of fee profits changes over time only through p and 4, endogenous exit
decisions by managers solely depend on p and 4 as well. If V(p, j) > 0 for all (p, q),
the manager never chooses to exit. If V(p, 4) = 0 for some (p, 4), the manager exits.
The following theorem characterizes the set of (p, 4) where a fund manager chooses
to exit, i.e.,
E = {(p, 4)|V(p, 4) =_ 0}. (3.6)
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that E is not empty. E is characterized by a downward
sloping curve 4 = h(p) that crosses the 4-axis (p=O) and the p-axis (4 = 0):
E = {(p, 4)14 < h(p)}
Proof. See Appendix. m
The set E defined by (3.6) may or may not be empty. If E is nonempty, managers
choose to exit immediately after they reach the curve q = h(p) in continuous time.
Hence, the curve j = h(p) is the exit threshold. The downward-sloping exit threshold
shows that there are two reasons why managers may choose to exit: managers are
perceived as low-skilled and/or there is insufficient naive capital invested in their
funds.
Entries
The prior cumulative distribution of the skill of managers newly born between t and
t + dt is given by F(p)dt. A prospective manager with probability p of being H-type
chooses to enter the AM industry if the participation constraint
V(p, 0) - D ;> 0 (3.7)
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holds, since a prospective manager enters with zero naive capital. Therefore, in order
to study entry decisions of prospective managers, it is useful to characterize properties
of V(p, 0) further. Define
Pex = sup{pIV(p, 0) 0}. (3.8)
By Proposition 3.1, pex exists if E defined by (3.6) is nonempty, but does not exist if
E is empty. The following corollary elucidates further properties of V(p, 0):
Corollary 3.1 V(p, 0) is convex in p. V(p, 0) is strictly increasing if Pex does not
exist, and strictly increasing for p Pex if pex exists.
Proof. See Appendix. m
Now define p* that satisfies
V(p*, 0) = 4< (3.9)
p* is greater than pex (if pex exists). Based on the participation constraint (3.7), the
following proposition characterizes the set of prospective managers who enter the AM
industry in a stationary equilibrium:
Proposition 3.2 In a stationary equilibrium, p* c (0, 1) exists and is unique. Prospec-
tive managers enter the AM industry if their prior skill (the prior probability of being
H-type) is higher than p*, i.e., prospective managers with p G [p*, 1] choose to enter.
Proof. See Appendix. *
The intuition of Proposition 3.2 is as follows: the prior skill of a prospective man-
ager matters for her decision to start an active fund, given that funds are homogeneous
in their ability to attract naive money. While the supply of skilled prospective man-
agers is limited, there are plenty of low-skilled managers 2, and competition among
funds does not allow surely unskilled managers to enter the AM industry. Therefore,
only prospective managers whose prior skill is above a certain threshold (p*) choose
to enter AM markets.
2This is captured by assumption (3.3).
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3.3.4 Long-run survivorship and entries of unskilled managers
While this chapter accounts for exit and entry decisions of both skilled and unskilled
managers, those of unskilled managers are of particular interest. Once a manager
survives for a sufficiently long time, her true skill is eventually revealed 3 . The following
corollary shows that old funds run by skilled managers never choose to exit in a
stationary equilibrium.
Corollary 3.2 Denote the survival time of fund i by ti, and the probability of the
manager being H-type by pi,t. If the manager of fund i is H-type, as tj -* oo, the fund
never chooses to exit.
Proof. See Appendix. n
Therefore, the long-term survivorship of skilled managers is relatively trivial com-
pared with that of unskilled managers.
Long-term survivorship of unskilled managers
As the survival time becomes sufficiently long, the true (lack of) skill of unskilled
managers is revealed, i.e., pt converges to 0 almost surely as t -+ oo. Since the fair
size of funds run by those managers is zero, these funds are always overpriced. The
value of fee profits to unskilled managers (with their type being revealed) is
T D
Vt = V(0, 4) = Et [t e--- ( 4u - ) duj
where
d~t = (b - 7 qt)dt + ,/q-e (-dWt + o-,zdZt)
Therefore, the value to surely unskilled managers is determined by how much naive
money they currently have, and how much naive money they can attract in the future.
The following lemma is helpful for the rest of the analysis:
3Formally, as t -+ oc, pt for a skilled manager converges to 1 almost surely, and pt for an unskilled
manager converges to 0 almost surely.
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Lemma 3.3 The set E defined by (3.6) diminishes as A and b increase. Precisely,
E(A ',b') C E( A,b) ,VA' > A), b' > b .
Proof. See Appendix. m
Before making formal statements, it is useful to define the precise meaning of the
long-run survivorship. Here, I define the long-run survivorship of unskilled managers
as the expected survival time once the type of those managers is revealed, given
the current naive money 4t fixed. A more general definition is the probability of
an unskilled manager's survival for sufficiently long time after entry. These two
definitions are closely related, and the relation is examined in the following analysis.
Proposition 3.3 The long-run survivorship of unskilled managers increases in b,
i.e., the expected survival time of surely unskilled managers increases in b, given qt
fixed.
Proof. See Appendix. *
Given the amount 4t of currently invested naive capital fixed, higher b allows surely
unskilled funds to attract more naive capital in the future. Hence, those managers
are expected to survive longer than they are for lower b. The result of Proposition
3.3 is valid regardless of the value of A, since fee profits of surely unskilled managers
do not depend on the value of A.
On the other hand, the following corollary requires a certain condition on A.
Corollary 3.3 Suppose that A 1 > A 2 and b1 > b2 . The probability of an unskilled
manager's survival is higher for (A 1, b1 ) than it is for (A 2 , b2 ) at any point of time,
given the prior skill po at entry fixed.
Proof. See Appendix. *
Therefore, as long as A does not decrease, an increase in b raises the probability of
an unskilled manager's survival at any point of time, given her prior skill fixed. This
is equivalent to the statement that the distribution of unskilled managers' survival
time becomes (first-order stochastically) dominant as b increases, which implies an
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increase in the expected survival time of those managers. Therefore, in this case, for
unskilled managers, the probability of survival and the expected survival time move
in the same direction as b changes.
However, if A decreases, the result of Corollary 3.3 does not hold. For A1 < A 2
and b, > b2 , the probability of survival for (A 1 , bi) does not necessarily dominate that
for (A 2 , b 2 ). Hence, the expected survival time for (A 1 , bi) may not be longer than
that for (A 2 , b2). Therefore, the short-run survivorship of unskilled managers depends
both on the value of A and b, and does not monotonically increase in the value of b.
In the long run, the true (lack of) skill of unskilled managers is revealed regardless
of the prior. Therefore, after sufficiently long time, the survivorship of unskilled
managers is solely determined by their current AUM (from unsophisticated investors),
and the value of b, which represents their ability to attract naive capital in the future.
The long-run survivorship of unskilled managers, defined by their expected survival
time for fixed 4 once their true skill is revealed, increases in b by Proposition 3.3.
In the limit of sufficiently long time after entry, the survival probability of unskilled
managers increases in b as well4 . The following proposition proves that the long-term
survival probability is greater for higher b regardless of A:
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that b 1 > b2 . There exists T such that for all s > T, the
survival probability of unskilled managers for b1 is greater than that for b 2 -
Proof. See Appendix. n
Therefore, in the remainder of the chapter, the long-run survivorship of unskilled
managers indicates both the expected survival time for surely unskilled managers and
the survival probability of unskilled managers in the long run.
In an extreme case that b is sufficiently large compared with #, unskilled managers
never choose to exit and, hence, no managers choose to exit.
'Simply put, the long-run survival probability of unskilled managers is dominantly determined
by the value of b. A simple analogy is as follows. Compare two processes where one decays with rate
A, until T and with rate A' afterwards, and the other decays with rate A2 until T2 and with rate
A' afterwards. Suppose A1 > A2 and A' < A'. In the limit of infinite time, the survival probability
of the former process is always greater than that of the latter.
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Corollary 3.4 If
b > (r (3.10)f
no managers choose to exit.
Proof. See Appendix *
Entries of unskilled managers
Skilled managers and unskilled managers are not distinguishable at entry. New man-
agers enter the AM industry with a certain prior about their skill, and this prior
is correct: among a group of managers with the same prior probability p of being
H-type, p portion of managers in the group are skilled, and (1 - p) portion of man-
agers in the group are unskilled. Therefore, given the prior skill distribution fixed,
the entry threshold p* defined by (3.9) determines the number (measure) of newly
entering unskilled managers.
When p* is lower, more unskilled managers enter the AM industry, while more
skilled managers enter as well. The following proposition characterizes when p* is
lower, and the implications of lower p*.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that A1 > A 2 and b1 > b2 . P* is lower for (A1, b1 ) than
that for (A 2 , b 2 ). Given the prior skill distribution fixed, the number (measure) of
entries of both skilled and unskilled managers is greater for (A1, b1 ) than those for
(A 2 , b2 ). Also, the portion of unskilled managers among newly entering managers is
higher for (A 1 ,b 1 ) than it is for (A 2 ,b 2 ).
Proof. See Appendix. m
The entry threshold p* decreases in A and b. When p* is lower, there are more
entries of skilled and unskilled managers, but disproportionately more entries of un-
skilled managers.
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3.3.5 Determinants of the stationary equilibrium
The previous analysis shows that the long-term survivorship of unskilled managers
crucially depends on b, and the entry threshold p* determines the entries of unskilled
managers as well as those of skilled managers. Based on these analyses, I investigate
how exogenous components of the model influences the equilibrium variables and,
consequently, the long-run survivorship and entries of unskilled managers, by changing
the stationary equilibrium.
In this subsection, I assume that a stationary equilibrium exists and it is unique.
The existence and the uniqueness are shown in the next subsection.
Aggregate invest opportunities (A) and aggregate naive capital (b)
The following proposition characterizes how an increase in A, the parameter that
governs the aggregate invest opportunities, affects the stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6 Ceteris paribus, an increase in A increases A, decreases b, and
increases the number N of active managers in the AM industry.
Proof. See Appendix. m
In general cases, an increase in A induces more entries of prospective managers.
In particular, when hA(N) and hb(N) are not steep, p* decreases in A, i.e., there are
more entries of prospective managers when there are more investment opportunities.
This is proved in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.7 Suppose that in the stationary equilibrium the exit set E defined by
(3.6) is nonempty. Denote the equilibrium measure of active funds by N*. There exist
CA > 0 and Cb > 0 such that if |h' (N*) 5 CA and |h'(N*)| Cb, a small increase in
A leads to a decrease in p*.
Proof. See Appendix. n
As long as hA(N) and hb(N) are sufficiently flat, i.e., returns to scale at the indus-
try level are not steeply decreasing, there are more entries of prospective managers
to the AM industry as there are more aggregate investment opportunities available.
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When the exit set E is empty, it is straightforward to show that the entry threshold
p* decreases in A:
Corollary 3.5 Suppose that in the stationary equilibrium the exit set defined by (3.6)
is empty, a small increase in A leads to a decrease in p*.
Proof. See Appendix. *
The following proposition characterizes how an increase in b, the parameter that
governs the aggregate amount of naive money, affects the stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 3.8 Ceteris paribus, an increase in b decreases A, increases b, and
increases the number N of active managers in the AM industry.
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 3.6. See Appendix. *
In general cases, an increase in b induces more entries of prospective managers.
In particular, when hA(N) and hb(N) are not steep, p* decreases in b, i.e., there
are more entries of prospective managers when there are more capital inflows from
unsophisticated investors. This is proved in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.9 Suppose that in the stationary equilibrium the exit set E defined by
(3.6) is nonempty. Denote the equilibrium measure of active funds by N*. There exist
cA > 0 and cb > 0 such that if Ih' (N*)| cA and |h'(N*)I cb, a small increase in
b leads to a decrease in p*.
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 3.7. See Appendix. *
As long as hA(N) and hb(N) are sufficiently flat, i.e., returns to scale at the indus-
try level are not steeply decreasing, there are more entries of prospective managers
to the AM industry as there are more aggregate naive money available.
When the exit set E is empty, it is straightforward to show that the entry threshold
p* decreases in 6:
Corollary 3.6 Suppose that in the stationary equilibrium the exit set defined by (3.6)
is empty, a small increase in b leads to a decrease in p*.
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that of Corollary 3.5. See Appendix. m
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Entry costs (<D) and distribution (G(1 - p)) of the prior skill
So far, I have investigated exogenous parameters that directly affect the value of A,
the average value creation per time by a skilled manager, and b, the average naive
money inflow rate. Here, I consider two other exogenous components of the model:
the entry cost and the distribution of the prior skill of prospective managers.
The following proposition shows how an increase in the entry cost <D influences
the stationary equilibrium:
Proposition 3.10 Ceteris paribus, an increase in 4D increases A, increases b, in-
creases p*, and decreases the number N of active managers in the AM industry.
Proof. See Appendix. m
Lastly, I study how the distribution of the prior skill of prospective managers
affects the stationary equilibrium. I consider G(1 - p) f F'(p')dp' instead of F(p)
because of the condition (3.3) that is imposed in order to guarantee the existence of
a stationary equilibrium5 . I define that G,(x) dominates G2 (x) if
G2 () < G1(x) , VO < x < 1 .
G1(1 - p) dominating G2 (1 - p) implies that the former distribution has more skilled
prospective managers than the latter does, at any point p.
Proposition 3.11 Suppose that G1(1 - p) dominates G2 (1 - p). Ceteris paribus,
A1 < A 2, b1 < b2 , P* > p*, and N1 > N2 .
Proof. See Appendix. n
3.3.6 Existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium
The following proposition proves the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equi-
librium.
5 1f F(p) is used as the cumulative distribution, the condition (3.3) implies limp_4o+ F(p) = Oc.
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Proposition 3.12 A stationary equilibrium defined by Definition 1 exists and is
unique.
Proof. See Appendix. m
3.3.7 Numerical Examples
For the baseline numerical computation, I make the following parameter choices:
A= 1, b=3.5 , (3.11)
s = 0.3 , A = 0.05 , 71 = 0.05, r 0= , -=O, o= 2,
and decreasing returns to scale
hA(N) hb(N) N-1,
and the distribution density
F'(p) =0. 4(1 -P)3
The value of fee profits is plotted as follows:
[See figure 11
Entries among all prospective managers are characterized as
[See figure 21
The exit threshold is plotted in the following:
[See figure 31
Lastly, the stationary equilibrium distribution of managers in (p, q) is
[See figure 41
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0 = 1.5 , <D = 3 , f = 0.015 ,
3.4 Heterogeneity in Investor Sophistication
In this section, I consider two different types of AM markets that are heterogeneous
in investor sophistication. I refer to markets with more sophisticated investors as
hedge fund markets, and markets with less sophisticated investors as mutual fund
markets. In order to contrast these two types of markets, I model the heterogeneity
in investor sophistication in an extreme form: unsophisticated investors only exist in
mutual fund markets.
Since no unsophisticated investors exist in hedge fund markets, further analysis
on those markets is needed in order to characterize the stationary equilibrium. On
the other hand, the analyses of the previous section, especially the partial equilibrium
results, apply to mutual fund markets.
3.4.1 The model of hedge funds
When a skilled (H-type) manager runs a hedge fund, she can generate
A dt + -dZ )
dollars between t and t + dt. Similar to the baseline setup, Zt is a physical Brownian
motion and idiosyncratic. The hedge fund sector is also subject to the decreasing
returns to scale at the industry level, which is modeled in a reduced-form as follows:
Ah A hhh(Nh) , (3.12)
where Nh is the number (measure) of active hedge fund managers, and hh(-) is a
smooth monotone (strictly) decreasing function in Nh. A condition similar to (3.5)
is imposed on h(Nh):
lim hh(Nh) -+ oc , lim hh (Nh) -+ 0 . (3.13)
Nh -+0 Nh -oo
A hedge fund manager can offer any short-term per-invested-dollar fee contracts
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between time t and t + dt to the investors, i.e., at time t managers can offer a contract
that pays off
ftlt+dt
to the manager at t + dt as a function of verifiable variables at time t + dt, including
excess returns between t and t + dt, per invested dollar at time t.
When an unskilled (L-type) manager runs a hedge fund, she generates no value on
average, but the volatility of the value is the same as that of a skilled manager. Hedge
fund managers are risk-neutral as mutual fund managers are. Hedge fund managers
bear the same operating costs <dt between t and t + dt as mutual fund managers do.
At entry, hedge fund managers pay the same entry cost <b as mutual fund managers
do.
The following analysis assumes a stationary equilibrium, and takes Ah as given.
3.4.2 Fee revenues
The gross excess return on a hedge fund between t and t + dt is
Ah (IHdt + !dZt)dRit = qt
where 1 H is 1 if the manager of the fund is H-type and 0 otherwise. Given that
the short-term compensation contract offers ft,t+dt per invested dollar, the net excess
return on the fund between t and t + dt is
Ah ( H dt + !dZt)dr ex = dR e - ft,t+dt = A - ft,tdt-
Since investors can diversify away idiosyncratic risks by themselves, they accept the
compensation contract only if the net expected excess return (net alpha) is non-
negative. On the other hand, if the net alpha on a hedge fund is strictly negative,
sophisticated investors do not invest any dollars in the fund. Since there are no
unsophisticated investors in hedge fund markets (by assumption), strictly negative
net alpha cannot constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, the net alpha must be zero in
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equilibrium. This condition reads
_t A__d pt AhdtEt [dre ptAhdt Et[ftt+dt] = 0 < Et [ft,t+dt] = -
ht qt qt
The intuition for this result that the net alpha is zero in equilibrium is the same as
that of Berk and Green (2004). Fee revenues at t + dt expected at t are
Et [qft,t+dt] = ptAhdt = Et Ah IHdt + -dZt)
I s
Thus, regardless of the form of the short-term compensation contract ft,t+dt, the
skill of the hedge fund manager is correctly priced and compensated. The following
proposition summarizes the analysis.
Proposition 3.13 If all the investors are rational, and can freely move capital, the
skill of active managers is fairly compensated, i.e., the expected fee revenue is equiv-
alent to the amount of dollar value that the manager is expected to generate. The fee
structure does not matter for fee revenues and, consequently, fee profits.
Proof. Proof provided in the above analysis. m
When there are no unsophisticated investors in AM markets, AM markets are
indeed markets for active managers' skill. Since skill is scarce, managers take all the
rents from surplus that they are expected to generate no matter what compensation
contracts are.
3.4.3 The value of fee profits and exits of hedge funds
Expected fee profits that a hedge fund receives between t and t + dt are
(ptAh - O)dt
The value of fee profits at t can be written as
Vht = Et e r(ut) (puAh -,[l T~ d
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where TD is the point in time when the hedge fund manager exits. TD is determined
by either an exogenous exit or an endogenous exit, similar to the case of mutual funds.
Since the conditional distribution p,, for u > t at time t depends entirely on pt, the
state variable for the value of fee profits at t is pt. Hence, the value of fee profits can
be rewritten as Vh,t = Vh(pt).
In dynamic programming language, the value of fee profits reads
Vh(pt) = max (ptAh - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)Et [V(pt+dt)], 0}
where
dpt = SPt (1 - pt) d~t .
When the value is greater than zero, the value function Vh(p) is smooth, and solves
the following ordinary differential equation (ODE):
1
(r + A)Vh(p) = (pAh - #) + V_(p)s2p2(1 _ p)2
There exist analytic solutions to the ODE. One can decompose Vh(p) into
Vh(p) = V(p) V'(p),
where Vhb(p) is the particular solution, and V(p) is the homogeneous solution. The
particular solution is
1
Vh (p) =(pAh 
-q!),
and the homogeneous solution takes the following form:
Vho(P) = C1 Vfl -P1+'1 + C2 VP' 1 -PI ,
where
p= 1+(2 >1, (3.14)
and the coefficients ci and c 2 are determined by boundary conditions.
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The following lemma characterizes some properties of Vh(p):
Lemma 3.4 Vh(p) is increasing and convex.
Proof. See Appendix. m
Since the state variable for a hedge fund is p, endogenous exit decisions by hedge
fund managers depend only on p. Define the set of p where hedge fund managers
choose to exit:
Eh {pVh(p) = O}
Since Vh(O) = 0, the exit set Eh of hedge funds is always nonempty, unlike the exit set
Em of mutual funds which may (or not) be empty. The set Eh is fully characterized
by ph as follows:
Eh - {plp < ph} , (3.15)
since Vh(p) is increasing in p. In continuous time, hedge fund managers choose to exit
immediately after p reaches ph and, hence, h is the exit threshold for hedge fund
managers. Therefore, hedge fund managers choose to exit if their skill is perceived as
low.
At p = 0 and p = 1, the manager's type is fully revealed, and there is no additional
learning about her skill. As a result,
Vh(0) = max{-#dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)Vh(0), 0} = 0,
Vh(1) max{(Ah - #)dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)Vh(1), 0} = max { , 0 .}
If Vh(1) = 0, p h = 1 and Vh(p) is uniformly zero. If Vh(1) > 0, i.e., Ah > 0, ph < 1
and c2 = 0. The smooth pasting condition at p = pi, further pins down ci and p as
follows:
C ( = 0)jl l 1- 7 (3.16)
(r + A)ap + id
and
Pex = 24 (3.17)
p+ q-h
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where p is defined in (3.14). ph is increasing in + and p. Therefore, the exit set Eh
of hedge funds diminishes as Ah increases:
Proposition 3.14 For Ah,1 > Ah,2, Eh(Ah,1) C Eh(Ah,2).
Proof. It is straightforward from (3.15) and (3.17). n
3.4.4 Stationary equilibrium
Since there are two types of AM markets, the a stationary equilibrium must be re-
defined. The state variables for an individual mutual fund manager are p and 4, and
the state variable for an individual hedge fund manager is p. The aggregate state of
the economy is the distribution of agents across states in mutual fund markets and
hedge fund markets.
In order to define the aggregate state variables formally, define the state space for
an individual manager. The state space of a mutual fund manager is the Cartesian
product Sm : [0, 1] x [0, oo) with Borel u algebra 3m, and that of a hedge fund is
Sh : [0, 1] with Borel o- algebra Bt . For any set Sm C L3m, pm(Sm) is the measure of
mutual fund managers in the set Sm. Similarly, for any set Sh E Bh, ph(Sh) is the
measure of hedge fund managers in the set Sh.
Definition 2 A stationary equilibrium is value functions Vm : Sm - R>0 and Vh
Sh R>O; the base surplus A, the additional surplus for hedge funds and the average
naive capital inflow rate b; and stationary measures p* and p* such that
" Given (Am, Ah, b), Vm(p, 4) and Vh(p) are value functions of mutual fund man-
agers and hedge fund managers, respectively.
* Given p* and p*, Nm = f f p* (p, 4)dpd4 and Nh f p* (p)dp are consistent
with the values of (A,,, Ah, b) by (3.4) and (3.12).
" Prospective managers arrive with the prior skill distribution F(p), and chooses
to enter mutual fund markets if Vm(p, 0) > Vh(p) and V,,(p, 0) > 1D, and enter
hedge fund markets if V,(p, 0) < Vh(p) and Vh(p) D.
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" Mutual fund managers choose to exit if V,(p, 4) = 0, and hedge fund managers
choose to exit if Vh(p) = 0. In addition, existing managers exogenously exit
under the Poisson process with probability Adt between t and t + dt.
* p* and p* are invariant under entries, exits and the transition of states of
existing managers, given by
dp = sp(1 - p)dZ, d = (b - q) dt + y' o-dW +or- d2)
3.4.5 Entries
A prospective manager with probability p of being H-type compares Vm(p, 0) and
Vh(p), and chooses to enter an AM market with a higher value of fee profits, as long
as the participation constraint
max{Vm(p, 0), Vh(p)} - <) > 0 (3.18)
holds. Define p* and p* such that
(3.19)
A stationary equilibrium imposes the following conditions:
Lemma 3.5 In a stationary equilibrium, both p* and p* exist, and are unique, re-
spectively. Vm(p, 0) or Vh(p) cannot dominate the other, i.e.,
Vm(P, 0) > Vh(P), Vp > pl ,
or
V(P,0) < Vh(P), Vp > p,
is inconsistent with a stationary equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. n
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V (Prnm, 0) = Vh (P*) =- <D .
From this lemma, one can prove the following proposition straightforwardly:
Proposition 3.15 In a stationary equilibrium, Ah > Am,.
Proof. See Appendix. m
This proposition implies that in a stationary equilibrium, hedge fund managers
generate more value than mutual fund managers do. Mutual fund managers enjoy
additional fee profits when they succeed attracting sufficient capital from unsophisti-
cated investors, but hedge fund managers are always fairly compensated. Therefore,
for prospective managers to be motivated to enter hedge fund markets, they must be
able to generate greater value in hedge fund markets than they are in mutual fund
markets.
This result implies that the sensitivity of the entry value to the perceived skill of
the manager is generally lower for mutual funds than for hedge funds. The following
lemma justifies this statement.
Lemma 3.6 The sensitivity of the hedge fund entry value to the perceived skill of the
manager satisfies
V '(p) < Ah
h r +A'
where the equality holds for p = 1. On the other hand, the sensitivity of the mutual
fund entry value to the perceived skill of the manager- satisfies
DVm (p,0) Am< Ah
ap r+A r+A
for all p.
Proof. See Appendix. U
This lemma shows that the maximum sensitivity of the entry value to the perceived
skill is strictly higher for hedge funds than for mutual funds. However, Vh(p) cannot be
strictly higher than &vm( ,O) for all p > ph , because otherwise Vh(p) strictly dominatesap e
Vm(p, 0). Still, the sensitivity of hedge fund entry value to skill (p) is strictly higher
than that of mutual fund entry value for high p.
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A high-skilled (high p) manager generates more value by managing a hedge fund,
and the value of her fee profits is more sensitive to her skill when she manages a
hedge fund, compared to the case where she runs a mutual fund. This implies that
better-skilled (with higher prior p of being skilled) prospective managers tend to enter
hedge fund markets. Although this sounds intuitive, it is hard to formally prove that
in general cases, mainly because V(p, q) does not have an analytic form.
In order to formally prove that high-skilled prospective managers choose to enter
hedge fund markets, I make an additional assumption: the signal-to-noise ratio s of
managers' skill is sufficiently small. This is a reasonable assumption considering how
noisy the actual track records of asset managers are. The following Lemma defines
what sufficiently small s means.
Lemma 3.7 There exists signal-to-noise ratio s = s such that for all s < 9
r A
where p* is defined in (3.19).
Proof. See Appendix. n
Given that the signal-to-noise ratio s being sufficiently low, prospective managers
sort themselves based on the investor sophistication: high-skilled managers enter
hedge fund markets, and low-skilled mangers enter mutual fund markets. This is
proved in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.16 Suppose that s is smaller than - as defined in Lemma 3.7. There
exists 0 < p < 1 such that prospective managers with p C (p*,, P) enter mutual fund
markets, and prospective managers with p C (7,1] enter hedge fund markets.
Proof. See Appendix. m
The intuition is, when s is low, the value of the exit option for hedge fund managers
becomes small. This implies that the sensitivity of the value of hedge fund fee profits
to skill (p) is close to the maximum slope Ah as long as the perceived skill p is
r+A
sufficiently far from the exit threshold p h. Therefore, the slope of the hedge fund fee
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value with respect to p is strictly greater than the slope of the mutual fund fee value
for most values of p. Since hedge fund markets compensate managers' skill better
than mutual fund markets do, high-skilled managers enter hedge fund markets.
When the mutual fund exit set Em is empty, it is also possible to prove that
prospective managers strictly sort themselves based on the investor sophistication,
regardless of the value of s. This is proved in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.17 Suppose that the mutual fund exit set E, is empty. There exists
0 < P < 1 such that prospective managers with p E (p*,,, P) enter mutual fund markets,
and prospective managers with p E (p, 1] enter hedge fund markets.
Proof. See Appendix. m
Since the value of hedge fund fee profits tends to be more sensitive to skill com-
pared with the value of mutual fund fee profits, prospective managers with higher
skill tend to enter hedge fund markets.
While unskilled hedge fund managers eventually choose to exit as they reveal their
(lack of) skill, unskilled mutual fund managers may survive as long as they attract
sufficient naive capital. In the limit of zero operating costs, the attrition rate of hedge
fund managers is strictly higher than that of mutual fund managers.
Corollary 3.7 In the limit of 0 -> 0, the hedge fund attrition rate is strictly greater
than the mutual fund attrition rate.
Proof. See Appendix. m
In summary, hedge fund markets are characterized by relatively high-skilled man-
agers attracting smart money. On the other hand, mutual fund markets are charac-
terized by relatively low-skilled managers attracting naive money.
3.4.6 Existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium
When there are two types of markets, formally proving the existence and/or the
uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium is quite difficult. The primary reason is that
prospective managers choose between those two types when they enter. The binary
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choice does not guarantee continuous changes of entry decisions as equilibrium pa-
rameters change infinitesimally. The proof of the existence and/or the uniqueness of
a stationary equilibrium relies on such continuity (see the proof of Proposition 3.12).
For example, consider an extreme case where Vm(p, 0) = V(p) - 6 where 6 is
infinitesimal. In this case, all entries of prospective managers are into mutual fund
markets. Now suppose that Ah increases slightly. In this case, prospective managers
choose to enter hedge fund markets only. This example highlights why small changes
in equilibrium parameters may not translate into small changes in entries. While
that example is quite extreme, without knowing properties of Vm(p, 0) sufficiently, it
is hard to exclude discontinuities in entry decisions.
Therefore, when there are two types of markets heterogeneous in investor sophis-
tication, I provide a limited set of results regarding the existence and uniqueness of
a stationary equilibrium. For example, Proposition 3.16 shows that, for s lower than
9 defined in Lemma 3.7, there exists a cutoff of the prior skill such that prospective
managers with skill higher than the cutoff enter hedge fund markets, and prospective
managers with skill lower than the cutoff enter mutual fund markets. Such sorting of
prospective managers is helpful for proving the existence and uniqueness of a station-
ary equilibrium, because the structure (sorting) guarantees the continuity of entry
decisions. However, since s depends on the values of Am and Ah, it is possible that
there is no finite - that guarantees the sorting of prospective managers for the entire
space of Am and Ah. In an extreme case where s -> 0, the result of Proposition
3.16 always holds. Therefore, I prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary
equilibrium in this extreme case:
Proposition 3.18 In the limit of s -4 0, there exists a stationary equilibrium and it
is unique.
Proof. See Appendix. n
Similar to Proposition 3.18, I consider an extreme case where the assumption of
Proposition 3.17 always holds. The mutual fund exit set Em may be either empty or
nonempty depending on the value of b. The only case where the mutual fund exit set
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is always nonempty regardless of b is the limit case of zero operating cost: # -- 0. I
prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in this extreme case:
Proposition 3.19 In the limit of 0 -+ 0, there exists a stationary equilibrium and it
is unique.
Proof. See Appendix m
Note that these results are in limited cases, as opposed to the general proof of
the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in Proposition 3.12 when
markets are homogeneous in investor sophistication.
3.4.7 Numerical Examples
I use the baseline parameter choices given in (3.11) for the mutual fund industry. In
addition, I make the following parameter choices for the hedge fund industry:
Ah = 0.6 , hh(Nh) = N1. (3.20)
Vm(p, 0) and Vh(p) are plotted as follows:
[See figure 51
Entries to mutual fund markets and hedge fund markets among all prospective man-
agers are characterized as
[See figure 6]
The stationary equilibrium distribution of mutual fund managers in (p, ) is
[See figure 71
The stationary equilibrium distribution of hedge fund managers in p is
[See figure 81
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3.5 Regulatory Implications for Retail Investor Pro-
tection
This discussion has implications (although limited) for regulations regarding retail in-
vestor protection. One crucial caveat is that this chapter does not provide a rationale
for retail investor protection, since financial transactions are merely the redistribu-
tion of wealth and do not necessarily improve the aggregate welfare. In addition, this
chapter does not address how the structure of AM markets affects the efficiency (or
price discovery) of asset markets. Therefore, no regulatory implications are offered
regarding welfare, and the regulatory focus is limited to identifying and elucidat-
ing effective measures for retail investor protection. Such are the limitations of the
regulatory implications of the chapter.
3.5.1 Protection of unsophisticated investors
In this chapter, sophisticated investors always break even since they only invest in
fairly priced active funds or passive benchmarks. In contrast, unsophisticated in-
vestors lose wealth when they invest their capital (naive capital) in underperforming
(overpriced) funds. While those investors can improve the outcome by investing in
passive benchmarks with similar risk characteristics, why they do not switch is not
the focus of this chapter. On the other hand, unsophisticated investors can break
even by investing in fairly priced funds. Therefore, the aggregate wealth transfer
from unsophisticated investors to active funds depends on how much naive money is
allocated to overpriced funds.
Whether a fund is overpriced, or not, depends on the skill of the manager and
the amount of invested naive money. By Proposition 1.1, a fund is less likely to be
overpriced when the (perceived) skill of the manager is high, and when the amount
of invested naive money is small. Translating this statement into the language of
the model, a fund is less likely to be overpriced when A, the amount of value per
time that a skilled manager generates, is high, and b, the average naive capital inflow
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rate to a fund, is low. In addition, low b reduces naive money allocations to the
fund. At the individual fund level, the protection of unsophisticated investors seems
straightforward: encourage active funds to generate more value, and prevent them
from attracting unsophisticated investors.
However, regulations that affect the incentive structure of active funds may also
affect those funds' entry and exit decisions. Specifically, entries of unskilled managers
and their survivorship are of particular concern. While unskilled managers enter AM
markets with a certain expectation of having skill, their true skill is revealed as their
track records accumulate. Therefore, funds run by unskilled managers are more likely
to become overpriced, and eventually are overpriced when their (lack of) skill is fully
revealed. If those managers survive in the long run, they negatively influence the
wealth of their (unsophisticated) investors for long periods.
Therefore, regulations that aim to protect retail investors must take into account
both the intensive margin (individual funds being overpriced and receiving more naive
capital) and the extensive margin (more entries of unskilled managers and their long-
term survivorship). In particular, high A decreases the probability of individual
funds being overpriced, but increases entries of unskilled managers. In contrast, low
b decreases the probability of individual funds being overpriced, discourages entries
of unskilled managers, and reduces the long-run surviviorship of unskilled managers.
Regulations that intend to influence one of them (e.g., raise or lower A) may also
affect the equilibrium value of the other (the value of b) through competition among
funds.
Regulations affect the industry-wide parameters (e.g., A, a parameter governing
the aggregate amount of value creation, and b, a parameter influencing the aggregate
naive money inflow), and may change the industry equilibrium. For example, regula-
tions that restrict the value-generating activities of active funds (e.g., strict disclosure
rules) can be thought of as decreasing A, and may discourage entries of unskilled man-
agers by raising the entry threshold p*. However, such regulations can increase the
long-term survivorship of unskilled managers by increasing b. This type of regulation
may be detrimental to the wealth of unsophisticated investors. On the other hand,
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regulations that discourage active funds from attracting capital from unsophisticated
investors (e.g., fiduciary rules for brokers and advisors) can be regarded as lowering b.
Such regulations may reduce entries of unskilled managers, and decrease the long-run
survivorship of unskilled managers (lower p* and lower b). This type of regulation is
likely to be beneficial to the wealth of unsophisticated investors.
Another regulatory implication of this chapter is that regulations for one type of
AM market (e.g., the hedge fund industry) may affect other types of AM markets (e.g.,
the mutual fund industry) in the long run. For example, imposing strict regulations on
the hedge fund industry may decrease the profitability of individual hedge funds, and,
as a result, induce better skilled prospective managers to enter mutual fund markets.
In the long run, this may increase the competition in the mutual fund industry, and,
hence, lower the long-term survivorship of unskilled managers. Regulations for the
AM industry must take into account the long-run interactions among different types
of AM markets.
3.5.2 Fee structure
The model does not address how funds make fee choices, mainly because endogeniz-
ing fee choices involves modeling how unsophisticated investors respond to fees. Such
modeling requires additional specific assumptions about the behavior of unsophisti-
cated investors, and these assumptions are not easy to justify, particularly because
this chapter studies industry equilibria. Different industry equilibria correspond to
different degrees of competition, and it is hard to imagine that the way in which
unsophisticated investors react to fees stays unchanged when competition in the AM
industry becomes more (or less) fierce.
While there is a clear reason why this chapter does not model fee choices, its
framework can address a certain aspect of mutual fund fee choices. The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970 in the US prohibited mutual funds from charging
asymmetrical performance fees. As a consequence, in the US, mutual funds face a
restricted set of fee choices: flat fees, which are overwhelmingly used in the mutual
fund industry, or fulcrum (symmetrical) fees, which are employed by only a handful
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of mutual funds. Since only a tiny portion of US mutual funds adopt fulcrum fees,
researchers find it difficult to conduct meaningful empirical investigations on the fund
choice of fee structure, not merely the level of fees.
Under an additional assumption, this chapter can show that mutual funds prefer
flat fees to fulcrum fees. Between t and t + dt, a fund may charge a proportional fee
of
ft,twdt = f dt + V)(drx),
where drex is the net return of the fund between t and t + dt excess the benchmark.
O(x) is an arbitrary increasing function' satisfying 4'(x) = -0(-x), since mutual
funds in the US are restricted from charging asymmetrical performance fees. One
crucial assumption that I make is that unsophisticated investors only pay attention
to f, i.e., the fixed component, and their capital flows to a fund only depend on f.
Note that this is a fairly strong assumption.
Suppose that a fund may choose its fee schedule once at entry, and cannot change
it afterwards7 . The following proposition proves that the fund (strictly) prefers flat
fees to fulcrum fees.
Proposition 3.20 Suppose that flows of naive capital only depend on f (the fixed
component of fees). At entry, managers choose flat fees over symmetrical fees, i.e.,
0(drVx) = 0
is the optimal fee choice for managers.
Proof. See Appendix. *
The intuition of Proposition 3.20 is as follows: symmetrical fees hurt funds when
the funds are expected to underperform, while fee structure does not matter (for fee
revenues) when the funds are expected to perform the same as the market. Therefore,
6I only consider fees that monotonically increase in performance. Fees that do not belong to this
class (e.g., fees that locally decrease in performance) may cause serious moral hazard problems (e.g.,
managers intentionally lowering their performance in order to receive higher fees).
7This assumption is not needed, but adopted for illustrative purpose. The conclusion does not
change even if funds may change the fee schedule continuously.
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symmetrical fees reduce the value of fee profits, by lowering fee profits when the
managerial skill is overpriced. When funds are restricted to charging symmetrical
fees, those funds find it optimal to choose flat fee structures, since that maximizes the
amount of fees that those funds can extract from unsophisticated investors. Although
the result of Proposition 3.20 relies on the strong assumption that naive capital only
depends on f, the result still holds if the behavior of unsophisticated investors is
sufficiently insensitive to the choice of 0(_) 8 .
This discussion points to the possibility that active funds choose their fee struc-
ture in order to exploit unsophisticated investors. Therefore, regulations for the AM
industry, particularly those restricting fee choices, must take this aspect into account.
Other possible explanations for fee structure choice
There are other valid explanations, from the perspective of investor rationality, for
why US mutual funds overwhelmingly choose flat fees over fulcrum fees. If investors
are rational and can freely move capital, as discussed in Proposition 3.13, fee structure
does not matter for fee profits. Yet, if managers are risk-averse and are not able to
hedge risk associated with fee profits, they may prefer flat fees to fulcrum fees in
order to receive less volatile streams of fee profits. Another explanation comes from a
view that fee contracts are means of aligning the incentives of the principal (investors)
and the agent (managers). If symmetrical performance fees discourage managers from
taking actions that are beneficial to the investors, and/or encourage managers to take
actions that are detrimental to the investors, the optimal fee contract can take the
form of flat fees.
There is a study by Drago, Lazzari and Navone (2010) that challenges these ex-
planations. The authors examine the fee structure choice of funds in Italian mutual
fund markets, where no (significantly) restrictive regulations for fee structure existed
until 2006. Their study documents that, in the Italian equity mutual fund industry
before 2006, the "bonus plan", i.e., fixed fees plus rewards for outperforming (but no
8 Under a cheap assumption that unsophisticated investors "hate" nontrivial 0(.), the result holds
as well.
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penalties for underperforming), is the standard fee structure and no funds employ
fulcrum fees. Those explanations based on investor rationality need to account for
both why funds (strictly) prefer flat fees to symmetrical fees, and prefer asymmetrical
fees (the bonus plan) to flat fees.
There may be other explanations for such fee structure choices. One possibility is
that those fee choices are path-dependent: once the industry standard is set up, new
funds cannot easily adopt other fee structures. Another explanation is that the differ-
ence in fee choices comes from, for example, heterogeneity in investor characteristics
between the US and Italian mutual fund industry. While these types of explanations
are valid, those hypotheses are not easily verifiable (or falsifiable), and violate the
expected universality of economic perspectives.
3.6 Discussions and Conclusions
This chapter concerns only the extensive margin, i.e., entries and exits of funds, but
not the intensive margin, i.e., actions other than entries and exits that individual
funds may take. In contrast, chapter 2 deals only with the intensive margin. It
would be interesting to study the interactions between the extensive margin and the
intensive margin in the context of the industry equilibrium, which remain a topic for
future research.
I would like to note that labor market dynamics are not dealt with, since one of
the underlying assumptions of the model entails the fixed distribution of the prior skill
of prospective managers regardless of how competitive AM markets are. However, in
reality, it is hard to imagine that the supply of prospective managers is unaltered by
the degree of competition in the AM industry. For instance, when skilled managers
are relatively highly compensated due to comparatively low competition, those who
are sufficiently competent outside AM markets are prone to enter the labor market,
expanding the supply of skilled prospective managers. Numerous questions on the
interactions between the AM markets and the labor market for prospective managers
remain to be explored, both theoretically and empirically.
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In conclusion, this chapter proposes a model that associates naive money with
entry and exit decisions of active funds. Under a small set of modest assumptions,
this chapter offers insights into the structure of the AM industry by examining the
industry equilibrium. These insights may be useful for evaluating the impact of
regulations that are designed to protect retail investors.
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Figures
Figure 1: Value of fee profits
The following figure plots the value of fee profits as a function of the probability p
of being H-type and the amount of invested naive money q. Parameter choices are
given in (3.11).
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Figure 2: Entry threshold
The following figures plot the density distribution of the prior skill of prospective
managers. The left figure plots the density distribution for all prospective managers,
and the right figure plots the density distribution for managers who choose to enter
the AM industry. Parameter choices are given in (3.11).
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Figure 3: Exit threshold
The following figures plot the exit threshold as a function of the probability p of being
H-type. Parameter choices are given in (3.11).
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Figure 4: Distribution of managers
The following figure plots the stationary equilibrium density distribution of managers
in p and q. Parameter choices are given in (3.11).
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous AM markets - Value of fee profits
The following figure plots Vm(p, 4), Vh(p) and the entry threshold. Parameter choices
are given in (3.11) and (3.20).
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous AM markets - Entry decisions
The following figures plot the density distribution of the prior skill of prospective
managers. The left figure plots the density distribution for all prospective managers,
and the right figure plots the density distribution for managers who choose to enter
the mutual fund industry and hedge fund industry. Parameter choices are given in
(3.11) and (3.20).
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Figure 7: Distribution of mutual fund managers - Heterogenous
AM markets
The following figure plots the stationary equilibrium density distribution of mutual
fund managers in p and q. Parameter choices are given in (3.11) and (3.20).
0.01
O 0.005,
0A4
2000
Naive money
0.4
P0
Distribution of mutual fund managers
145
Figure 8: Distribution of hedge fund managers - Heterogenous
AM markets
The following figure plots the stationary equilibrium density distribution of hedge
fund managers in p. Parameter choices are given in (3.11) and (3.20).
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
V(p, 4) is the fixed point of the following map:
Tf(p, 4) =max {(max{pA, fci} - o) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f(p', '')Ip, c] ,} , (3.21)
where
P/|p
4'| 1
= p + sp(1 - p)dZ ,
= + (b -rq)dt + yvl~ (o-dW + orzdZ)
where Z is a standard Brownian motion. The contraction mapping theorem guaran-
tees that
V(p, 4) = lim) T )
for an arbitrary function f(p, 4).
Suppose that f(p, 4) is an (weakly) increasing function in p and 4. For p, < P2,
E [f(p', 4') Ipl, 4] 5 E [f(p', 4')1p2, 4] ,
since p'lp2 first-order stochastically dominates p'lpi asymptotically as dt -+ 0, and
the distribution of 4' is unaffected. As a result,
Tf(pi, 4) = max {(max{p1 A, f 4} - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f(p', 4') p], 0}
Tff(p2, 4) = max {(max{p 2A, f 4} - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f(P', 4') P21, 0}
since max{p1 A, fci} max{p 2 A, f 4}. Hence, T maps an increasing function in p to
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an increasing function in p. Similarly, for 41 < 42,
E [f(p', 4') 1p, 41] :! E [f (p', 4') p, 421
since 4'142 first-order stochastically dominates 4'141 asymptotically as dt -+ 0, and
the distribution of p' is unaffected. As a result, together with max{pA, f'1}
max{pA, f 21,
Tf (p, 41) < Tf (p, 42) .
Hence, T maps an increasing function in 4 to an increasing function in 4. Since f(p, 4)
is increasing in p and 4,
V(p, 4) = lim Tkf( )k-*oo
is increasing in p and 4 as well.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Given the same map T as in (3.21), suppose that f(p, 4) is (weakly) convex in the
direction of (sp(l - p), -79) at each (p, 4). For an arbitrary point (p, 4), define
(P1, 41) =(pA 4) - (6P, 6e4) ,(P2, q2) =(pA 4) (6P, 64)
where 6p and 64 are infinitesimal and
(6p, 6 4) c (sp(1 - P), -z V') .
The order of magnitude of 6p and 64 is set to be the same as or smaller than that
of dt. This assumption on the magnitude of 6 p and SJ guarantees that first- and
second-order derivatives of V(p, 4) are constants in an infinitesimal region within 6p
and 64.
I first show that the following holds:
E [f(p', q')1p, :5 E [f(p', q')Ipi, 41] + IE [f(p', 4') 1p2, 4212 2
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i.e., E [f(p', 4')|p, 4] is locally convex in the direction of (sp(1 - p), uv7). Expanding
the LHS yields
= E [f (p + sp(1 - p)dZ, 4+ (b - q4)dt + V ( udW + )d]
f (p, 4) (b -q4) + 1s 2 22 p2
1 2 f(p) 2 + 2 )4+ a2fs(p ( )O p09l - P)azv-] dt
1 1
2 21 fp '|1 1 [f(pd)p2 2
= (f(P1, 41) + f(p2, 42)) + I )(b - 74)
2 ( +)
1___ aD p )0 2+a24 2f (p, ) sp-
+ a
2f(p,) 2 2
22sp(1 _ p) 2
)uz v] dt + O(v/t)}.
If f(p, 4) is strictly convex at (p, 4) in the direction of diffusion dZ in p and 4, i.e.,
.92f (pd)
[sp(1 - p) [-299 a2f (p4)
L pN
.92f(p'4)
a4
the following is (strictly) positive:
Ef(p', 1)Ipj, i1] + [f(P, 4)IP2, q2] - E
2 2
1 ma2f{(p, 4) 62 +a2 f (Pt) +2 ap2 +2 g C0
+ max{ 0(jp2dt), 0(642dt)} .
If f(p, 4) is flat at (p, 4) in the direction of the diffusion dZ in p and 4, i.e.,
[sp(1 -p)
[a2f(p,4)
Op 2a I a2f (p4)
L90
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Similarly,
[Sp(l ~ P)
cxz V'q J > 0 ,
[f(p', Cj') p,
02 f(p,4) 62
a42 I
a2 f(p, 4) P 
-)
a42 Oz r
= 0
E [ f ( p', 4')|1p, 4]
= f (P, 4) + I
then
1 1
-E [f(p' q')pi, 1] + -E [f(P', 4')P2, 421 - E [f(p', ')p, 4]
2 ' 2
1 af (p, 4)2 4 ((b - q41) + (b - 94)-2(b - 714)) dt
+ (2f (pj) 2 (1 + ( 2 - 24) dt + max{0(6P2
= max{0(4p2Vgit), O(6(j2Vg23 )
Hence, the second-order derivative of E [f(p', 4') p, 4] in the direction of (sp(1 -
p), ozV') is at the order of V s or smaller. In the continuous-time limit where
terms of the order of dt dominate, the second-order derivative is zero. Therefore,
E [f(p', j')|p, 4] is convex in the direction of (sp(1 - p), a /).
Note that this logic cannot be applied to (6p, 64) that is orthogonal to (sp(1 -
p), ozq)- If f(p, 4) is strictly convex in the direction of (sp(1 - p), a,/=), but flat
in the orthogonal direction, the second-order derivative of E [f(p', 4') p, 4] in the or-
thogonal direction may be negative at the order of dt. Although one starts from
strictly convex f(p, 4) (in all directions) in order to avoid such a situation, the limit
Tkf(p, 4) as k -s oo may be weakly convex, since the set of strictly convex functions
is not closed. Hence, E [Tkf(p', 4') p, 4] may be locally concave in the direction that
is orthogonal to (sp(1 - p), o/d).
Having proven that E [f(p', 4')lp, '] is convex in the direction of (sp(1 - p), ozV 4)
if f(p, 4) is convex in that direction, I next prove that Tf(p, 4) is convex in the same
direction. Since
max{pA, f 4}
is a convex function,
(max{pA, f 4} - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f(p', q-')]
is convex in the direction of (sp(l - p), Ou,/). Since taking the pointwise maximum
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of two functions preserves convexity,
Tf(p, 4) = max { (max{pA, f 4} - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f(p', 4') 1p, 4], 0}
is convex in the direction of (sp(1 - p), o, /q) in the continuous-time limit.
Since the map T preserves the convexity in the direction of the diffusion dZ in p
and 4,
V(p,4) lim Tkf (p 4)
k-+oo
is convex in the direction of (sp(1 - p), a-zy 7).
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Since V(p, 4) is nonnegative and increasing in p and 4, if V(p', 4') = 0, V(p", 4") 0
for all p" < p' and " 4'. Suppose that (pi, 41) is on the curve q = h(p), i.e.,
V(pi, ') > 0 for all 4' > 41 and V(pi, ') = 0 for all 4' < 41. In addition, suppose that
the curve is (strictly) upward sloping at (pi, 41), i.e., there exists (p2, q2) on the curve
4 = h(p), where P2 > pi and 42 > 4i. However, this implies V(pi, 42) = 0, which leads
to a contradiction. Therefore, 4 = h(p) is downward-sloping.
Since lim&,o V(p, 4) -* oo, the continuity of V(p, 4) implies that there exists 4'
such that V(0, 4') > 0. Therefore, 4 = h(p) crosses the 4-axis at some 4 < 4'. If
4 = h(p) does not cross the p-axis, V(p, 0) is uniformly zero. This implies that there
is no entry, which contradicts a stationary equilibrium. Therefore, 4 = h(p) crosses
the p-axis at some 0 < p < 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.1
At 4 = 0, the direction of diffusion dZ is in the direction of p-axis. Therefore, Lemma
3.2 implies that V(p, 0) is convex in p. pex does not exist if and only if the set E is
empty by Proposition 3.1.
If pex does not exist, I first show that V(6p, 0) > V(0, 0) for an arbitrary small 6p.
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In order to show this, note that
TD
V(0, 0) = E [JT re-" (f 4. - #) du do = 0 j
where the right-hand side is strictly greater than zero from the definition of E. Since E
is empty, TD is solely determined by the Poisson (exogenous) exit process. Similarly,
TD
V(6p, 0) = E [ J - C_'u (max{pA, f 4} - 0) du Po = 6P, 40 = 01
Since E is empty, the process that determines TD is the same as that of V(0, 0). Since
the process of qu is independent of po, and the distribution of pu given po = 6p has a
positive probability for pu > 0,
V(6p, 0) > V(0, 0),
for an arbitrary small 6p. Therefore, V(p, 0) is strictly increasing in p at p = 0, if E
is empty. Then, the convexity of V(p, 0) yields
DV(p, 0) 0  Vp>O,
ap
This proves that V(p, 0) is strictly increasing if pe does not exist.
If Pe exists, by the definition of p,,, for p > Pex,
V(p, 0) > V(pex, 0) = 0.
This implies
V(p, 0)>Pex
dp
due to the convexity of V(p, 0). Therefore, V(p, 0) is strictly increasing for p > pex.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose p* does not exist, i.e., there is no p satisfying
V(p, 0) = <b .
Since V(p, 0) is (weakly) increasing, this implies that either V(p, 0) < <b for all p E
[0, 1], or V(p, 0) > <b for all p E [0, 1].
If V(p, 0) < <1 for all p, the participation constraint (3.7) does not hold for any
prospective managers. In this case, there is no entry and, as a result, no managers re-
main in the AM industry since existing managers eventually exit. This is inconsistent
with a stationary equilibrium because of assumption (3.5).
If V(p, 0) > <b for all p, the participation constraint (3.7) holds for all prospective
managers. In this case, an infinite number (measure) of prospective managers enter
AM markets because of assumption (3.3). Since V(p, 4) > <D > 0, funds do not choose
to exit and, as a result, the number (measure) of existing managers becomes infinite.
This is inconsistent with a stationary equilibrium because of assumption (3.5).
Given the existence of p*, the uniqueness naturally follows from Corollary 3.1.
Since V(p, 0) is strictly increasing for V(p, 0) > 0, if p* exists, i.e., V(p*, 0) = <D > 0,
it is unique. Since V(p, 0) is increasing, any p E [p*, 1] satisfies the participation
constraint (3.7).
Proof of Corollary 3.2
As t. -+ o0, pi,t converges to 1 almost surely. If pe exists, since pe < p* < 1
by Proposition 3.2 and V(1, 4) > V(p, 4) > V(p, 0) by Lemma 3.1, V(1, 4) > 0 by
Corollary 3.1 and the fund never chooses to exit. If pe does not exist, the set E
defined by (3.6) is empty by Proposition 3.1, and any fund never chooses to exit.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3
Consider A1 > A 2 . Since the process of pt and 4t do not depend on the value of A,
fee profits for A1 at any s > t
max{pA1 , f } - #
first-order stochastically dominate those for A 2 .
fee profits for A 1 is greater than the value of fee
Hence, for any (pt
profits for A 2, i.e.,
, 4t), the value of
(3.22)
Therefore, the set E(A1 , b) defined by (3.6) is a
not the case, i.e., there exists (p', 4') such that
subset of E(A 2, b). Suppose this is
V (p', o'; A& b) > 0 , V (p', 4'; A2, b) = 0,
which violates (3.22), and is a contradiction.
Similarly, consider b1 > b2 . Given 4t,
S(b)=,+ -S b-4)du+ j q (o-dW + oLzdZ) Vs >t .
4,(bi) first-order stochastically dominates 4,(b 2) for all s > t. As a result, fee profits
for b1 at any s > t
max{pA, fjs(bi)} -
first-order stochastically dominates those for b2 . Hence, for any 4t, the value of fee
profits for b1 is greater than the value of fee profits for b2 , i.e.,
(3.23)
Therefore, the set E(A, bi) is a subset of E(A, b 2 ). Suppose this is not the case, i.e.,
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V(pt, dt; A& b) > V(pt, dt; A2, b) .
V(pt, 4t; A, bi) ;> V(pt, 4t; A, b2) .
there exists (p', ') such that
V(p', 4'; A, bi) > 0 , V(p', 4'; A, b2) = 0 ,
which violates (3.23), and is a contradiction. Consequently, for all A' > A and b' > b,
E(A', b') C E(A', b) C E(A, b)
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Given 4t9 ,
4,(b) = 4t+ (b - 7 ,Jduj+ u(dWu + arzdZ) , Vs > t.
For b, > b2 , 4,(bi) first-order stochastically dominates 4,(b 2 ) for all s > t. In addition,
by Lemma 3.3, the exit threshold at p = 0 is lower for b1 than for b 2 . Therefore, since
4,(bi) first-order stochastically dominates 4,(b 2), and the exit threshold for 4,(b1 ) is
lower than that for 4,(b2 ), the probability of an unskilled manager's survival is higher
for b, than that is for b2 , at any s > t.
Denote the cumulative probability distribution function of survival time, condi-
tional on the survival at t, by F(ult), where the support is (t, oc). The probability of
an unskilled manager's survival at s > t (conditional on the survival at t) is closely
related to the distribution of the survival time in the following way:
P(survival between t and s) = 1 - F(sft) .
Therefore, the statement that the probability of an unskilled manager's survival is
higher for b1 than that is for b 2 at any s > t is equivalent to
F(sjt; A1 , bi) < F(slt; A 2, b 2) , Vs > t ,
9In this equation, the physical Brownian motion Zt is used instead of the "perceived" Brownian
motion Z, because the physical distribution is determined by Zt, not Zt. At pt = 0, dZt = dZt for
unskilled managers by (1.1).
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i.e., the survival time of surely unskilled managers for b1 first-order stochastically
dominates that for b2 , given 4t.
Proof of Corollary 3.3
Given the prior skill po fixed, the process of pt, conditional on survival, is independent
of A and b. The process of 4t does not depend on A, but does depend on b. Given
40 = 0,
4 (b)= (b - r14)du+ j qu (o-dW u+o-(-spdu+ dZu)) , Vt >0,JO JO
by (1.1). Hence, 4t(bi) first-order stochastically dominates 4t(b2 ) for all t > 0. In
addition, by Lemma 3.3, E(A1, bi) is a subset of E(A 2 , b2 ). Therefore, the probability
of an unskilled manager's survival for (A 1, bi) is higher than that for (A 2 , b2 ) at any
point of time.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Since b, > b2 , regardless of the values of A1 and A 2 , there exists p, such that hi(p) <
h2 (p) for all 0 < p < pE, where h(p) is defined by Proposition 3.1. Consider an
arbitrary small p,. The perceived skill p (the probability of being H-type) of unskilled
managers converges to 0 almost surely as their survival time grows to infinity. This
implies that there exists T such that for all s > T after entry, unskilled managers'
ps lies between p = 0 and p = p,, conditional on survival, with probability 1 - E for
an arbitrary small c, both for economy 1 and economy 2.
Now consider the following hypothetical exit rule: from T, unskilled managers exit
if their h, is smaller than h(p) for s = T + kAT for k = 1, 2, - -.. The hypothetical
exit rate is strictly lower than the true exit rate, because the true exit rule imposes
that unskilled managers exit if their j, is smaller than h(p) for all s > T,. Since the
CIR process is an ergodic process, for an arbitrarily small 6, there exists sufficiently
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large AT such that, under the hypothetical rule, for all k,
P(survival between T + (k - 1)AT and T + kAT)
= 1 _) 1 2, h(_ ) + (c) + O( + O(PS) 1 ,
F) (L2 02 h 0I
where -y is the lower incomplete gamma function, and P indicates probability under
the hypothetical exit rule. Therefore, under the hypothetical rule, for sufficiently
small c and p,, as T grows to infinity
P(survival between T, and T) (1 - 17 ( , h(0)) + 0(6) T
Therefore, under the hypothetical exit rule, the survival probability decreases expo-
nentially in time, where the exponent is
T log I 1- y (2b, , h2 (0)) + 0(6))
The actual survival rate is strictly lower than the hypothetical survival rate. Hence,
the actual survival probability asymptotically decreases exponentially or faster than
exponential functions as T becomes large. Since b1 > b2 , hi(0) < h2 (0), and the
asymptotic attrition rate (for large T) is strictly lower for b, than that for b2 . There-
fore, regardless of the survival probability at T, there exists T such that the survival
probability of unskilled managers for b1 is greater than that for b 2 for all s > T.
Proof of Corollary 3.4
V(0, 4) solves the following ODE:
( )V(0 ) 1 a2V(0, 4)(r + A)V(0, 4) = (f 4 - #) + '4 (b -TI4) + ' 4 (or + of)#
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The particular solution is
Vb(O (b 1 fb-
V6(,77 - + A --
and the homogeneous solution is
V Q(O, M r + A 2 b 2q C2 U r + A 2b 2,q
r7 O.2 + Or2 '.2 + Or2 1 0'.2 + Uz2 I .2 + UZ
where M(ai, a2 , x) is the Kummer's function, and U(ai, a2, X) is the Tricomi confluent
hypergeometric function. Note that ci and c2 are nonnegative because the particular
solution Vb(O, 4) is the hypothetical value of fee profits if the manager does not take
any action. The manager can always choose to exit, and V'(0, 4) represents the value
of the exit option.
For large #
and this implies that c1 = 0. For b > ++)k
V(0, 4) > 0 ,V ;> 0
This implies that c2  0, since c 2 > 0 suggests that lim 0o V(0, 7) - oc. Therefore,
for b> f+A i)
V(0, ) Vb(0,Q) f b + -# _0 >0, V4 >0.
This implies, since V(p, 4) is increasing in p and 4,
V(p) > 0, Vp > 0 , V4 > 0.
Therefore, the exit set E is empty, and no managers choose to exit.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
In the proof of Lemma 3.3,
V(p, 4; A, bi) V(p, 4; A 2, b2) (3.24)
is shown. By the definition (3.9) of p*, the following holds:
p*(A,, bi) p*(A 2 , b2 ) -
Suppose this is not the case, i.e., p, = p*(Ai, bi) > P2 = p*(A 2 , b2). Then
V(pi, 0; A1 , bi) = 'D = V(p 2 , 0; A 2 , b2 ) < V(pi, 0; A 2 , b2) ,
where the inequality comes from Corollary 3.1. This contradicts (3.24).
Therefore, p* is lower for (A 1 , bi) than for (A 2 , b2 ). By Proposition 3.2, prospective
managers with prior skill p C [p* 1] choose to enter the AM industry. The measure
of entries is given by G(1 - p*), where G(1 - p) f' F'(p')dp' and F(p) is the
cumulative distribution of the prior skill of prospective managers. Define g(x) =
G'(x) = F'(1 - x). Then the measure of entries of skilled managers and that of
unskilled managers are, respectively,
n = j p (1 - p)dp , nL = j(I - p)g(1 - p)dp./1 1
Since g(x) > 0 for all x E [0, 1], nH and nL are both decreasing in p*. p*(Ai, bi) <
p*(A 2 , b2) implies that
nH(Al, bi) > nH(A 2, b 2) , nL(Al, bl) nL(A 2 , b2 )
Therefore, the measure of entries, that of skilled managers and that of unskilled
managers all increase in A and b.
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Given p*, the portion of unskilled managers is lower than 1 - p*:
niL nL _ ( f -p)g(l-p)dp P 1 < 1- -*
n nL 'nH fg(1 - p)dp
When p* is lowered by an infinitesimal amount 6 p*, the portion of unskilled managers
among the marginally entering managers is 1 - p*. Therefore, lower p* leads to a
higher portion of unskilled managers among newly entering managers.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Consider an increase in A: A -+ A'. Suppose that the number N' of active managers
does not change in the new stationary equilibrium. This implies that
A' = A'h(N) > A , b'= bhb(N) =b ,
i.e., A increases and b is unchanged. By Proposition 3.5, the entry threshold p*
decreases, and by Lemma 3.3, the exit set E diminishes. Since changes in A does not
change the process of pt and 4t, there are more entries and less exits compared with
the stationary equilibrium for A. This contradicts the assumption that the number
of active managers does not change.
Now suppose that the number of managers increases such that A' is the same as
A. Denote this number by N". This implies
A' = A'hA(N") = A , b' = bhb(N") < b,
i.e., A is unchanged and b decreases. The entry threshold p* increases, and the exit
set E expands. The process of pt does not change, but the process of 4t(b') is first-
order stochastically dominated by 4t(b). Hence, there are less entries and more exits
compared with the stationary equilibrium for A. This contradicts the assumption
that N increases.
Therefore, in the new stationary equilibrium, N < N' < N" must be satisfied.
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Consequently, A' > A and b' < b in the stationary equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Consider an infinitesimal increase in A: A' = A + 6A where 6A > 0. Let p* be the
initial entry threshold and p' = p* + 6p be the entry threshold after the increase in
A, where the sign of 6p is not determined. Now assume the following hypothetical
entry rule: prospective managers whose perceived skill is above p* choose to enter.
This hypothetical entry rule is different from the actual entry rule under A' where
prospective managers whose perceived skill is above p' choose to enter. The parameter
values A and b at N* is
A = AhA(N*) > AhA(N*) , b = bhb(N*) . (3.25)
Assume the hypothetical exit rule where the exit set E(A, b) defined by (3.6) is charac-
terized by above A and b. Under the hypothetical entry and exit rules, the stationary
measure N of active managers is greater than N*:
N=N*+N, 6N>0,
because the hypothetical entry rule is the same as that for A, and the hypothetical
exit set E is strictly smaller than that for A. The parameter values A and b at N are
A = A(hA(N*) +h' (N*)6N) = AhA(N*) + 6AhA(N*)+ h' (N*)6 ,
b = b(hb(N*) + h'(N*)6N) = bhb(N*)+bh'(N*)6.
Since the entry threshold p*(A, b) is strictly decreasing in both A and b, there exist
CA > 0 and Cb > 0 such that
p*(AhA(N*), bhb(N*)) = p*(AhA(N*) + 6AhA(N*) - ACA6N , bh(N*) -bCO )
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Note that there are infinite numbers of (CA, Cb) that satisfies this condition. Given
Ih' (N*)I < CA and Ih'(N*) cb, p*(A, b), where A and b are determined under the
hypothetical entry and exit rule, is weakly lower than p*(AhA(N*), bhb(N*)).
Now, consider another hypothetical entry and exit rule: prospective managers
whose perceived skill is above p* choose to enter, and the exit rule is the same as the
actual exit rule for A'. Since the actual exit set E for A' is strictly greater than the
hypothetical exit set E(A, b) determined by (3.25), the new hypothetical measure N'
of active managers is strictly less than N. This implies
p*(AhA(N*), bhb(N*)) ;> p*(A hA(N), bhb(N)) > p*(Ah (N '), bhb (N')) .
This implies that the actual p' is strictly lower than p*, i.e., 6p < 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.5
When the exit set E is empty, no managers choose to exit. Therefore, in this case,
the number N of active mangers is determined by
N -G( - p*)
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where p* is the entry threshold, and G(-) is defined by (3.2). Since the number N of
active managers in the AM industry increases as A increases by Proposition 3.6, the
number of entries must increase as well. Therefore, p* decreases as A increases.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
Consider an increase in b: b --+ _'. Suppose that the number N' of active managers
does not change in the new stationary equilibrium. This implies that
A' = AhA(N) = A , b' = b'hb(N) > b,
i.e., A is unchanged and b increases. By Proposition 3.5, the entry threshold p* de-
creases, and by Lemma 3.3, the exit set E diminishes. Since an increase in b does not
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change the process of pt, but makes the process of 4t first-order stochastically domi-
nant, there are more entries and less exits compared with the stationary equilibrium
for b. This contradicts the assumption that N does not change.
Now suppose that the number of managers increases such that b' is the same as
b. Denote this number by N". This implies
A' AhA(N") < A , b' = b'hb(N") = b,
i.e., A decreases and b is unchanged. The entry threshold p* increases, and the exit
set E expands. The process of pt and t do not change. Hence, there are less entries
and more exits compared with the stationary equilibrium for b. This contradicts the
assumption that N increases.
Therefore, in the new stationary equilibrium, N < N' < N" must be satisfied.
Consequently, A' < A and b' > b in the stationary equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.9
Consider an infinitesimal increase in b: b' = b + b where b > 0. Let p* be the
initial entry threshold and p' = p* + 6p be the entry threshold after the increase in
b, where the sign of 6p is not determined. Now assume the following hypothetical
entry rule: prospective managers whose perceived skill is above p* choose to enter.
This hypothetical entry rule is different from the actual entry rule under b' where
prospective managers whose perceived skill is above p' choose to enter. The parameter
values A and b at N* is
A = AhA(N*) , b = b'hb(N*) > bhb(N*) . (3.26)
Assume the hypothetical exit rule where the exit set E(A, b) defined by (3.6) is charac-
terized by above A and b. Under the hypothetical entry and exit rules, the stationary
measure N of active managers is greater than N*:
N = N* + 6N, c5 > 0,
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because the hypothetical entry rule is the same as that for b, and the hypothetical
exit set E is strictly smaller than that for b. The parameter values A and b at N are
A A(hA(N*) + h' (N*)6N) = AhA(N*) + Ah'(N*)6N,
b = bI(hb(N*) + h' (N*)6N) = bh(N*)+ I~hb(N*) b1'(N*)6N.
Since the entry threshold p*(A, b) is strictly decreasing in both A and b, there exist
cA > 0 and Cb > 0 such that
P= p*(AhA(N*), bhb(N*)) = p*(AhA(N*) - ACA6N, bhb(N*) + 6bhb(N*) - bcb6N).
Note that there are infinite numbers of (CA, Cb) that satisfies this condition. Given
Ih' (N*)I c: 4 and h'(N*)I Cb, p*(A, b), where A and b are determined under the
hypothetical entry and exit rule, is weakly lower than p*(AhA(N*), bhb(N*)).
Now, consider another hypothetical entry and exit rule: prospective managers
whose perceived skill is above p* choose to enter, and the exit rule is the same as the
actual exit rule for I. Since the actual exit set E for I' is strictly greater than the
hypothetical exit set E(A, b) determined by (3.26), the new hypothetical measure N'
of active managers is strictly less than N. This implies
p*(AhA(N*), bhb(N*)) > p*(AhA(N) Iblhb(N)) > p*(Ah (N'), bhb(N'))
This implies that the actual p' is strictly lower than p*, i.e., 6p < 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.6
When the exit set E is empty, no managers choose to exit. Therefore, in this case,
the number N of active mangers is determined by
N- G(1 - p*)
77
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where p* is the entry threshold, and G(-) is defined by (3.2). Since the number N of
active managers in the AM industry increases as b increases by Proposition 3.8, the
number of entries must increase as well. Therefore, p* decreases as b increases.
Proof of Proposition 3.10
By the definition (3.9) of entry threshold p*, p*(D) is a strictly increasing function
of (D from Corollary 3.1, given A and b fixed. Consider an increase in (D: (D -+ 4'.
Suppose that the number N' of active managers does not change in the new stationary
equilibrium. This implies that both A and b are unchanged as the entry cost increases.
However, if this is the case, p*(V) > p*( 4 ): the number of entries is smaller than
that of the stationary equilibrium before the change of 4). On the other hand, the
exit threshold is unchanged, since A and b are not changed. This contradicts the
assumption that the number of active managers does not change.
Now suppose that the number N' of active managers decreases such that the entry
threshold does not change. Denote this number of managers by N", which is smaller
than N. This implies
p*(4'; A', b') = p*( 4 ); A, b) , A' = AhA (N") > A , b' = bhb (N") > b .
Hence, the number of entries is the same as that of the stationary equilibrium for
4 , but the number of exits is smaller: the exit set E defined by (3.6) diminishes by
Lemma 3.3. This contradicts the assumption that N" is smaller than N.
Therefore, the number N' of active managers in the industry satisfies N" < N' <
N. As a result, A and b increases, and p* increases.
Proof of Proposition 3.11
Suppose that N = N2 . This implies that A1 = A 2 and b, = b 2 , which also implies
that p* = p*. By proposition 3.2, the measure G(1 - p*) of new managers enter the
AM industry per time. Since G2(1 - p*) < G1(1 - p*), there are more entries to the
first stationary equilibrium than there are to the second stationary equilibrium. Since
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the exit set E is the same for both equilibria, the exit rate is higher for the second
stationary equilibrium. This contradicts the assumption that N, = N2 .
Therefore, N, > N2 , and
A1 = AhA(N1) <AhA(N 2 ) =A 2 , b1=bhb(N1) <bhb(N2) = b2 -
By proposition 3.5, p* > pg*
Proof of Proposition 3.12
Consider the following map N(N) : R>o -+ R>O: take N as the number of active
managers that determines A and b, and taken those A(N) and b(N) as given, compute
the stationary number N of managers. A fixed point N* of the map N = N(N)
determines a stationary equilibrium.
To be more explicit, for N, A(N) and b(N) are determined by
A(N) = AhA(N) , b(N) = bhb(N) .
Entry decisions of prospective managers for A(N) and b(N) are given by Proposition
3.2. Existing managers exit exogenously with rate A, or endogenously choose to exit
once they reach the exit threshold q = h(p) defined by Proposition 3.1, given A(N)
and b(N). The entry and exit decisions, taken A(N) and b(N) as given, pin down the
stationary number (measure) N of managers. If N = N, N is a stationary equilibrium
number of active managers in the AM industry.
N(N) is a decreasing function in N, since A(N) and b(N) are decreasing in N.
Lemma 3.3 suggests that the exit set E diminishes in A and b, and Proposition 3.5
implies that p* decreases in A and b. Therefore, as N increases, there are more exits
and less entries, and the stationary number N decreases. Note that N is continuous
in N, since an infinitesimal change of N leads to infinitesimal decreases of A and b
and, consequently, N decreases infinitesimally as well. The condition (3.5) implies
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that
lim N (N) -+ oo lim N (N) = 0.
N-O N-+oo
The continuity of N(N) guarantees the existence of a fixed point: N* = N = 9(N).
Therefore, there exists a stationary equilibrium.
The uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium can be shown straightforwardly from
the strict monotonicity of N(N). In order to show that N(N) is strictly decreasing
in N, it suffices to show that p* is strictly increasing in N10. For N, > N2, A, =
A(N1) < A 2 = A(N 2 ) and b1 = b(N1) < b2= b(N2 ). For all p > pe(A,, bi), where
pe is given by (3.8),
T D
V(p, 0; A 2, b2) = E eT u (max{puA 2, fJs(b2)} - #) du PO = p, 4o = 0
T D
> V(p, 0; A, b,) = E J e-ru (max{puA,, f 4u(bi)} - #) du po = p, 4o = 0 ]
since 4,(b2) first-order stochastically dominates 4t(bi). Since p* is determined by (3.9)
p*(A 2 , b2 ) < p*(A,, bi) .
Hence, p* is strictly increasing in N. The exit set E expands in N, and the process of
4t becomes first-order stochastically dominated as N increases. Therefore, N(N) is
strictly decreasing in N, which proves the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3.4
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. Vh(p) is the fixed point
of the following map:
Tf(p) = max {(pAh - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f (p')Ip], 0}
10The exit set E cannot be strictly expanding for the entire range of N, since the set becomes
empty for a sufficiently small N.
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where
p'p = p+ sp(1 - p)dZ ,
where Z is a standard Brownian motion. The contraction mapping theorem guaran-
tees that
Vh(p) = lim T kf(P)k-+oo
for an arbitrary function f(p). Suppose that f(p) is an (weakly) increasing function
in p. For p, < p2, E[f(p')p1] E[f(p')p 21, since P'1P2 first-order stochastically
dominates p'Ipi asymptotically as dt -+ 0. As a result, Tff(pl) : Tf(p2). Hence, T
maps an increasing function to an increasing function. Since f(p) is increasing, Vh(p)
is increasing as well.
Now suppose that f(p) is (weakly) convex. For an arbitrary point p, define
P=P- 6 P, P2=P+ 6 P,
where the order of magnitude of 6p is set to be the same as or smaller than that of
dt. If f(p) is (locally) strictly convex at p, i.e., 0 2 fP > 0,
1 1 12f(p
2E [f(p')Ip1] + 21E [f(P')|P21 - E [f(p')|p] = 2 2 +0(6p 2dt) > 0 .
and if f(p) is (locally) flat at p, i.e., a2f(p)= 0,
1 E [f(p')|p1] + E f(P')|P2] - E [f(p')|p] = 0O(6p2V 3 )2 2
In the continuous-time limit, terms of the order dt (or lower) dominate. Hence,
E [f(p') Ip] is convex. As a result,
(pAh - #) dt + (1 - rdt - Adt)E [f(p')| p]
is convex and, consequently, Tf(p) is convex since taking the pointwise maximum
of two functions preserves convexity. Since the map T preserves convexity, Vh(p) =
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limk,, Tkf(p) is convex.
Proof of Lemma 3.5
If p*, does not exist in a stationary equilibrium, this implies
Vm(p, 0) < <b4, Vp ,
in which case there are no entries to mutual fund markets, or
Vm(p, 0) > <D , VP ,
in which case there are infinite entries to mutual fund markets by (3.5).
contradict a stationary equilibrium.
If p* does not exist in a stationary equilibrium, this implies
Vh(p) < ( ,
These
VP ,
which contradict a stationary equilibrium.
If Vm(p, 0) dominates Vh(p), there are no entries to hedge fund markets. If Vh(p)
dominates Vm(p), there are no entries to mutual fund markets. Both of these contra-
dict a stationary equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.15
Suppose that Ah < A,,. Fee profit rates for mutual funds are
max{pt Am, f qt} - ,
and fee profit rates for hedge funds are
ptAh - q5-
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Since the process of pt is the same for hedge funds and mutual funds, given the
same po = p, fee profits for mutual funds strictly dominate those for hedge funds.
Therefore, Vm(p,0) dominates Vh(p), which contradicts a stationary equilibrium by
Lemma 3.5.
Proof of Lemma 3.6
The sensitivity of the hedge fund entry value to p can be easily computed from the
closed form of the value of hedge fund fee profits:
Va~p) I (pA -$)+c -- - 1+
Vh() 1 - + -1-" -- 1+ 1+A
(phA)+h 1  i-p
h(P) - Ah Clf1~- h
and
Ah
Since Vh(p) is convex, Vh(p) increases in p.
The sensitivity of the mutual fund entry value to p is not easy to compute since
Vm1 (p, 0) does not take a closed form. For p > pm, Vm(p, 0) can be decomposed as
follows:
Vm(p, 0) = (pAm + V(p, 0)
where Vm(p, 0) satisfies
(r + A)V.(p, 0) = i 2V )2p,  2( _ )2 + V(, 0)b2 8p2  sp(p)+ .
Therefore,
8Vm(1, 0) Am + 2 V(1, 0)b
ap r + A apad
Now I show that ap94V,,(1, 0) < 0. First note that
ap adVm(p, 0) = 09Pv ( p, 0).
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Since 4, for s > t is independent of pt,
pVm(1, 0) a TDap it'r
= E je-rA)Aml{Am>fs.}ds]
since ps = 1 for s > t given pt = 1. As a result,
a4aPVm(1,0) = E 00 e-(r+A)sAmI{Am>fqs}ds
(9qtit
Am
-AmE e-(r+A)s a4 qs
>0 , Vs > t ,
and strictly positive for finite s.
result,
Note that 6(-) is the Dirac delta function.
9Vm(1,0) Am
ap r+A
As a
Since Vm(p, 0) is convex by Corollary 3.1,
avm(p, 0) <aVm(1, 0) Am
ap - ap r + A
Ah
r + A
Therefore, the sensitivity of the mutual fund entry value to p is strictly lower than
Am
Proof of Lemma 3.7
Since p defined by (3.14) is a monotone decreasing function of s, s < 9 is equivalent
to p > ft where
8(r + A)
S= 1 -2
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~" (max{pAm, fe 8} - #) ds p = 1, 't = 0]
because
ds] < 0 ,
p* is determined by the following condition:
p *Ah - c
r +A cIP h* Ph
where c1 is defined by (3.16). In the limit y -+ oc, i.e., s -+ 0,
*,00 (r + A)4+#
Ph* 
-+Ph Ah
p* can be decomposed as follows:
phr = p* + 6P*() W
Then, for sufficiently large ji, 6p* (/) is determined by
0 6ph()+ 2# 1
r+A r+AP+1
(r +A)( +# 0
kj-1i
h-(r + A) -
Ah -
x (1 +
Ah A
which can be approximated as
6P*(Y) 1 20 1 - (
( -t A
x Ah - r+ A)4 --
Ah -#0
Ah (r + A)4) +
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(r +A)<b + *(Y
Ah P
For large p-t, Vh'(p*) reads
Ah ph + 
_Ph
r+A Ph l-Ph
AhP Phq ~'0 _
Ah~ ~ 2__ _ _ __ _ _
A h 2 # p *"' + P - M - I )
r + A  + A p+ WO*O +1)
A - # #X i 4-
* + A (r + A)p*'O (r + A)<D + #
(/Ah
Ph
Ah -(r + A4 -
Ah - 0
Hence, V,,(p*) is strictly decreasing in pu for large p, and
ur ,(P*t) Ah Am
r+A r A
by Proposition 3.15. Therefore, there exists - such that for p > [t
Am
V'(P*; P) > Ah r+A
This implies that there exists 9 such that, for all s < S,
Am
V (P*; s) > A
Proof of Proposition 3.16
I first show that p* < p*.
implies
Suppose that this is not the case, i.e., p* > ps. This
Sn = V(P*) is V(P*, 0)
Since V(-) is convex, for p > p*
&Vm(p, 0)
>p
where the second inequality comes from Lemma 3.6. Combining the two relations,
for p > p
Vh(P) > V.(p,0),
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V,/(pt,)
1 - P*'5/A
1 l#Ah
V'(P) > A
which contradicts the stationary equilibrium by Lemma 3.5. Therefore, p* < p*, and
this implies
<D = Vh (Ph* < m.(P* ,0) -
Now, I show that there exists p* < < 1 such that
Vh() = Vm(, 0).
Suppose there does not exist such P. Since <) = Vh
for all p > pi*)
(p*) < Vm(P*, 0), this implies that,
Vh(p) < Vm(p, 0) ,
which contradicts the stationary equilibrium by
p* <j3 < 1 where
Lemma 3.5. Therefore, there exists
Vh() = Vm(A, 0).
Next I show that P is unique and
Vm(P,0) -Vh (P) { > 0
< 0
, ifp>p
7ifp~
The uniqueness of P is straightforward from
, Am, DVm( p 0)V '(P) > At> a" I0r + A Op
for p > p*. Since the slope of Vh(p) is strictly greater than the slope of Vm(p, 0) for
p > ph , once those two functions cross, they never cross again. The continuity of
Vh(p) and Vm(p, 0) guarantees that Vh(p) < Vm,(p, 0) for p <j3, and Vh(p) > Vm(p, 0)
for p > P. Consequently, prospective managers with p E (p*1, ) enter mutual fund
markets, and prospective managers with p G (P, 1] enter hedge fund markets.
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Proof of Proposition 3.17
Given that Em is empty, no mutual fund managers choose to exit. On the other hand,
the hedge fund exit set Eh defined in (3.15) is always nonempty. These together imply
that there exists 0 < P < 1 such that
Vm(p, 0) > Vh(p), Vp C [0,j3),
and for an arbitrary small 6p > 0
Vm(j+6p,0) < V(P + 6p),
by Lemma 3.5. Next I show that
Vm(P, 0) < Vh(P) Vp E(,1]
Since Vm,(p, 0) and Vh(p) are smooth,
V '(P) > ppVm (P, 0)
In order to proceed, I first need to show that
4 apVm(p, 4) < 0 . (3.27)
Since 4, for s > t is independent of pt,
OpVm(p, 4) = 9 E [JTD ers (max{psAm, f 4s} - #) ds
Jpt e
= E -r ps Amljp Am;,>fq.,ds .
Note that TD is independent of the change in pt"1 , since the mutual fund exit set Em
"
1This property is crucial to prove that adDpVm (p, q) is nonpositive.
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is empty. As a result,
aoapVm(p, 4) S E[ TD -rs Am11ps.lA.>fd s
-qt e ampt m~Ijds
-AmE [JD Crs aPs a~sapt 094e psAtm
f )
ds] <0
where 6(-) is the Dirac delta function. The sign of 49 OpVm(p, e) comes from
> 0 > 0 Vs > t .
Now decompose Vm(p, 0) as follows:
Vm(p, 0) = V (p, 0) + V"(p, 0) ,
where
pA pAV, m
r+ A
and V4 (p, 0) solves
(r + A)V",(p, 0) = 1 m
2 V (p,0) S2p2
2 ( 2 2 P)
2  +V'(p, 0)b
_ ,32+ b
Note that (3.27) implies
9P 4 Vm(p, 0) = 8(94V,(p, 0) ; 0,
i.e., av?(pO) is decreasing in p.
Define
Vm(p, 0) = + Cmo +
where cm,O and cm,1 are chosen such that
Vm(P, 0) = Vm(3, 0), aPVm(P, 0) = 9PVm(P, 0) .
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(3.28)
Cm 77 L, 1 NP / - Pi+
I first need to show that
b aVm (P,0)
'r+A a q
Suppose that this is not the case, i.e., cm,o > b av (O). For p' = j + 6p with an
arbitrary small 6p,
DpVm(p', 0) - DpVm(P, 0) =
2
s2p2 (1 - p)2
2
s2P2(1 - p) 2
[Vm(P'
[17m (p,
0)
I 2Vm(p,0)dp
p d
_ pAm b V (p,0)
r +TA r +A a94 jd
0) pAm -cm, 1O dp
r + A = ap8m(p' 0) - DpEm(p, 0) ,
because of (3.28).
Vm(p', 0),
Since the first-order derivative of Vm(p', 0) dominates that of
Vm(p', 0) > Vm(p', 0) .
A similar argument shows that
An-+ b aVm(1,0)
r+ A r+ A a4
> Vm(1,0)
which is a contradiction since b av.(1,0) < b aV, (AO) < Cm, 0 .r+A aq~ - rA a
b WVg(3,0)
r+A aq
Therefore, CmO <
Now I can prove that for all p > 3,
Vm(p, 0) > Vm(p,0), &pVm(p, 0) > ePVm(p, 0) .
For p'= 7+ 6p with an arbitrary small 6p,
&pVm(p', 0) - 9pVm( ,0) = I p'2 Vm(p,0)dp
2
S2 p2(1 - p) 2
2
s2p2(1 - p) 2
[Vm(p, 0)
[rm(p, 0)
pAM b 
-v(p,0) dp
r + A r + A a4
pAm 
-
r + A CmO dp = am(p', 0) - pfm(p, 0) ,
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>1?
Am 
-$
r+ Cm,O
r+ A
(3.29)
=jp
jp'
<
where the equality holds if "V4(pO) is constant over p E [jp'). Otherwise, the strict
inequality holds. This implies that Vm(p', 0) < Vm(p', 0). Suppose that (3.29) is
violated. Then, from the continuity of V,,(p, 0) and Vm(p, 0), there must exist p" c
(j, 1) such that
Vm(p", 0) Im(p", 0) , DpVm(p", 0) = Dpm(P" , 0) ,
and for an arbitrary small 6p > 0
DpV(p" +6p,0) > pf(p" +6p,0).
Suppose that there exists such p". Then one can construct
pAM - 0
V' (r +) = + C'm~ 'm0 (P )y-M e 1 -P
such that
Vm(p", 0) =VI(p",0) , pVm(p",0) = apvm(p",o) = pv4'(p", 0).
This implies that c' <,0 c m,o and
shows that
C' = Cm,1. A similar argument to that of Vm(p, 0)
8 pVm(p" + P, 0) ap' (p" +6p, 0) = pm(p" + 6p, 0),
which contradicts the existence of p". Therefore, for all p > 7,
Vm(p, 0) > Vm(p,0)1 DpVm(pO) > DpVm(p, 0).
Finally, I show that
Vm(p,0)<Vh(p), VpE(p, 1.
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Denote
g(p) = V/1 - P < 0.
Note that g'(p) > 0. Suppose that c1 > cm,. Since
Ah AmV(3) =r + cig( ) > apVm( (, 0) = 9Pm(, 0) Am + cmig()
the following holds for all p > P:
Ah Am
( P) A + A + cmg(p) =apm( p,0).
Now suppose that cl < cm,l. It is straightforward that V,(p) is (strictly) greater than
9p m(p, 0) for all p > P. Therefore, since V(P) = Vm(i, 0),
Vh(p) > Vm(p, 0) > Vm(p, 0),
for all p > 3.
Proof of Corollary 3.7
The mutual fund exit set Em is empty in the limit of # - 0, but the hedge fund
exit set Eh is nonempty. Since p = 0 is always included in Eh, unskilled hedge fund
managers choose to exit once they reach ph, which converges to zero in the limit of
# -9 0. Therefore, hedge funds exit at a higher rate than mutual funds do.
Proof of Proposition 3.18
Consider a map N(Nm, Nh) = (Nm, Nh) : R2 -> Ri. The map takes the numbers
Nm and Nh for the values of Am(Nm), b(Nm) and Ah(Nh), and computes the stationary
numbers Nm and Nh of mutual fund managers and hedge fund managers, respectively.
A fixed point N* = (N,*, N*) of the map (Nm, Nh) = N(Nm, Nh) determines a
stationary equilibrium.
Compared with the proof of Proposition 3.12, it is much more tricky to show the
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existence and the uniqueness of a fixed point of a two-dimensional map than that of
a single-dimensional map. In order to address this issue, the proof consists of two
steps: first, I define a map that reduces the dimensionality of the map N(Nm,, Nh),
and next, I show the existence and the uniqueness of a fixed point of the reduced
map. A fixed point of the reduced map solves for a fixed point of N(Nm, Nh), and
vice versa.
Define a map Nm(Nm; Nh) : R>o - R>o. The map regards Nh as an exogenous
parameter, and uses the value for computing Ah(Nh) and, consequently, Vh(p). For
each Nm, the map takes the value of Nm to compute Am(Nm) and b(Nm). Then,
the map computes the stationary number Nm of mutual fund managers as a func-
tion of Nm. I first show that a fixed point of this map Nm(Nm; Nh) exists and
it is unique, given Nh. Proposition 3.16 proves that, if there exists P such that
Vm(, 0) = Vh(P), Vm(p, 0) > Vh(p) for p < P and Vm(p, 0) < Vh(p) for p > P. Since
P changes continuously as Nm changes, entry decisions are continuous in Nm. Since
Vm(0,0) > Vh(0), P exists as long as Vm(1,0) < V (1). If Nm is sufficiently large,
Vm(P, 0) < <D and there are no entries to mutual fund markets, i.e., Nm is zero. If
Nm is sufficiently small, Vm(p, 0) > Vh(p, 0) for all p, and all entries are into mutual
fund markets. As Nm goes to zero, Nm diverges to infinity from (3.3). Therefore,
from the continuity of m(N,; Nh), there exists a fixed point N,*(N) satisfying
N,*(Nh) = Nm(N**(Nh); Nh). The uniqueness of the fixed point comes from the
strict monotonicity of Nm(Nm; Nh) for Nm > 0.
Now define a map Nh(Nh) : R>o -+ R>o. The map is defined by
Nh(Nh) Nh (N,*(Nh), Nh),
where N,;*(Nh) is the fixed point of Nm = Nm(Nm; Nh). In other words, Nh(Nh)
computes the stationary number of hedge fund managers taking Nh and N*:*(N) as
given. Note that N**(Nh) is continuous in Nh, which can be proven by the continuity
of entry decisions in Nm. If Nh is sufficiently large, there are no entries to hedge
fund markets and N is zero. In contrast, if Nh goes to zero, N,, diverges to infinity.
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The continuity of N**(Nh) implies the continuity of Nh(Nh) and, hence, there exists
a fixed point Nt* = Nh(N*). Then, N**(N**) and N* jointly solve
(N; N*(N** ), N** ) = ( N** ( N** ), N** ).
Therefore, there exists a stationary equilibrium.
The proof of the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium requires several steps.
Denote the stationary measure of mutual fund managers and hedge funds managers
in a stationary equilibrium by N* = (N*,, Na). Suppose that there exists another
stationary equilibrium, and denote the stationary measure of mutual fund managers
and hedge fund managers by Nt = (Nt, Nt). There are four possible cases:
1.N*>Nt N*N , 2. N* Nt , N, * < N
M h- h m- m - h,
3. N* Nt N* Nt , 4. N*< Nt , N* Nt
where N* # Nt.
In case 1,
Am(N*,) : Am(Nmt) ,b(N*,) b(Nt) Ah(Nh) < h(Nt),
with at least one strict inequality. This implies that there must be more entries to
one type of the AM markets for the stationary equilibrium with Nt than entries to
the same type for the stationary equilibrium with N*. This implication contradicts
N*, > Nt or Nj > Nt. A similar argument excludes case 2.
m h'
In case 3,
Am(N*,) :Am(Nt) , b(N*,) &b(Nt) , Ah(Nh*) ?Ah(N )
with at least one strict inequality. This implies that there must be more entries to
mutual fund markets for the stationary equilibrium with Nt than entries to mutual
fund markets for the stationary equilibrium with N*. This implication contradicts
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N* ;> Nmt. A similar argument excludes case 4.
Therefore, since Nt # N* is not consistent with a stationary equilibrium, the
stationary equilibrium for N* is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.19
Consider a map N(Nm, Nh) = (Nm, Nh) :RO -+ R 0. The map takes the numbers
Nm and Nh for the values of Am(Nm), b(Nm) and Ah(Nh), and computes the stationary
numbers Nm and Nh of mutual fund managers and hedge fund managers, respectively.
A fixed point N* = (N*, N) of the map (Nm, Nh) = N(Nm, Nh) determines a
stationary equilibrium.
Define a map Nm(Nm; Nh) : R>o -*I RIo. The map regards Nh as an exogenous
parameter, and uses the value for computing Ah(Nh) and, consequently, Vh(p). For
each Nm, the map takes the value of Nm to compute Am(Nm) and b(Nm). Then,
the map computes the stationary number Nm of mutual fund managers as a func-
tion of Nm. I first show that a fixed point of this map Nm(Nm; Nh) exists and
it is unique, given Nh. Proposition 3.17 proves that, if there exists P such that
V.(,0) = V(P), Vm(p,0) > Vh(p) for p < P and Vm(p,0) < Vh(p) for p > P. Since
P changes continuously as Nm changes, entry decisions are continuous in Nm. Since
Vm(0, 0) > Vh(0), P exists as long as Vm(1, 0) < Vh(1). If Nm is sufficiently large,
Vm( 3P, 0) < <b and there are no entries to mutual fund markets, i.e., Nm is zero. If
Nm is sufficiently small, Vm(p, 0) > Vh(p, 0) for all p, and all entries are into mutual
fund markets. As Nm goes to zero, &, diverges to infinity from (3.3). Therefore,
from the continuity of N,(Nm; Nh), there exists a fixed point N**(Nh) satisfying
N,*(Nh) = N(N*:*(Nh); Nh). The uniqueness of the fixed point comes from the
strict monotonicity of m(Nm; Nh) for N, > 0.
Now define a map Nh(Nh) : R>O - R>O. The map is defined by
Nh(Nh) - Nh(N*m*(Nh), Nh),
where N*(Nh) is the fixed point of Nm = Nm(Nm; Nh). In other words, Nh(Nh)
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computes the stationary number of hedge fund managers taking Nh and N**(N) as
given. Note that N;*(Nh) is continuous in Nh, which can be proven by the continuity
of entry decisions in N,. If N is sufficiently large, there are no entries to hedge
fund markets and &h is zero. In contrast, if Nh goes to zero, N diverges to infinity.
The continuity of N,*(Nh) implies the continuity of Nh(Nh) and, hence, there exists
a fixed point N * = R&(N*). Then, N*,(N*) and N** jointly solve
(N;*(N**), N**) = N(N**(N**), N**).
Therefore, there exists a stationary equilibrium.
The proof of the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium requires several steps.
Denote the stationary measure of mutual fund managers and hedge funds managers
in a stationary equilibrium by N* = (N,, Na). Suppose that there exists another
stationary equilibrium, and denote the stationary measure of mutual fund managers
and hedge fund managers by Nt = (Nt, Nt). There are four possible cases:
1. N* > Nt N* > Nt 2. N*< : Nt N* <Ntm- m h- h m- M h - h 7
3. N*> Nt N*< Nt , 4. N,*, N t N* >Nt
where N* 5 Nt.
In case 1,
Am(N*,) < Ant(Ntt), b(N*,) < b(NtJ A (Nh) :! h (Nt),
with at least one strict inequality. This implies that there must be more entries to
one type of the AM markets for the stationary equilibrium with Nt than entries to
the same type for the stationary equilibrium with N*. This implication contradicts
N >, Nt or Nh > Nt A similar argument excludes case 2.
In case 3,
Am(N*,) < Am(Nt) ,b(N7*,) < b(Nmt) ,Ah(Na*) > Ah(N t
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with at least one strict inequality. This implies that there must be more entries to
mutual fund markets for the stationary equilibrium with Nt than entries to mutual
fund markets for the stationary equilibrium with N*. This implication contradicts
N* ;> Nt. A similar argument excludes case 4.
Therefore, since Nt h N* is not consistent with a stationary equilibrium, the
stationary equilibrium for N* is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.20
Given f and nontrivial 0(-), i.e., 0(-) is not uniformly zero, the net alpha is
Et [drex] = JtAdt - fdt - Et [4(drex)]
qt
Rational investors provide capital until the net alpha becomes zero. If the net alpha
becomes negative, rational investors withdraw their capital and do not invest in the
fund. If rational investors invest in the fund,
ptAdt ptA
Et [dr|x] = - - fdt - Et [4(dr X)] = 0 <- i=
because dr'x is symmetric and mean-zero and, as a result, Et [4i(dr x)] = 0. On
the other hand, if the amount 4t of naive money exceeds the size 2, the net alpha
becomes negative, which implies
Et [drex] < 0 <-= Et [4(drex)] < 0,
since the conditional distribution of drex has a negative mean and is symmetric about
the mean.
Then, the expected fee revenues between t and t + dt at time t is
Et max , It (f dt + (drex)) A p Adt
f 4t (f dt + Et [4(drex)]) < 4tf dt ,t > L-t^
Therefore, the conditional expectation of fee revenues at time t is smaller for any
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nontrivial 0(-) than for uniformly zero 0(-). At entry, a manager make choices in
order to maximize the discounted fee profits
f~/4)T D ert ma 1 ptll(ij (f dt + V/4drx)) - O5dt)V = max E e* max ,I 4 t + dr'--df,o(-),TD [0f
TD 
- ~
= max E er Et max{j , 4t (f dt + 0(drex)) - #dt)]f,,O(-),TD [01 f I
where the second inequality comes from the law of iterated expectations. For any
choice of f and TD, because the dynamics of 4t does not depend on the choice of V(-),
the manager is better off by choosing 0(-) = 0, i.e., flat fees.
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